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Abstract
This thesis focuses on Space Communications and combines engineering, economics, market,
and policy analyses to identify challenges and opportunities in the industry that are beyond the
scope of any one isolated discipline.
This work is divided in two parts. The first part begins by discussing the background of the
communications satellite industry, its value-chain, service applications, history and evolution, and
then explores two questions of significant importance to the survival and sustained growth of this
industry: 1) are satellite communications solutions competing or complementary alternatives to
terrestrial networks-in what context and for what service applications? And 2) what are the
characteristics of the regulatory and policy environments and how do they affect the satellite
communications industry? In order to address the first question, a framework to analyze the
tradeoffs associated with satellite versus terrestrial solutions is developed around three axes: type
of solution, service application, and geographic market. It is then argued that satellite solutions
and terrestrial networks have a dual character: they are simultaneously competing and
complementary technologies. The case is made that satellite solutions have important competitive
advantages for voice and data transmission in rural markets and urban areas where terrestrial
networks are not available. It is found that consumer video applications represent the most
dynamic market with the highest potential of growth for satellite operators. Then, to assess the
impact of the regulatory and policy environments, two key regulatory issues are discussed:
spectrum/orbit allocation and spacecraft disposal. First, major conflicting issues in frequency
bandwidth allocation are discussed. Second, it is argued that there is a critical need to enforce
space debris regulations, even though such regulations would have short-term negative financial
implications for satellite operators. The case is made that a single collision in geostationary orbit
(GEO) is likely to create a cascading debris field that can impact the entire fleet of spacecraft in
GEO, resulting in significant loss of satellite communications services. In addition, it is found
that the U.S. space communications policy is highly flexible, while on the European side there is
a need to consolidate and further ease the regulatory environment in order to promote
competition. It is argued that more international cooperation in regulatory issues is desirable.
The second part of this thesis focuses on the lifeblood of the satellite industry: the satellite
itself (as opposed to the industry-context explored in Part 1). In particular, part II explores issues
associated with satellite design lifetime. Qualitative arguments are presented for reducing or
extending a spacecraft design lifetime, as seen from different stakeholders' perspectives (the
manufacturer, the customer, and society at large). Quantitative analyses are then conducted from
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an operator's perspective, and preliminary results indicate that optimal design lifetimes do exist
that maximize a satellite financial/value metric. These results disprove the traditional assumption
that satellite operators (customers) are always better off acquiring spacecraft designed for the
maximum technically achievable lifetime. Additionally, it is argued that design lifetime is a
powerful lever that can impact the market size as well as the financials of the key players in the
space sector. Overall, it is shown that the specification of a system's design lifetime requires
much more attention than it has received so far in the literature, as it can impact an entire industry
value chain.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Joseph H. Saleh
Executive Director, Ford-MIT Alliance
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"For the advent of communications satellites will mean the end
of the present barriers to the free flow of information; no
dictatorship can build a wall high enough to stop its citizens
listening to the voices from the stars. It would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to jam satellite broadcasts [...]"
The influence of satellite communications "will be like that of
air transport, though on a much larger scale and affecting
whole nations rather than a relatively few favored individuals.
The inexorable force of astronomical facts will destroy the
political fantasies that have so long fragmented our planet. For
when all major artistic productions, entertainments, political
and news events can be viewed simultaneously by the whole
world, the parochialism and xenophobia of the past will be
unable to survive."
Adapted from Arthur C. Clarke. VoicesJfom the Sky. 1962
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Introduction
1.1. Background and Motivation
Technological advances in two major fields in the twentieth century changed the way people live:
transportation and communications.' Before the proliferation of the automobile, people traveled
on foot or by horse. A trip of 100 kilometers was an adventure. Prior to the invention of the
telegraph and the telephone, people had to travel in order to communicate with someone in a
different urban area. Traveling was onerous and could required days or weeks. The airplane
provided us with an incredible mobility that nowadays is often taken for granted, but was
unimaginable just a century ago. In addition, the development of advanced telecommunication
technologies has made it possible to communicate with virtually anyone, anywhere, at anytime.
Artificial Earth satellites have been used for more than 40 years and satellite communications
form today a unique part of our every-day life, serving billions of people and granting access to a
vast range of voice, data and video telecommunication applications.
At the beginning of the commercial space era, satellites were designed to deliver long-distance
telephony services.2 Since then, new satellite technologies have emerged, and today a variety of
spacecraft is capable of providing diverse service applications to various types of end-users with
different communication needs. As a result, several industries have developed around satellite
communications. In fact, the entire space enterprise value-chain has become a key foundation of
the economy and one of the engines of economic growth and development. In the United States,
for instance, the aerospace industry generated in 2003 the largest positive trade balance of any
manufacturing sector. This represented over 15 percent of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) and translated into a total of over 15 million high quality jobs.3 In addition, the enabling
technologies generated by the space-based communications industries, such as overnight parcel
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delivery and just-in-time manufacturing, literally have an impact on almost all aspects of our
daily living.
Within the commercial space sector, three central stakeholders are directly related to the satellite
communications industry, namely: the satellite manufacturers, the launch service providers, and
the satellite operators (also called satellite services providers). In addition to these three main
stakeholders, there is a significant number of industries and institutions indirectly related to the
space-based communications industry. The entire space enterprise value-chain includes suppliers
of equipment, engine manufacturers, government agencies, regulatory bodies, banks and
investment organizations, insurance companies, and of course, the different types of end-users
(i.e., the satellite operators' customers), namely telecom operators, TV and radio broadcasters,
government organizations, corporate users, and others. Figure 1.1 provides a comprehensive view
of the entire space enterprise value-chain.
Figure 1.1: Comprehensive view of the entire space enterprise value-chain
(Adapted from Euroconsult)
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1.2. Thesis objectives
As stated above, satellite operators are major stakeholders (probably the most important ones,
since they provide the service itself) within the satellite communications industry. The main
objective of this work is to provide a comprehensive perspective on the space-based
communications industry including the analysis of challenges and opportunities in the market,
policy and regulatory environment, as well as linking engineering considerations to
business/strategic issues. This thesis focuses on the key stakeholders of the satellite
communications industry, i.e., satellite service providers. Yet, it also provides noteworthy
insights on the dynamics of the interactions between the operators and the end-users, as well as
different perspectives on the influence of some regulatory bodies in the industry.
Satellite operators can in turn be classified into three categories: Fixed-Satellite Service providers
(FSS), Mobile-Satellite Service (MSS) providers, and Direct Broadcast Service providers (DBS).
Although this thesis focuses on the FSS operators, it presents an overview of the industry that
includes all commercial communication satellite services. In addition, some of the findings
identified in Chapters 3 and 4 are also applicable to the DBS and MSS sector. Furthermore,
Chapters 5 expands the scope of the thesis and proposes to analyze issues related to spacecraft
design lifetime from two perspectives: the operator's and the manufacturer's perspective.
In fact, the first contribution of this thesis is precisely the broad perspective that it introduces. In
the academic and business literature, one can find various reports and studies on different topics
related to the satellite communications industry. However, the author believes this is the first time
that the members of the commercial space sector are presented with a wide and comprehensive
analysis of the structure and the dynamics of the satellite operators industry, including the current
opportunities, challenges, competing technologies, and financial and regulatory issues faced by
major stakeholders. The second major contribution of this thesis is the multidisciplinary approach
that is proposed. It is divided in two parts combining engineering, economics, industry analysis
and policy in a way that identifies insights beyond the reach of any one isolated discipline. The
specifics of both Parts and each Chapter are described below.
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1.3. Thesis Outline
This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I, On the Market Dynamics of the Satellite
Communications Industry, consists of Chapter 2, Overview of the Satellite Communications
Industry, Chapter 3, Satellite Communications and or versus Terrestrial Networks: Competing or
Complementary Technologies, and Chapter 4, The Regulatory Environment for Satellite
Operators and the Policy-making process for Space-based Communications.
The objective of Chapter 2 is to provide the reader with the necessary background about the
subject matter of this thesis, as well as with an overview of key issues and indicators of the
satellite communications market. It provides a summary of the evolution of the industry and
introduces the key definitions of satellite services used by the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU), in order to effectively and clearly discuss the subject. In addition, Chapter 2
presents a snapshot of the current financial state of the industry and the concept of satellite
applications. A classification and a brief description of these applications are presented here.
Finally, Chapter 2 provides the highlights of some of the most important satellite operators.
Chapter 3 presents a thorough discussion of the dual character of satellite technologies when
confronted to terrestrial networks: competing and or complementary solutions. The author of this
thesis believes that satellite technologies have yet to conquer potential new markets and that
satellite operators might find it useful to forge partnerships with some of their terrestrial
competitors. Chapter 3 provides arguments that support this assertion. Firstly, it presents a
comprehensive analysis of satellite communications as a competing or complementary
technology to terrestrial networks. Secondly, it summarizes the challenges that satellites face as a
solution to providing telecommunications in urban areas. Next, it discusses the opportunities that
rural areas represent for the satellite services industry. Brief descriptions of Aramiska and the
Twister projects (two satellite-based solutions) are provided as examples for rural connectivity.
An analysis of the trans-oceanic communications market is also provided. Finally, Chapter 3
closes with an overview and outlook for a new technology, the Worldwide Interoperability for
Microwave Access (WiMAX), which might considerably impact or disrupt the satellite service
industry in the near future.
Chapter 4 discusses the regulatory environment for satellite service providers. It also delineates
what, in the opinion of the author, might be the shape of the space communications policy in the
near future. The chapter starts with an historical summary of international regulatory bodies,
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followed by an overview of what the author considers to be two of the most important regulatory
issues, namely frequency/orbit allocation and space environmental pollution. The second section
of Chapter 4 is devoted to the description of the space policies implemented by the United States
and the European Union in order to promote and develop satellite communications.
In sum, the first part of this thesis discusses the market dynamics and the regulatory environment
of the satellite industry. While market and policy issues play a central role in shaping the
structure of the satellite services industry, economic and engineering considerations provide
decisive insights that can significantly alter the dynamics of the sector. The second part of this
thesis combines economic and engineering analyses within a multidisciplinary approach and
focuses on the lifeblood of the satellite industry: the satellite itself (as opposed to the industry-
context explored in Part I). In particular, part 11 explores issues associated with spacecraft design
lifetime and the impact that it may have on the whole industry value-chain. Part II, Economic and
Engineering Issues in Spacecraft Design, consists of Chapter 5, To Reduce or To Extend a
Spacecraft Design Lifetime?, and Chapter 6, Utilization Rates of GEO Communication Satellites.
Chapter 5 investigates issues associated with the selection and specification of a communications
satellite's system design lifetime, as seen from the perspective of different stakeholders.. It
involves a qualitative and a quantitative study that explores the engineering and economic issues
at stake for reducing or extending a complex system's design lifetime, using spacecraft as
example. The study examines these issues from both an operator (customer) and a manufacturer's
perspective, as well as from the perspective of society at large. The question of whether there is
an optimal design lifetime for complex engineering systems in general (and spacecraft in
particular) is addressed here. In addition, at the level of the entire space industry value chain (i.e.,
the spacecraft manufacturers, launch industry and the operators), the case is made that design
lifetime is a powerful lever that can significantly impact the whole industry's performance,
financial health, and employment.
Satellites are correctly described as the lifeblood of the space industry. A key metric for the
performance and outlook for the commercial space communications sector is the utilization rate
(or load factor) of a satellite. Chapter 6 introduces the basic definitions of this key metric, and
provides the reader with some figures about the load factor of geostationary orbit (GEO)
communications satellites in recent years. Load factor data of twenty-one communication
satellites was collected and analyzed. Time series analyses and statistical models describing the
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evolution of utilization rates (or loading dynamics) of a communication satellite are presented
here. The chapter exposes the results of theses time series analyses showing three different
loading patterns that are consistent within groups of satellites launched in different time periods.
Finally, Chapter 6 also presents a discussion of the factors that drive satellite loading dynamics.
Chapter 7 contains the conclusions and recommendations for future work.
24
_ __ ___ ___ I
References - Chapter 1
T. Pratt, C. Bostian, J. Allnutt. Satellite Communications. Wiley and Sons, 1996. pp. 1-6
2 T. Pratt, C. Bostian, J. Allnutt. Satellite Communications. Wiley and Sons, 1996. p.1
3 J.P. Torres-Padilla, "European Efforts to Challenge US Aviation Global Leadership". FAA
Office of the Associate Administrator for International Aviation, August 2004.
25
26
II 
___I I_ 
__
PART I: ON THE MARKET DYNAMICS
OF THE SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRY
27
28
_1_1 _ _ _
Chapter 2
Overview of the Satellite Communications
Industry
The objective of this chapter is to provide the reader with background information about the
subject matter of this thesis and to present an overview of key issues and indicators of the satellite
communications market. It is organized as follows: Section starts with a historical overview of
the evolution of the industry. Section 2 introduces the key definitions of satellite services used by
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Section 3 presents a snapshot of the current
financial state of the industry. Section 4 introduces the concept of satellite applications, which are
then classified and a described. Section 5 is devoted to satellite service providers. It provides a
synopsis of five of the biggest global satellite operators and describes two examples of regional
service providers.
2.1. From a modest "beep-ing" satellite to a $100 billion industry in four decades
The origins of satellite communications can be traced back to an article written by Arthur C.
Clarke in the British radio magazine Wireless World in 1945.' In this visionary paper, Clarke
describes a world communication and broadcasting system based on geosynchronous space
stations. Clarke was a member of the British Royal Air Force and interested in long-distance
radio communication. He suggested the fundamental principle of a GEO (geostationary orbit)
satellite: the spacecraft would remain stationary with respect to the Earth's surface if it was
orbiting on an equatorial plane with a period of twenty-four hours.* At that moment, there were
no satellites in orbit nor rockets powerful enough to launch them. Twelve years later, in October
1957, satellite communications became a reality with the launch by the USSR of a small
*More precisely, in 23 h 56' 4,091" (86164 seconds) or 1 sidereal day
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rudimentary satellite called Sputnik 1. This was the first artificial Earth satellite; it carried only a
beacon transmitter and did not have two-way communications capability, but demonstrated that
satellites could be placed in orbit by powerful rockets. The next significant step toward the
development of a satellite communication system took place in 1965: the first commercial
geostationary satellite INTELSAT I (Early Bird) heralded the commercial space era2. In the same
year, the USSR launched MOLNYA I, the first Soviet communications satellite.3 Only eleven
years passed between the launching of Sputnik I and the implementation of a fully operational
global satellite communications system (INTELSAT - III) in 1968. Since then, GEO satellites
have grown steadily in weight, power, size, lifetime, and capacity. In 2000, there were
approximately 200 GEO satellites in operation. Today, the world satellite industry consists
broadly of four sectors: satellite manufacturers, launch services, satellite operators, and ground
services; the industry generates almost $100 billion per year in revenues.4
GEO satellites have always been the backbone of the commercial satellite communications
industry. Radio waves travel in straight lines at the microwave frequencies used for wideband
communications, so a repeater is needed to transmit signals over long distances.5 Satellites are a
good place to locate a repeater, since they can link places on the Earth that are thousands of
kilometers away, and large GEO satellites can serve one-third of the Earth's surface. Non-GEO
satellite systems with lower attitude, such as those operating at highly elliptical orbit (HEO), low-
Earth or medium-Earth orbit (LEO or MEO), have been utilized to deliver few applications in
special circumstances.6 Two examples of such systems are the Russian Molnya satellites and the
Global Positioning System (GPS). The Molnya satellites operate at HEOs, an egg-shaped orbit
inclined approximately 60 degrees to the equator with a high apogee over the northern
hemisphere and a low perigee over the southern hemisphere. In this type of orbit, the satellite
makes one revolution around the Earth approximately every 12 hours. The satellite swings low
and fast over the southern hemisphere and then slows as it rises toward its apogee in the northern
hemisphere, making it appear to "hover" in the sky over northern territories for long periods of
time. This type of orbit is therefore suitable for communications services in the high-latitude
areas. Such satellites systems (i.e., the Molnya satellites) were designed to serve the
communication needs of the former USSR. They are appropriate to cover most of the territory of
the former USSR, at higher latitudes.7 The GPS is a worldwide MEO satellite navigational system
formed by 24 satellites. These satellites orbit the Earth at approximately 19,000 kilometers
(12,000 miles) above the surface and make two complete orbits every 24 hours. However, the
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majority of communication satellites are in geostationary Earth orbit, at an altitude of around
36,000 km (22,500 miles).
2.2. Satellite communications: ITU classification and definitions
Radio Regulations are necessary to ensure an efficient and economical use of the radio-frequency
spectrum. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the entity within the United
Nations that publishes the Radio Regulations (RR). The RR refer to the following space
radiocommunication services, defined as transmission and/or reception of radio waves for
specific telecommunication applications:8
* Fixed Satellite Service (FSS)
* Mobile Satellite Service (MSS)
* Broadcasting Satellite Service (BSS)
* Earth Exploration Satellite Service (EES)
* Space Research Service (SRS)
* Space Operation Service (SOS)
* Radiodetermination Satellite Service (RSS)
* Inter-Satellite Service Satellite Service (ISS)
* Amateur Satellite Service (ASS)
Different frequency bands are allocated to each of the above services to ensure compatibility of
use. The bands can be either exclusive for a service or shared by several services.9
The following subsections discuss the three major types of services, namely the Fixed Satellite
Service (FSS), the Mobile Satellite Service (MSS), and the Broadcast Satellite Service (BSS).
Table 2.1 shows the frequency allocations for these three services.
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Table 2.1: Frequency allocations (Data Source: ITU)10
Typical frequency Usual Mainly used by:Radiocommunications service bands for terminology
uplink/downlink
Fixed service
Fixed Satellite Services (FSS) 6 / 4 GHz C band Fixed serviceterrestrial microwave
Military
communication /8 / 7 GHz X band communicationDigital Radio feeder
links
Fixed service14 / 12-11 GHz Ku band Fixed service
terrestrial microwave
Local multichannel
30 / 20 GHz Ka band distribution service
(LMDS)
Studio television
Mobile Satellite Services (MSS) 1.6 / 1.4 GHz L band links / cellular phone
communications
LMDS / Intersatellite30 / 20 GHz Ka band links (ISL)
Digital Radio /Broadcasting Satellite Services /2.2 GHz S band NASA and deep(BSS) 2 / 2.2 GHz S band NASA and deep
space research
12 GHz Ku band Direct-to-User
transmissions
* The BSS use a frequency of about 12 GHz for downlinks. The uplinks transmissions are carried
by FSS operators (these uplinks are called feeder links).
2.2.1. Fixed Satellite Services (FSS)
According to the Radio Regulations of the ITU, "FSS is a radiocommunication service between
given positions on the Earth's surface when one or more satellites are used. These stations located
at given positions on the Earth's surface are called Earth stations for the FSS. The given position
may be a specified fixed point or any fixed point within specified areas. The stations located on
board the satellites [...] are called space stations of the FSS". 1' In other words, FSS refers to the
applications that involve communication links between a satellite and anyfixed point on Earth. It
does not include links between a satellite and a mobile receiver on Earth, or broadcast services,
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i.e., transmissions from a satellite to several end-users simultaneously. Figure 2.1 shows a generic
representation of Fixed Satellite Services.
Space Station
I- 
~ I
I ·::' :. .::i · ..... r·- iL
Ground Stations
Figure 2.1: Generic illustration of FSS (links between a fixed point on Earth
and a space station)
Cun-ently, most of the transmissions between two earth stations are achieved through a single
satellite. This link can be separated in two parts: an uplink between the ground transmission
station and the satellite, and a downlink between the satellite and the ground receiving station.
However, in the near-future links between two earth stations using satellite-to-satellite links are
likely to be utilized. This multi-satellite link will be part of the Inter-Satellite Service (ISS) as
defined by the ITU.
The FSS also includes other types of links called "feeder links". These are uplinks from an earth
station at a fixed point to a space station transmitting information for a service other than the FSS.
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Some examples of this category include uplinks to the satellites of the broadcasting satellite
service (BSS), as well as up and downlinks between fixed earth stations and satellites of the
mobile satellite service (MSS).I2 In this cases, the FSS satellite and ground station are used to
provide part of the BSS or MSS applications.
2.2.2. Mobile Satellite Services and Broadcast Satellite Services
The communication satellite services described in this section use different frequency bands than
the ones allocated to the FSS.
Mobile-satellite services (MSS): According to the regulations of the ITU, "MSS is a
radiocommunication service between mobile earth stations and one or more space stations, or
between mobile earth stations by means of one or more space stations".13 This type of services
include maritime, aeronautical and land applications. Figure 2.2 provides a schematic view of
mobile-satellite services (MSS).
Space Station
Ground mobile stations
Figure 2.2: Generic illustration of MSS
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MSS provide key communications services to the maritime and aeronautical sector. Before the
advent of communication satellites, it was not rare for merchant navy ships and other vessel in
high seas to be lost in the oceans under difficult weather conditions due to lack of means of
communication. The first effort to address this issue was made by COMSAT (an entity
specifically created to act for the United States within Intelsat, the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization), over the Navy satellite called Marisat in the late
1970s.'4 Its success culminated in the formation of Inmarsat (International Maritime Satellite
Organization) in 1979, an international treaty organization similar to Intelsat, but focused on
connectivity to and from ships in the seas. Inmarsat has provided communication services to ships
and aircraft for several decades, although at a high price. LEO satellites were seen as one way to
create a satellite telephony system with worldwide coverage; three systems were eventually
deployed (e.g., Iridium and Globalstar). However, the implementation of a LEO and MEO
satellite system for mobile communication has proved much more costly than anticipated, and the
capacity of the systems is relatively small compared to GEO satellite systems, resulting in higher
costs per transmission. Satellite telephony systems were therefore not able to compete with
cellular telephone systems, mainly because of the high costs and low capacity of the space
segment. 5 Other ventures have entered this market and the lack of success of most of them has
been well documented and analyzed. The reader is referred to Ref. 16 or Ref. 17 for a thorough
discussion of these topics.
Broadcasting-satellite services (BSS): The ITU defines BSS as "a radiocommunication service in
which signals transmitted or retransmitted by space stations are intended for direct reception by
the general public using very small receiving antennas" (television receiving only, or TVRO).' 8
The satellites utilized by the BSS are often called direct broadcast satellites (DBS). The TVRO
needed to receive the signal from a BSS is usually smaller than the one needed to receive an FSS
signal. Furthermore, the direct reception shall include both individual reception (e.g. Direct-to-
Home (DTH) applications) and community reception (e.g. Cable Television Network (CATV) or
satellite master antenna TV (SMATV)).
Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) television was developed in the United States to overcome
"blind spots" in the coverage area of traditional terrestrial systems. Today, a DBS (or Direct-to-
User, DTU) system is capable of transmitting digital video signals from high-powered
geostationary satellites directly to individual subscribers via small receiving dishes, without the
need for additional ground receiving or distribution equipment. Two examples of DTH pay-TV
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satellite broadcasters in the United States are DirecTV and Echostar. Together they operate a total
of 16 satellites and will launch three new ones in coming years.' 9
This sector, the Pay-TV broadcast services, has generated a rapid growth in this segment of the
satellite industry, with further expansion expected from the introduction of interactive TV
services. Communication satellites are also being used to deliver commercial radio DTU services.
One example is the Worldspace project, which involves three satellites to provide radio services
to around 5 billion people living in Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean, and Central and South
America.2 0 In the U.S., the FCC announced a spectrum auction for nationwide digital radio. The
two winners of this auction in April 1997 were American Mobile Radio Corporation (AMRC)
then in partnership with WorldSpace, and CD Radio, now known as XM Radio and Sirius Radio,
respectively. Both systems are now in operation and had a total of 3.2 million subscribers as of
October 2004, targeting 4 million by January 2005.21' 22 Table 2.2 shows the revenues generated
by the biggest Non-FSS Satellite Operators in 2003.
There are other services that are mainly focused on specific applications, such as radionavigation-
satellite (notably the Global Positioning System, a constellation of satellites that has
revolutionized navigation and surveying systems) or meteorological-satellite service (e.g.
EUMETSAT, the European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites).2 3 The
description of those systems is outside the scope of this thesis.
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Table 2.2: Revenues of Non-FSS Satellite Operators in 2003. (Source: Euroconsult) 2 4
Company Revenue Market Cumulated Market
(in USD million) Share (%) Share (%)
Mobile Satellite Service Providers (MSS)
Inmarsat 504 50 % 50 %
Thuraya 290 28.8 % 78.8 %
Iridium 80 7.9 % 86.7 %
Globalstar 51 5 % 91.7 %
Others 83 8.3 % 100 %
Total MSS
DirecTV
Echostar
BSat
Total DBS
XM Satellite Radio
Sirius Radio
WorldSpace
Total Digital Audio 
System (DARS)
1,008 100 %
Direct Broadcasting Satellite Service Providers (DBS)
7,700 58.6 %
5,400 41.1 %
30 0.3 %
13,130 100 %
Digital Audio Broadcasting by Satellite (DAB)
92 86.8 %
13 12.3 %
1 0.9 %
Radio 106 100 %
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58.6 %
99.7 %
100 %
86.8 %
99.1 %
100 %
-
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2.3. Current status and financial performance of the satellite industry
This section is organized in two parts: the first one presents key indicators about the financial
performance of the satellite industry. The second part describes some recent and important
changes in the ownership structure of the sector.
The revenues generated by the entire satellite industry (satellite manufacturers, launchers, satellite
operators, and ground services) experienced continuous growth between 1996 and 2002. The
average annual growth during this time period was 13%.25 In 2003, however, the growth of the
entire satellite industry slowed to about 6%, considerably lower than the record high of almost
30% in 1997.26 Figure 2.3 shows the revenues generated by the entire satellite industry between
1996 and 2003. This revenue growth was due almost entirely to the growth in the satellite
services providers sector. Government spending and strong consumer demand for video services
(mainly for DBS applications) were responsible for much of this growth. This trend can be clearly
observed in Figure 2.4, where the reader will find the satellite operators' revenues generated by
each type of service provided, namely FSS, MSS, and DBS.
Entire Satellite Industry Revenues, by Sector (in USD Billion)
38 49 55 60.4 73.7 78.6 86.1 91
100%
80%
l 60%
:4
.=
ia
' 40%
i
20%
O%
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
: Satellite Operators Satellite Manufacturers Launch Industry Ground Equipment Manufacturers
Figure 2.3: Entire Satellite Industry Revenues, by Sector
(Source: Futron Corporation) 27
38
__ __
5
t
The satellite operators sector has experienced considerable changes over the past 25 years: going
from 6 service providers operating 24 GEO satellites in 1979 to 45 companies operating over 220
satellites in 2004.28 This sector has more than tripled in size from 1996 to 2003 (see Figure 2.3).
Its share of the entire commercial space industry revenues has grown from 42% to over 60%
during the same period of time. In 2003, satellite services revenues reached $ 55.9 billion. 29
Subscription and Retail Services have witnessed the greatest growth of all industry sectors in
2003, with a 15% growth rate. The service that continues to drive overall growth is Direct-to-
Home satellite pay-TV. This sector represented a market of over $13 billion in the United States.
30 In 2003, revenue growth of over 400% occurred in the digital audio radio broadcasting satellite
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market, even though this still accounts for less than 1% of the total satellite services revenues.
This application has been developed predominantly in the United States. The following figure
shows the revenues generated by satellite operators, for each type of service provided from 1996
to 2003.
Satellite Operators Revenue, by Type of Service (in USD Billion)
:FSS MSS ' DBS
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Figure 2.4: Satellite Operators Revenues, by type of service provided
(Source: Futron Corporation) 32
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Fixed satellite services have always been a stable and strong component of the space industry. In
2003, FSS revenues attained $ 9.6 billion.3 3 Despite falling prices of transponder leases, the FSS
sector still enjoys considerably high operating margins (between 70 and 80% in 2003).34
While competition on point-to-point applications has increased (terrestrial services have
important advantages in capacity over satellite services as will be discussed in the following
chapter), satellite's particular point-to-multipoint distribution advantages are allowing broadcast
services to remain a prominent source of revenues for the satellite industry.3 5
Even though FSS generated $ 9.6 billion in revenues in 2003, some operators (the ones that have
less capacity than their customers' demand) lease capacity from other operators. Consolidated
revenues of FSS operators reached $ 6.6 billion in 2003 (increasing 3% with respect to the
previous year). Yet, most of this growth was the result of currency exchange rates (a weak U.S.
Dollar), since two of the largest operators (SES Astra and Eutelsat) operate in Euros (the U.S.
Dollar devaluated about 16% during 2003). At a constant exchange rate, the FSS industry
consolidated revenues actually decreased by 3% to about $ 6.2 billion. For the first time, the FSS
industry experienced three consecutive years of negative growth since 2000 (with a consolidated
revenue of about $ 7 billion). 36 This decrease is mainly due to a decline in transponder lease price
together with a lack of growth in demand. Satellite operators have been forced to concede in price
in order to maintain a higher load factor (or utilization rate). As a result, even if the number of
transponders leased has slightly increased, this small growth has not compensated for the decline
in prices.
The revenues of the FSS sector have traditionally been concentrated: in 2003, four operators held
60% of the market, and the top ten FSS providers shared about 85% of the total revenues. Despite
a decrease in revenues and lower profitability margins, the FSS still enjoys an average industry
margin of 70% for EBITDAt, 31% for operating profitability (EBIT), and a net profit average of
about 20%. Furthermore, the recent decrease in EBIDTA margins slowed down in 2003. The
EBITDA is a key indicator for the industry, since the FSS sector generates high depreciation and
amortization costs, while operational costs are relatively low with respect to the revenues
generated. Therefore, any decline in revenues reflects directly on the EBITDA margin (assuming
no significant decreases in sales and operational costs). Additionally, the average net profit
t Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization. EBITDA is a financial
measure defined as revenues less cost of good sold and selling, general, and
administrative expenses. It is a common way to measure the profitability of a company
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margin became constant in 2003 at 20%, coming down from a high record of 31% in 2000.37
Table 2.3 shows the typical cost structure of a FSS satellite operator.
Table 2.3: Typical cost structure of a FSS satellite operator (Data Source: Euroconsult) 38
Typical cost structure of a FSS satellite operator
Depreciation and Amortization (D and A) 50 % to 60 %
Cost of sales and cost of operations 20 % to 34 %
Selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A) 16 % to 20 %
Recurrent capital expenditures by the operators are unavoidable in order to maintain a
competitive fleet of transponders and to provide reliable services to satellite customers. Even
though the satellite fleet of most of the large service providers is currently young (an average age
of less than 6 years) as satellites become obsolete and less productive, they have to be replaced.
Persistent capital expenditures and long-term contracts result in predictable cash flows. This,
together with the characteristic high operating profitability margins of the satellite operators,
makes FSS companies attractive to private equity firms.
A description of some of the biggest satellite operators is provided in a forthcoming section.
However, recent changes occurred in the ownership structure of the FSS industry that are worthy
of note. Four acquisitions of satellite operators by private equity firms took place in 2004. These
operations reached a transaction value of over $13 billion:
* PanAmSat, one of the leading providers of video, broadcasting and network distribution
and delivery services, was acquired by a group of equity firms (Kohlberg Kravi Roberts,
The Carlyle Group, and Providence Equity Partners) in April 2004 for $ 4.3 billion; 39
* New Skies Satellites was acquired by the Blackstone Group in July 2004 for $956
million; 40
* Intelsat, the pioneering commercial satellite company, owned and governed for most of
its 40 years by companies representing 145 governments around the world, has recently
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been acquired (August 2004) by a conglomerate of four private equity groups reunited
under Zeus, a newly formed consortium for $ 5 billion. 41
In March, November and December 2004, five private equity firms (Texas Pacific Group,
Spectrum Equity Investors, Cinven Ltd, Eurazeo, and Goldman Sachs Capital Partners)
paid a total of over $ 2.8 billion for an overall stake of 85.1% of Eutelsat, the leading
European satellite operator.42
In addition to these acquisitions, Intelsat acquired Loral Skynet's North. American satellite assets
in March 2004, for $ 960 million.
The interest of private equity firms for satellite operators is not new, but it has considerably
grown since 2003. When these types of transactions occur, the acquirer has often funded the
buyout by issuing more bonds and debt. In the case of PanAmSat, KKR paid $3.55 billion cash
and sold 54% interest to two the two other private equity firms: the Carlyle Group and Providence
Equity Partners. 4 3
Since the rationale of the industry is based on economies of scale and access to large capital
market, more consolidation is expected in the coming years. The industry will probably undergo
another wave of Mergers and Acquisitions soon, where large operators (e.g. Intelsat, Eutelsat)
and smaller regional operators may be involved. A more detailed profile of regional and global
operators is provided in section 2.5 of this chapter.
2.4. Satellite applications
In section 2.1, I introduced and discussed the concept of satellite services and the main types of
services that a communication satellite can provide (FSS, MSS, BSS). In this section I discuss the
different types of satellite applications. Stakeholders and analysts of the commercial space sector
use different classifications and definitions of satellite applications. Even the term "application"
itself is frequently understood and interpreted differently. It is not rare to find classifications in
the business and scientific literature that do not make a difference between satellite "services" and
"applications", and often refer to one or the other concept with either term indistinctly. For the
purposes of this thesis, I define a satellite service as the type of transmission link between the
ground station and the space station, namely FSS, MSS, or BSS (see section 2.2), and a satellite
application as the specific task or purpose that the satellite service is delivering.
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There are several ways of classifying telecommunications applications. Some of the most
commonly found in the scientific and business literature are: 44
1) By direction:
a. One-way (such as uplink only or downlink only); and
b. Two-way (e.g., typical of voice services)
2) By bandwidth:
a. Narrow-band (e.g. telegraph and low-speed data);
b. Voice frequency band; and
c. Wideband (56KHz to hundreds of megahertz)
3) By type of network:
a. Switched (public telephone, telegraph, and some complex private networks);
b. Demand access or dedicated (point-to-point services such as private lines or
private networks);
c. Broadcast (radio, television, weather warnings)
For the purpose of this thesis, I define the following classification of telecommunications
applications, grouped into three main categories: the transmission of voice (telephony), video and
digital radio, and data. Each of these types of applications can be subdivided in several
submarkets: 4 5
a) Voice
> International telephone relay
> Domestic telephone relay
> Fixed telephony
b) Video and digital radio
) TV relay (cable and broadcast)
> Direct to Home (DTH) TV
> Digital Audio Radio System (DARS)
> High Definition TV
> Digital Cinema
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c) Data
> Private networks (VSAT: and others)
> ISP-to-lnternet backbone
> End-user internet (SOHO§ and residential)
> Air Telecom (In-flight entertainment)
> Caching
> Multicasting
Each of these submarkets of the three main types of applications is discussed in this section. A
description of "traditional" communications satellites markets is presented in the first subsection.
The second subsection is devoted to the discussion of some emerging markets within the video
and data types of applications.
2.4.1. Traditional markets
i) Voice:
This market includes domestic and international relay (trunking) as well as fixed telephony
services such as satellite mainlines and satellite phone booths. International and domestic trunk
services were the prime engines for the early evolution of communication satellite applications.
Following the introduction and proliferation of high-capacity optical fibers, the trunking markets
have since been steadily shifting away from satellite to fiber-optic cables, particularly on the
transoceanic routes. However, the telephone trunking (also referred to as point-to-point) market
has experienced a modest growth as telecommunications traffic with and among less developed
markets increases.4 6 Large carriers (as well as ISPs -Internet Service Providers) backhauling
traffic to the U.S. or European backbones are using satellite operators more heavily for access to
developing regions. There are essentially no market opportunities for point-to-point satellite
services between "Tier 1" cities (major cities in developed countries), since even the need for the
satellite service as a backup for fiber-optics has declined as fiber routes have diversified and
increased internationally. The voice transmission as a satellite application has low revenue
growth potential and is currently a small market. Yet, it is perhaps interesting to note an
anticipated growth of the fixed telephony services (a consumer market). This includes the satellite
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"phone booths" and other rural networking infrastructure unlikely to be served by terrestrial
alternatives. 4 7
Figure 2.5 shows the share of satellite in the outgoing international traffic of U.S. carriers.
Share of Satellite in the Outgoing International Traffic of
US Carriers
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The reader may find interesting to analyze this chart. The general trend that is observed is clearly
a decrease in the percentage of the U.S. outgoing international communications carried by
satellites. The world average, for instance, has experience a steady decline from 22% in 1995 to
3% in 2002. However, the reader can also notice three interesting patterns: a) the share of
outgoing communications carried via satellite to more developed regions in the world (such as
Western Europe and Asia-Pacific) was relatively low even in 1995 (between 10% and 20%);
since then, it has decreased at a small rate to 3% to 5% in 2002; b) the share of satellite in the
outgoing traffic to Latin America presents a similar behavior; this can be explained by the fact
that it is easier to develop terrestrial networks across continents than it is across the oceans; c) the
share of communications going to South-Asia was relatively high in 1995 (almost 60%); yet it
has decreased at a much higher rate than (a) and (b), this can be explained by the fact that South-
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Asia has experienced a high economic growth, a rapid infrastructure development, therefore new
technologies such as or underwater cable networks have been implemented during the past 10
years; finally, d) regions such as Africa, Middle East, and Eastern Europe, have experienced a
slower economic development, therefore the implementation of terrestrial networks has been
slower, and consequently the share of outgoing communications carried via satellite from the U.S.
to these regions has decreased at a slower rate.
ii) Video:
The transmission of video (TV relay, including both broadcast and cable markets) remains the
core business and the greatest source of revenue for satellite operators. Recent forecasts analysis
suggest that this sector will continue to experience a reasonably constant growth rate, although
the most dynamic market is being observed on the consumer side of the video transmission, i.e.,
DTH (direct-to-home).4 9
There are three types of video distribution and radio satellite transmissions:
* Contribution (exchange of video contents between broadcasters);
* Feed of cable TV head-ends, and broadcast of free-to-air TV channels;
* DTU broadcast of TV and radio channels (DTH TV and DARS).
Video distribution is likely to continue to grow and dominate over satellite communication links
in the FSS sector. Technological improvements in C- and Ku- bands together with a lower cost
per use of transponder are likely to support this growth. Transponder demand for video and radio
broadcasting has tripled over the past 12 years from around 1,000 transponders in 1991 to almost
3,000 in 2003. That year, the nearly 3,000 transponders used for video transmission accounted for
more than 55% of the total satellite services demand. Video represents at least 50% of the
revenue source for eight out of the top ten satellite operators.50
Video broadcasting services and the digital revolution have changed the relationship between
video service providers and satellite operators: the latter have been changing the way they market
services and fix prices to attract more video broadcasters as their customers. Today, the
introduction of interactive entertainment, High Definition TV (HDTV) channels, the new
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compression format MPEG-4, and the consolidation of satellite TV broadcasters, might have an
impact on the structure of the video transmission market.5'
As discussed in a previous section of this chapter, growth in the number of video transponders
has been mainly due to the progress of satellite TV ventures (Echostar, DirecTV, SkyDigital and
SkyperfecTV, and recently Galaxy Satellite Broadcasting and Dish TV). Furthermore, the DTH
pay-TV sector is still observing some growth despite the fact that there has been a consolidation
of satellite broadcaster in middle-sized markets.5 2 Figure 2.6 shows the growth of the world video
transponder fleet between 1991 and 2003.
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Figure 2.6: Growth of the world video transponder fleet between 1991 and 2003
(Source: Euroconsult)5 3
Finally, another significant issue in this market is the fact that independent channels are using
lower compression rates than the DTH ventures. The use of compression has accelerated in recent
years, growing from 2.5 channels per 36-MHz equivalent transponder in 2000 to 3.8 in 2003. As
a result, the number oftransponders dedicated to independent channels has been decreasing.54
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iii) Data:
Video broadcast is indeed the primary revenue source for the FSS sector. In fact, several DBS
operators lease significant capacity from FSS operators to deliver their service. Yet, it would be
wrong to assume that the DTH TV sector is enough to sustain the FSS industry. Voice and data
services represented around 45% of the total transponders leased in 2003. Data (and voice)
transmission is the historical market of the satellite operators, and it remained their main source
of revenues for years.5 5 In the following paragraphs a brief description of some of the submarkets
associated with the data application is presented.
Private networks (VSA T and others):
A Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) is an earthbound station used in satellite
communications of data, voice and video signals, excluding broadcast television. A VSAT
consists of two parts, a transceiver that is placed outdoors in direct line of sight to the satellite and
a device that is placed indoors to interface the transceiver with the end user's communications
device, such as a PC. The transceiver receives or sends a signal to a satellite transponder in the
sky. The satellite sends and receives signals from a ground station computer that acts as a hub for
the system. Each end user is interconnected with the hub station via the satellite, forming a star
topology. The hub controls the entire operation of the network. For one end user to communicate
with another, each transmission has to first go to the hub station that then retransmits it via the
satellite to the other end user's VSAT. This submarket continues to be the dominant application
within the data market. It is also the only one that has experienced strong and steady yearly
growth. VSAT devices are typically used to extend corporate networks with ubiquitous and
uniform communications infrastructure. The main users of VSAT include customers in the retail
industry (e.g., gas stations or small supermarkets); banking, finance and assurance (e.g., Visa,
Nomura Securities, etc.); automotive and others.56 Hundreds of gas stations can be connected to a
central data facility to process transfers, inventory, billing, etc. In general, the Private Corporate
Networks sector includes a variety of closed data communication networks for businesses with
multiple locations. The increase use of networked applications suggests that corporate VSAT will
continue to grow. End-users (such as corporations with branches in remote locations) seek in
VSAT networks a cost-effective and flexible solution to connect its business when terrestrial
alternatives are unavailable or unreliable. This is a stable market and, even if it is not as stunning
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as newer applications, it accounts for the majority of current data services demand. North
America is the largest market for this application, although Asia is currently experiencing the
highest growth rates, both in terms of total number of terminals sold and transponders utilized.5 7
Table 2.4 shows the evolution (from 1999 to 2003) of revenue generation from VSAT networks
for three major satellite operators.
Table 2.4: Revenue from VSAT networks for three of the biggest satellite operators
(Data Source: Euroconsult) 58
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
millions of US dollars (except installed VSATs)
Eutelsat 45.0 60.6 65.0 112 100
Intelsat n.a. 274.3 292.7 327.4 352.5
PanAmSat 186.7 207.9 208.8 194.9 207.8
Total n.a. 543 566 634 660
Number of installed VSATs 431,000 530,000 642,000 n.a. 700,000
ISP-to-lnternet backbone:
This market includes the direct connection to the fiber backbone for national operators serving
ISPs and ISPs serving individual users. It has experienced a surprisingly high growth rate since
satellites started to provide this service in the mid-1990s, although it is starting to peak in many
markets. Like other point-to-point applications, it represented a good business opportunity when
the optic fiber was unavailable. In some areas where fiber is not yet available (such as Eastern
and Central Europe), this market is likely to continue showing some growth.5 9 This sector, IP
trunking, represented about 9% of the overall transponder demand in 2003, with Asia-Pacific as
the leading market.
2.4.2. Emerging markets
In this subsection a discussion of some emerging markets within the video and data types of
satellite application is presented.
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i) Video and Digital Radio:
Interactive services:
Most satellite TV platforms are planning to provide improved services in addition to the TV
programming. The number of interactive services has experienced a significant growth from 176
in 2000 to 388 in 2003.60 Typically, these applications are delivered by using very high
compression rates and will gradually be broadcast in the new MPEG-4 format, supporting even
higher compression rates. The development of this market is an important stake for the satellite
TV ventures in order to compete with the triple package of services offered by TV cable
operators: a unique application that includes TV, telephony and Internet services.
HDTV:
Some analysts of the industry estimate that HDTV channels would require three times the
bandwidth used by a digital standard TV channel. 6' The development of High Definition
television is expected to generate an increase in transponder demand in the short-term, although
the HDTV market contributes still marginally to the industry, with less than 1% of the total of
satellite TV channels in 2003, most of them available in North America. The second biggest
market is Asia, including both Japan and Australia. Because of higher transmission and
production costs than Standard Definition Television (SDTV), HDTV is expected to be only a
small niche with premium content such as movies or sports events, where viewers are ready to
pay for high-quality pictures.
Digital Cinema:
This market represents a new form of satellite contribution service to provide cinemas and
theaters with better-quality digital movies at lower costs than with physical copies of films.
Despite a decline in the price of digital projectors, most of the operators of cinemas or theaters are
not ready to pay for an upgrade of their equipment. However, the number of theaters equipped for
digital cinema has tripled since 2001, with 161 in 2003, out of a total of about 115,000
worldwide.6 2 In addition to this, uncompressed movies require a lot of bandwidth and time to
download, as well as storage infrastructure. The technical standards that will be developed and
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used for compression might have an impact on the future of this market. However, this impact is
not likely to be experienced in the mid-term, since ventures created to promote digital cinema via
satellite are not making commercial progress (leading operators in this market, such as Boeing
Digital Cinema, are considering a sale as an exit option due to the low rate of theaters equipped
with the necessary technology).
Digital Audio Radio System (DARS):
In the satellite DTU market, television came first and digital radio only started in 2001.
Worldspace is one of the first DTU Digital Radio venture, and it involves three satellites to
provide radio services to around 5 billion people living in Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean,
and Central and South America.6 3 In the U.S., rapid growth in this market has been recently
observed. Today, XM Radio and Sirius Radio are the two main DARS in operation nationwide.
Despite a late start and some adverse business conditions, several of these systems are currently
operating around the world. The technology has an important potential, given the large number of
radio listeners around the world in cars, homes and other environments.64 Figure 2.7 shows the
revenues generated by DTH radio operators in 2003.
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Figure 2.7: Revenues generated by DARS operators in 2003 (in million USD)
(Data Source: Euroconsult) 65
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ii) Data:
End-user Internet (Enterprise, SOHO and residential):
This sector encompasses a mix of diverse sub-markets: last mile access to the Internet for
residences, Small-Offices/House-Offices (SOHOs), Small/Medium Enterprises (SME), and Large
Enterprise. The key drivers for all the last mile access sectors are broadly the same:
* Exponential growth in content availability and individual user bandwidth needs
* Price competitiveness of satellite delivery, including user equipment and bundling
* Ka-Band introduction reducing the number of transponders needed to serve still-growing
bandwidth demand
These factors, however, don't affect all regions similarly. There are some short-term
opportunities in entering the market of developed regions that have a need for broadband.
However, this market is closing to the satellite services due to the deployment of terrestrial
broadband. Similar opportunities in developing countries are likely to be found in forthcoming
years, as demand outpaces availability of terrestrial infrastructure.6 6
Air Telecom (In-flight entertainment):
Six companies are currently planning to offer in-flight services (Tenzig Communications,
AirShow 21, Live TV, Connexion by Boeing, AirTV, and In-Flight Network). Live TV is owned
by JetBlueAirways and is equipping its airplanes for the reception of the existing satellite TV
platforms. Connexion by Boeing announced lease contracts for about 16 transponders for the
trans-Atlantic airline traffic, and is looking to expand in Asia. About three hundred airplanes are
expected to be equipped with this application by 2005.67 In the opinion of the author, the
necessary transmission capacity for this application is likely to be leased by DBS and FSS
operators. This service seems to focus more on broadband capabilities than on video contents, and
the outlook for this application is not very clear at the time this thesis is being written.
Caching:
This application consists of taking the most popular content of the Web and push it to edge
devices located in hundreds of "points of presence" (POPs) owned by a number of carriers to
allow quick content access and easier streaming. Software developed in-house by the Content
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Delivery Networks (CDNs) streamlines content distribution and automatically ranks content to be
put on the POPs. However, caching services have not been able to sustain all of the competing
CDNs, and the ones that are still in the market have refocused their portfolios to include large file
transfers and content aggregation. 68 This has resulted in a lower number of potential customers
for FSS providers, but an increase in demand for bandwidth capacity to provide these additional
services can be experienced in the short term.
Multicasting:
The term multicasting refers to "the delivery of information to multiple destinations
simultaneously using the most efficient strategy to deliver the messages over each link of the
network only once and only create copies when the links to the destinations split".69 Multicast
satellite services are highly efficient delivering P content when a combination of satellite and
fiber is used. Point-to-point long-haul transport is usually done through fiber between content
aggregation points. Point-to-multipoint satellite services deliver then content from these
aggregation points to the edge servers in the POPs. The resulting one-step distribution over the
satellite network, rather than the multiple steps necessary with terrestrial networks, provides the
customer with a higher-quality service. A key differentiator for satellite-based services is their
ability to scale for a large number of users, allowing service providers to reach a larger audience
and to deal efficiently with demand peaks. Although this application is not truly being
commercially exploited, it might represent a significant potential for satellite operators.
2.5. Regional and global satellite operators
This section is devoted to the description of five global and two regional satellite operators. For
the purposes of this thesis, a global satellite operator is defined as a satellite service provider that
has service covering more than one of the three main geographic regions on Earth: Atlantic
Ocean Region (AOR), Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and Pacific Ocean Region (POR).70 The top
five -by revenue- global satellite service providers are: Socidtd Europdenne des Satellites (SES
Global through its subsidiaries SES Astra and SES Americom), Intelsat, Eutelsat, PanAmSat and
Loral Skynet.
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Table 2.5: 2003 Revenues and Market Shares of FSS Satellite Operators
(Source: Euroconsult) 7'
2003 Revenue 2003 Market
Company (in USD Share
million)
SES Global 1,352 20.5 %
Intelsat 953 14.5 %
Eutelsat 886 13.4 %
PanAmSat 831 12.6 %
JSAT 371 5.6 %
Loral Skynet 259 3.9 %
New Skies Satellite 215 3.3 %
Total 4,867 73.8 %
The following tables provide the highlights of the global satellite operators mentioned above. 72
SES Global
Ownership SES Global operates through two wholly owned subsidiaries: SES
Astra and SES Americom. In addition, SES Global has some
partnerships in which it holds interests. Some examples of these
partners include AsiaSat, Nahuelsat, Star One, and Satlynx. GE
Capital owns a 25 percent stake of SES Global. The Luxembourg
government together with two state-owned banks owns another third
of SES Global.
Head Office Chateau de Betzdorf, Luxembourg
Satellite Capacity A total of 29 satellites. Twelve of them are operated by SES Astra,
and located primarily in two orbital positions: 19.2 degrees east and
28.2 degrees east.
Main services provided: -Consumer Internet access via Advanced Codec (AVC) Broadband
-Business services provided through Satlynx, a joint venture between
SES Global and Gilat Satellite Networks
-Corporate/small and midsize enterprise broadband (through a
product called Systar advantage)
-Broadband interactive system based on a Ku/Ka hybrid system
-Remote system connectivity, through Satlynx.
-IP and multicasting services
-Communications solutions to broadcasters, cable programmers, ISP,
government agencies, and private corporate networks
54
Intelsat
Ownership Zeus, a private equity consortium.
Head Office Washington, D.C., USA, with Asia/Pacific regional offices in
Chennai (India) and Singapore
Satellite Capacity The global system includes 27 satellites under several series (Intelsat
V-A, VI, VII, VII-A, VIII, VIII-A, and IX). IS-907, at 332.5 degrees
east, one of ntelsat's most recent launches (2003) provides C-band
coverage for the Americas, Africa, and Europe, as well as Ku-band
spot beam coverage for Europe and Africa.
Main services provided: -Video transmission (satellite news gathering, television
broadcasting, and DTH broadcasting)
-Satellite master antenna television (SMATV)
-Internet backbone and enterprise connectivity
-VSATs and private network services
-Transponder leasing for occasional use
-High-speed internet access
-Multicasting
-Training and technical assistance
Eutelsat
Ownership Five private equity firms (Texas Pacific Group, Spectrum Equity
Investors, Cinven Ltd, Eurazeo, and Goldman Sachs Capital Partners)
held stock for more than 80% of Eutelsat.
Head Office Paris, France
Satellite Capacity Operates a fleet of 24 satellites. The "hot Bird", a constellation of five
satellites, located at 13 degrees east, provides full coverage of
Europe. Eutelsat 1I-F3, located at 21.5 degrees east, covers Western
Europe. Most of the spacecrafts are constructed by Alcatel Space
Industries. Three satellites, the Atlantic Bird 1, 2 and 3, cover the
Americas, Europe, the Middle East and Africa.
Main services provided: -Television and radio broadcasting for the consumer public
-Professional video broadcasting
-Corporate networks connectivity
-Intranet services mostly to European corporations
-IP services and multicast file delivery
-Home internet (through a product called OpenSky)
-IP trunking
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PanAmSat
Ownership A private equity consortium composed of the following corporations:
Kohlberg Kravi Roberts, The Carlyle Group, and Providence Equity
Partners.
Head Office Greenwich, Connecticut, USA, with Asia/Pacific regional offices in
Tokyo (Japan), and additional offices in Hong Kong, Sydney
(Australia), Mumbai (India), Mexico, and Peru.
Satellite Capacity PanAmSat's global system comprises 25 satellites (as of January
2004), covering the main business centers across North and Latin
America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.
Main services provided: -Transponder leasing for occasional use
-DTH broadcasting capability
-Video transmission
-Internet backbone services
-Internet content distribution network and Internet access
-Private business networks and VSATs
-Telephony and radio
-Network design and engineering
-Special event and ad hoc services such as new customized
applications
Loral SkyNet
Ownership The main shareholder is Loral, which owns 39 percent. Intelsat owns
LoralSkyNet's NorthAmerican assets. Lockheed Martin owns 15
percent.
Head Office New York City, NY, USA.
Satellite Capacity A total fleet of 12 satellites (as of January 2004) covering Europe, the
Americas, and parts of Asia and Africa. Their Europe Star 1 satellite,
at 45 degrees east, provides the highest-powered Ku-band cross
connection between South East Asia and Europe, and is the first
satellite to provide interconnections between Asia, India, Africa,
Europe and the Middle East.
Main services provided: -IP broadband data transmission
-Global telephony services via its subsidiary GlobalStar
-Internet access
-DTH broadcasting
The following tables present the highlights of two regional satellite operators: New Skies
Satellite (The Netherlands) and JSAT (Japan). For the purposes of this thesis, a regional satellite
operator is defined as either a satellite service provider that does not have global coverage, or as a
satellite operator whose satellite fleet is considerably smaller than that of a global satellite
operator.
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New Skies Satellite
Ownership Originally a public-listed company, recently acquired by Blackstone
group, a private equity company.
Head Office The Hague (Netherlands), with offices in London (UK), New Delhi
(India), Sao Paulo (Brazil), and Washington, D.C., USA.
Satellite Capacity Five satellites. Covering predominantly AOR with one POR and one
IOR satellite.
Main services provided: -Transponder leasing for occasional use
-Digital and analog video distribution
-Multicasting
-High-speed IP backbone connections: "multihoming satellite links"
enable ISPs to offer one-hop connections from the internet backbone
JSAT
Ownership Privately owned. First private-sector satellite operator in Japan.
Head Office Tokyo (Japan), with offices in Los Angeles, CA, USA.
Satellite Capacity Nine satellites covering the Asia / Pacific Region and parts of North
America.
Main services provided: -Uplink services for SkyPerfecTV (DTH TV)
-Two-way satellite communications (VSAT)
-Live coverage of special events through SNG (Satellite News
Gathering) services
-Digital video transmission
-1P-based content distribution over North America using the
Horizons-i satellite.
2.6. Summary
This chapter provided an extensive overview of key issues and indicators of the satellite
communications industry. Establishing a sound framework and setting coherent definitions
constitutes already a significant contribution that is often taken for granted or simply not reached.
I therefore started this chapter by summarizing the evolution of the industry and introduced the
key definitions of satellite services used by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).
The distinction was made between FSS, MSS and BSS. Chapter 2 presented as well a snapshot of
the current financial state of the satellite industry in general, and the FSS operators in particular.
The first substantial contribution of this thesis was the identification, classification, and outlook
assessment of the different types of service applications (markets) delivered by communication
satellites. Finally, the highlights of some of the most important satellite operators were presented
at the end of the chapter. The next chapter will address the central question of Part One of the
thesis: are satellite communications solutions competing or complementary alternatives to
terrestrial networks-in what context and for what service applications?
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Chcapter 3
Satellite Communications and or versus
Terrestrial Networks: Competing or
Complementary technologies?
In order to better understand some of the issues associated with the future of the satellite industry,
it is important to be aware of the context in which the satellite operators provide their services.
Communication satellites are part of telecommunication networks. Telecommunication refers to
the science and technology of communication at a distance by electronic or optical transmission
of impulses.' The term "telecommunications" refers to all kind of data transmissions, including
voice, video, and different pieces of information usually formatted in a variety of specific ways.
Telecommunications is therefore a set of services, while satellites are tools for providing some of
these services.2 In general, services are present in a market for a much longer period of time than
tools. Yet, satellites have been used for more than 40 years now and they have demonstrated an
exceptional adaptability to the evolving challenges and new types of telecommunications
services. In early 2001, in the midst of the then-ongoing telecommunications and satellite
industry downturns, there was a recurrent debate and discussion about the satellite business
outlook. "Does the satellite industry have a future?" was the question that a number of experts
and analysts of the sector attempted to address. The author of this thesis believes that the answer
to this query is positive, and this chapter will provide some of the arguments that support this
assertion.
The chapter is organized as follows: The first section presents a comprehensive analysis of
satellite communications as a competing or complementary technology to terrestrial networks.
Section 3.2 summarizes the challenges that satellites face as a solution to providing
telecommunications in urban areas. Section 3.3 discusses the opportunities that rural areas
represent for the satellite industry. Brief descriptions of Aramiska and the Twister projects (two
63
satellite-based solutions) are provided as examples for rural connectivity. Section 3.4 is devoted
to the analysis of the trans-oceanic communications market. Finally, section 3.5 closes the chapter
with an overview and outlook for a new technology, the Worldwide Interoperability for
Microwave Access (WiMAX) that might considerably impact the satellite service industry in the
near future.
3.1. In what context, service application or geographic market, are satellites a
competing and or a complementary alternative to terrestrial networks?
This section focuses on the tradeoffs associated with choosing satellite communications versus
terrestrial solutions to deliver telecommunication services. The goal is to understand in what
context satellites represent a competing technology or a viable alternative to terrestrial networks,
and vice-versa. More generally, as the title of the section suggests, the discussion presented here
is about comparing the two types of solution in different contexts. The analysis is structured
around three axes: type of solution, service application, and geographic market. Figure 3.1 shows
a graphic representation of the three perspectives from which the analysis is developed. The type
of solution refers to satellite versus terrestrial networks. The service application perspective
divides the satellite communications market in two categories: transmission of voice and data, or
transmission of video contents. The third axis compares both solutions (satellite and terrestrial) in
three major geographic markets: urban areas in developed markets, urban areas in emerging
regions, and rural areas in general.
This section is divided in three parts: subsection 3.1.1 provides an overview of the alternative
technologies to satellite communications, i.e., other types of technologies capable of providing
the same telecommunications services that a satellite provides. Currently, the main competing
technologies to satellite communication solutions are Optical Fiber Cables and Digital Subscriber
Lines (DSL). The major advantages associated with these technologies are briefly discussed in
this subsection. The second subsection, 3.1.2, is devoted to the analysis of the advantages of
satellite communications over terrestrial networks. Subsection 3.1.3 presents a description of the
tradeoffs associated with the use of both solutions (satellite and terrestrial) to deliver a specific
service application (the transmission of voice and data, or video) in the three different types of
geographic markets, namely urban-developed, urban-emerging, and rural in general.
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Figure 3.1: Graphic representation of the perspectives used for the comparative analysis of
satellite versus terrestrial solutions to provide telecommunication services.
3. 1.1. Overview of competitor markets
This subsection provides the reader with an overview of the competitor markets of satellite
communications, i.e., other types of technologies that are capable of providing the same
telecommunications services that a satellite provides. There are currently two main competitor
technologies to satellite communication solutions, Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL) and Optical
Fiber Cables.
3.1.1.1 Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL)
DSL refers collectively to all types of digital subscriber lines, the two main categories are
Asymetric DSL (ADSL) and Symetric DSL (SDSL). DSL technologies use modulation schemes
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to pack data and transmit it over copper wires. They are sometimes referred to as last-mile
technologies because they are used only for connections from a telephone switching station to a
home or office, not between switching stations. DSL operates over existing copper telephone
lines (plain old telephone service, or POTS), and requires short runs to a central telephone office
(usually less than 20,000 feet). DSL offers high speeds of data transmission: up to 32 Mbps for
upstream traffic, and from 32 Kbps to over 1 Mbps for downstream traffic.3
DSL is often understood, in most regions of the world, as synonymous with broadband access.
The DSL infrastructure began to be deployed in the late 1990s, and this market represents now
approximately 60 percent of the world's broadband subscribers.4 ADSL is the dominant DSL
technology, although new technologies such as Very-High-Data-Rate DSL (VDSL) and Global-
Standard High-Bit-Rate DSL (GSHDSL) are emerging.
In North America, cable continues to dominate DSL and it maintains a two-to-one advantage in
the number of new customers. Europe and Asia, however, are much better suited markets for
higher-speed DSL broadband access. In comparison with North America, the lengths of the loop
between the central offices (CO) of a telephone company and the customer are much shorter.
They also have newer and cleaner copper that minimizes loss and interference.
DSL is currently perceived as a technology that will deliver not only high-speed Internet access,
but also video services. Several telecommunication companies (telcos) across the world (such as
Bell Canada, and Aliant, also in Canada) are providing television services via ADSL or VDSL.5
In addition to this, telcos are using DSL to offer Voice over IP (VolP) services, and although
there are currently some technical barriers to be overcome, ADSL is likely to deliver this kind of
connectivity in the near future. In North America, there is an ongoing competition on price
between telcos and cable providers to attract customers within the markets of providing Internet
access and data transmission services. Finally, DSL is being gradually considered more as a
platform that provides a package of services than as a simple ISP; its availability is growing
globally. The potential market that DSL might penetrate in Europe is more than 90%, although in
North America it remains approximately 60%.
3.1.1.2 Optical Fiber Cable
A fiber-optic system is similar to the traditional copper wire system that it replaces. The
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difference is that "fiber-optics use light pulses to transmit information down fiber lines instead of
using electronic pulses to transmit information down copper lines".6 The optical fiber can be used
as a medium for telecommunication and networking because it is flexible and can be bundled as
cables. Because of the remarkably low loss and excellent linearity and dispersion behavior of
optical fiber, data rates of up to 40 gigabits per second are possible in real-world use on a single
wavelength.7 Modem fiber cables can contain up to a thousand fibers in a single cable, so the
performance of optical networks easily accommodates today's demands for bandwidth on a point-
to-point basis. It is estimated that no more than 1% of the optical fiber installed in recent years is
actually in use. 8 In recent years, fiber-optic cables have been steadily replacing copper wire as a
suitable technology to transmit communication signals. Currently, fiber-optics extend over the
long distances of local phone systems, and provide the infrastructure for the backbone of many
network systems. Other users of optical fiber cable are cable television services, universities,
office buildings, industrial infrastructure, and electric utility companies.
Worldwide, DSL is the largest broadband access technology, followed by cable. In North
America, however, cable dominates the residential broadband access market. American Multiple
System Operators (MSO), or cable services providers, invested billions of dollars to upgrade their
previous infrastructure for two-way services. Abroad, where satellite pay-TV is more present, and
where video is not the main product of consumer services, cable operators have had more
difficulties upgrading their cable network.9 Global cable operators continue to grow their
broadband subscribers base, and are investing in new technologies (such as Voice over IP) aiming
to increase their revenue per user, and to add value to their services. Major cable operators in the
United States and Canada dominate the market, and better network availability is helping the
operators to remain as the leaders in the consumer market.
The next subsection provides an analysis of the advantages of satellite communications over the
terrestrial solutions that were described above, namely DLS and cable.
3.1.2.Satellite advantages over terrestrial networks
Since the beginning of the commercial space era in the 1960s, satellite communications have
provided a variety of broadcasting and telecommunication services. They made possible the
creation of a global and automatically-switched telephony network. Today, even though the
deployment of advanced optical fiber submarine cables across the oceans and across the
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continents have considerably lowered telephony costs and have significantly increased
transmission capacity, only satellite communications have the capability to provide reliable
transmission links over all types of terrestrial obstacles, regardless of the distance or of how
remote the locations to be connected might be.' °
The main and inherent strength of a satellite is thus its ubiquity. Unlike any other communication
technology, their position gives them a radio visibility across vast areas of the Earth that is almost
impossible to match. From the beginning of the commercial era of the satellite communications
industry, this characteristic played a fundamental and strategic role in the deployment of defense
systems. As a result of this military role, the commercial applications experienced an accelerated
technology development process.''
In addition, satellite communication systems have three properties that are not found in terrestrial
networks (or only to a lesser extent): 12
* Multiple access capability, i.e., point-to-multipoint, or multipoint-to-multipoint
connectivity.
* Distribution capability, in particular in the case of point-to-multipoint transmission.
* Flexibility for changes in traffic and in network architecture, and ease of reconfiguration.
These intrinsic characteristics of a satellite system make it particularly well suited to provide
communication services over large or dispersed areas.'3 Vast territories, natural obstacles (forest,
mountain ranges, deserts), scattered population, or an undeveloped infrastructure are some of the
situations where communication satellites can play a unique role by allowing the rapid
establishment of a telecommunications network, typically capable of providing high-quality and
low-operational-cost links (especially in rural areas) for the transmission of data, voice and video.
A brief discussion of each of the most specific characteristics of satellite networks is presented
below:
=> Coverage:
A satellite system enables communication links between any two points on Earth independently
of the geographical distance between these points, and provided that they are located within the
satellite coverage area. This communication link can be established without any intermediary
infrastructure. In the case of GEO satellites, a single spacecraft has geometric visibility of
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approximately 40% of the Earth's surface.'4 The points to be covered must be situated within the
geographical areas covered by the beams of the satellite antennas; these areas are called the
coverage areas of the satellite system. The antenna beams can be configured to form customized
coverage areas that respond to the specific needs of the customer and the region that will be
served. Satellite coverage can therefore easily reach the rural areas that terrestrial solutions are
not capable of serving. This characteristic gives customers of satellite operators the possibility to
use their service applications homogeneously across their network.
=> Multiple access:
This is an exceptional feature used in FSS telecommunication links. Multiple access is defined as
the ability of a satellite transponder to receive data from several ground stations simultaneously.
The most important consequence of this feature is that it allows any ground station located in the
satellite coverage area to receive transmissions from several other ground stations through one
satellite transponder. This allows a transmitting ground station to group several transmissions into
a single-destination link.' 5 There are several common types of multiple access protocols, such as
frequency division multiple access (FDMA) and time division multiple access (TDMA). Their
description is outside of the scope of this thesis. The reader is referred to Ref. 16 for a thorough
discussion of this topic.
= Distribution:
The distribution capability of a satellite is the ability to transmit data from one point to multiple
points on Earth. It is used when the data to be transmitted is emitted by a single ground station
towards stations that are assigned for reception only (in general several stations are scattered
throughout the coverage area). This capability is particularly useful for television (specifically
DTH TV) and for some data transmission services (e.g. data banks). 17
=> Flexibility:
The implementation of the ground segment of a satellite network is relatively simple in
comparison to other terrestrial solutions. Technologies such as optical fiber require the
installation of thousands of miles of cable, for which the right-of-way has to be secured from
governments or other organizations, hundreds of sites have to be build, provided with shelter and
power, and maintained regularly to guarantee a reliable service. 8 Therefore, rapid installation
and bringing into service of ground stations represents an important advantage of satellite
systems. Provisioning times for satellite services vary, but initial service can be offered within
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weeks instead of months (typical delay of other solutions such as T1 or T3 lines, i.e., DSL
technologies). Another important feature that makes communication satellites attractive is the
flexibility for changes of services and traffic, such as "bandwidth-on-demand". Once the service
is established, bandwidth can be provided immediately up to 45 Mbps. In the case of traditional
terrestrial private lines services, upgrading from a 1.5Mbps DS1 line to a 45Mbps DS3 line may
require several months. Finally, another advantage of satellite systems is the relative low cost of
installation. Once the satellite is in-orbit, service providers and end-users can deploy the
necessary equipment with low costs in comparison with the capital expenses necessary to pull
fiber cables to a new location.19
Table 3.2, presented at the end of this section, summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of
satellites solutions.
3.1.3.Service applications
This subsection discusses the tradeoffs associated with the use of satellites versus terrestrial
solutions to deliver a specific service application (transmission of voice and date, or video) in
different geographic markets (urban-developed, urban-emerging, and rural in general). For the
purposes of the analysis presented here, issues related to the transmission of voice and data are
grouped in one category, while the tradeoffs associated with the transmission of video are
considered under a second category.
3.1.3.1 Voice and Data
The telecommunications traffic has been steadily moving from analog transmissions to digital
technology during the past decades. This tendency, together with the high capacity of both optical
fiber and satellites, has resulted in a lower cost of long-distance telephone calls and therefore in
an increase in the number of circuits available. Prior to the commercial development of
communication satellites, in 1960, communications from the United States to Europe had to be
handled by an operator and many hours of waiting time to establish a call was not rare. In 2000,
international calls could be dialed directly by end-users and rates had decreased at least by a
factor of ten.2 0 A capacity superior to that of the copper cables across the oceans and continents
was, in the early years of satellite communications, a decisive advantage that made international
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and domestic trunk traffic services the main engine of the satellite industry. However, the
implementation of optical fibers and their higher capacity rapidly challenged the satellite trunking
services, first across the continents, and then across the oceans. In the future, this sector (voice
transmission) will clearly not be one of the main drivers of the satellite communications industry,
although satellite's ease of reconfiguration of coverage and capacity to match peaks in demand
(e.g. for dealing with natural disasters or government needs) might sporadically translate into a
small benefit to the sector. Satellite communications also provide a reliable alternative (as a back-
up solution) to submarine cables when for any reason the service is disrupted (e.g., if the anchor
of a ship damages the underwater cable). In other words, satellite and cable can be sold as a
bundled solution, with submarine cable as the primary technology and satellite communications
as a back-up alternative should the cable connectivity suffers a disruption for any reason.
Figure 3.2 shows the usage trends by service application
shows the percentage of change in capacity used by type
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Figure 3.2: Usage Trends by Service Application. Years 2000 to 2003.
(Data Source: Futron Corporation)21
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In the near future, data applications are likely to experience the strongest growth, mainly driven
to increases in both demand for bandwidth per user, and the numbers of users. Figure 3.4 shows
the data applications market share for private networks, ISP-to-Internet- backbone, and end-user
Internet access.
i
i
Figure 3.4: Data applications: Market shares in 200323 (DataSource: Futron Corporation)
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In 2004, some satellite operators, such as Spaceway by Hughes, Shin Satellite, and Telesat,
launched Ka-band satellites, and more are scheduled for launch in 2005. These new high-capacity
satellites are likely to change the landscape of the satellite services industry. Higher speeds and
lower service costs should be the natural consequence of making more frequency in the Ka-band
available. As a result, satellite services might be at the reach of new customers that have not yet
been able to take advantage of this technology, and new markets of satellite applications might
become a real opportunity for satellite operators. As a result, there is an ongoing debate about
weather broadband satellite solutions will be a competing or a complementary technology to DSL
and cable. Different stakeholders within the satellite services industry are at odds about this
question. For example, the belief that satellite services can compete as an alternative to DSL and
cable underlies Spaceway's strategy.2 4 In contrast, Alcatel Space is looking at its "DSL in the
Sky" broadband satellite solution as a complementary option to existing terrestrial infrastructure.
Alcatel is combining its solution with its existing DSL network and management services.2 5 In
addition, Alcatel believes it can persuade customers to use this solution by bundling services such
as DTH TV with broadband connectivity.
Approximately 40% of the 7 million businesses in the United States are out of the reach of
terrestrial networks.2 6 Remote offices represent a large market for satellite operators. Some of
these companies in remote locations have chosen satellite solutions as the best alternative because
of the ubiquity, the relatively low cost of installation, as well as the quick deployment of this
solution. Another advantage of this structure is the fact that it implies less complex service
contracts and billing issues, since a single service provider delivers connectivity to all of the
company's locations. Other customers have preferred to use DSL or cable solutions in urban
locations and use satellite to cover only their remote locations.2 7 Satellite solutions are also
appealing for the Small and Medium Business (SMB) and the SOHO markets, where often the
DSL alternative is limited by degradations in speed that become insurmountable when the
customer is beyond a specific distance from the central office (CO). In addition, satellite's
"bandwidth-on-demand" (i.e., customers pay for bandwidth use as opposed to paying for a flat
monthly rate) is a potential source of cost-savings, especially for SMB.
Hybrid solutions that integrate both terrestrial and satellite technologies have recently started
playing an important role in the industry. This has resulted in partnerships between satellite
operators, system integrators and carriers. An example of these new hybrid service solutions are
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Gilat's Connexstar product, which is integrating terrestrial (DSL) and satellite based
communications. Another example is Intelsat, which has partnered with L3 Communications to
provide its GlobalConnex hybrid Internet trunking service to enlarge existing terrestrial networks.
This product registered a 329% increase in revenue in 2003.28 Satellite operators are likely to
search for new opportunities and partnership in order to avoid a role of "commoditized transport
provider". Their goal, in order to remain profitable, should be to become a solutions provider
rather than a satellite service provider. By expanding their portfolio of products and including
new access tools, satellite operators may intend to become a neutral network-access provider.29
In conclusion, it is certainly true that satellite broadband has yet to make an impact in the satellite
services industry. In 2005, as new Ka-band satellites are launched, more capacity will be
available.3 0 This higher capacity will allow two-way access and an increase in the number of
subscribers. However, satellite broadband differentiators from fixed-line broadband solutions
(ubiquity and low upfront installation costs) will essentially allow satellite service providers to
remain competitive, but in no way satellite broadband will represent a strong competitive
advantage over terrestrial networks. The success of this new technology will mostly depend on
the creativity of satellite operators to upgrade and sell their services. Satellite service providers
must concentrate their efforts on markets already using satellite solutions. Some opportunities to
succeed and grow are, for example, to up-sell Internet services to existing residential DTH TV
customers, or to up-sell two-way broadband satellite services to business VSAT customers that
already know the benefits of this technology and are looking for a more solid and complete
solution.31 In most cases, because the costs of customer premises equipment (CPE, or upfront
installation cost) are higher than those of DSL or cable modem,32 satellite services are used only
if other alternatives are not available. Therefore, satellite operators should also create a strategy to
reduce CPE and monthly service costs.
3.1.3.2 Video
The transmission of video (TV relay, both broadcast and cable) continues to be the main market
of the satellite services industry. Eight out of the ten top satellite operators generate at least 50%
of their revenue from video services, which are estimated to account for 59% of the total revenues
of the satellite operators in 2003.33 The consumer side (primarily DTH services) has provided the
most dynamic market within the video satellite application. In most geographic regions, DTH TV
continues to take market share away from terrestrial pay-TV providers.3 4 In some of these
74

regions, the fact that the deployment of cable has been slow (given the physical geography and
related difficulties) has generated a steady growth for DTH pay-TV platforms.
As the author defined in chapter 2, there are three major types of video broadcasting services:
= Contribution (i.e. backhaul* of video contents,3 5 or the exchange of video contents
between broadcasters);
=> Feed of cable TV head-ends, and broadcast of free-to-air TV channels;
=* DTH broadcast of TV channels (previously referred to as the consumer market).
The main applications of the contribution market are feeds to head-ends of cable for terrestrial
broadcasting and exchanges of video contents. This market can be divided into two categories:3 6
=> Permanent broadcasting of TV channels to the head-ends of cable.
=> Occasional broadcasting of TV programs and video contents for live broadcast or
integration into TV channels.
In recent years, the demand for video transponders used for contribution services has increased
continuously in some geographic markets, such as Asia.3 7 This tendency has been mainly
generated by an increase in the number of TV channels in the region, not only satellite pay-TV,
but also cable and over-the-air channels. In this context, even if cable is a competitor of satellite
pay-TV, it also generates a positive impact on FSS providers performance, since cable providers
need to feed their head-ends using satellite links, mostly due to difficult geographic conditions in
the region and to the lack of cable infrastructure for the backhaul segment.
In North America, video contribution is a key market, considering the importance of the media
industries and of cable TV penetration. Approximately 83 million households subscribed to cable
TV in 2003.38 As a result, the feeding of cable networks head-ends is a robust business. During
the past 3 years, all cable platforms have recently increased the number of programs offered,
driving demand for satellite capacity up. In addition, the United States hosts the world's largest
producers of video content for TV; consequently, the exchanges of programs are growing
between North America and other markets, and this results in an increase in the number of
satellite transmissions.
*In satellite technology, backhaul refers to the transmission of data to a point from which it can be uplinked
to a satellite.
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In Latin America, video broadcasting represents half of total transponder demand.3 9 In 2003,
there was a limited growth in demand for video transponder, and it was generated mostly by
demand for broadcasting TV channels independent of the satellite pay-TV platforms. Video
contribution, however, has been a stable market in the region, with an annual average of 40
transponders in service for the feeds of cable TV networks and video content exchanges during
the past five years.
Western Europe is a heterogeneous market with significant differences in culture, business
practices, and competition, especially in the cable and free-to-air TV market (cable TV can reach
50% penetration in the northern countries, while it remains at less than 20% in France and the
UK). Approximately 67% of total transponder demand of the region comes from video services.
Transponder demand for video contribution and backhaul applications has decreased around 30%
since 1996, mostly because of an increase in compression rates, and because of the growing
competition of optical fiber. This decrease stopped in 2003, since a large number of live feeds,
cable feeds and programs exchanges were generated mainly by geopolitical events, especially the
Gulf War. In this context, satellite solutions are well suited for the live coverage of such events.
Growth in this sector should continue as long as major events (such as the European Football Cup
or the Soccer World Cup in Germany) and other news in the region continue to generate demand
for transponder capacity.
In 2003, transponder demand for video services in the Asia-Pacific region experienced an
increase of 8.5%.40 This growth in demand was mainly generated by video contribution and
backhaul services. Asia is the largest TV base with 470 million TV households. Most of the video
transponders in the region are used to broadcast TV channels independent of the satellite TV
platforms. The increase in transponder demand in 2003 for video contribution and backhaul
applications can be explained by the international geopolitical context, with several global news
and live video content of interest for the region, as well as content originating in the region that is
of interest for broadcasters around the world. Again, in this context, satellite services are in a
much better position to cover the broadcaster needs than terrestrial networks.
In general, providing satellite contribution services has become an inclusive industry where
broadcast companies benefit of the complementary of optical fiber and satellite networks to
backhaul and broadcast video content. Broadcast companies usually prefer fiber-optic cables to
transmit high volume and permanent video traffic routes. Nevertheless, satellite services remain
the primary solution for remote and far geographic market,4' as well as for service applications
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that require a higher degree of flexibility, such as live coverage of global news or major massive
events. Table 3.1 shows the optical fiber recently leased or bought by major satellite broadcast
service providers.
Table 3.1: Optical Fiber used by some satellite broadcast service providers4 2
(DataSource: Euroconsult)
Globecast (France Telecom) Paris / London; Transatlantic
BT Broadcast Services (BT) Paris / London; Transatlantic
New York / Washington / Los Angeles
North America / Latin America
Transpacific and Asian loop
Verestar (SES Americom) 10 points of presence (POP) in the US; Transatlantic
Williams Vyvx Traffic inside the US; Transatlantic (through partnerships);
Transpacific (through partnernships)
From a broader perspective, as a summary of this section, three elements can be identified that are
key to ensure that satellites as tools will continue to be resilient and deliver services in the
telecommunications industry. Firstly, the strong attribute of multiple access that satellites provide.
Secondly, the fact that satellites service providers continue to adapt to the evolving needs of the
market by providing more complete solutions and enhanced services. Finally, an important issue
to ensure the longevity of these tools will be that satellite businesses and ventures are managed
precisely as what they are: business, and not as technological experiments.4 3 In addition, the
recent partnerships between satellite operators and telecommunication companies are likely to
play an important role within the sector. If well managed, they might prove to be a new
successful business model in the satellite services industry. In this direction also, some of the
recent changes in the ownership structure of the satellite service providers are likely to bring a
more strict financial discipline within the major operators. Table 3.2 presents a summary of the
tradeoffs associated with the use of satellite and terrestrial networks.
77
Table 3.2: Summary of issues associated with the use of
terrestrial and satellite solutions.t
Terrestrial Solutions
+ Higher capacity
+ Reliable and modern network
infrastructure already deployed in
urban developed markets
+ Lower price per unit of capacity
Degradations in speed beyond a
specific distance from the central
office (CO) for DSL
Remote locations out of the reach
of terrestrial networks (e.g. 10%
of the 150 million households in
Europe) 44
High installation costs
Satellite solutions
+ Ubiquity in coverage:
a) Voice and data: Rural regions and
urban emerging markets (where there is
no terrestrial network infrastructure
deployed) represent a large market for
satellite operators
b) Video: Remote locations, where the
deployment of cable has been slow, are a
potential market for DTH TV
applications as well as for the backhaul
segment
+ Higher degree of flexibility: ideal for
applications that require immediate
implementation (such as live coverage of
global news, major massive events, or
natural disasters). Ease of reconfiguration
of coverage and capacity allows to easily
match peaks in demand.
+ "Bandwidth-on-demand" as a potential
source of cost-savings
+ Quick initial deployment
+ Less complex service contracts and
billing issues (a single service provider
delivers connectivity to all of the
company's locations)
- Lower capacity (although broadband
capacity delivered by new Ka-band
satellites launched in 2004 and 2005 is
expected to allow satellite solutions to
remain competitive)
- Higher cost of customer premises
equipment (CPE)
t The + or - refer to characteristics that are perceived as advantages or disadvantages, respectively.
78
Competing
technologies
_ I
Table 3.2 (continued): Summary of issues associated with the use of
terrestrial and satellite solutions
Terrestrial and Satellite solutions
Complementary Bundled solution with cable as the primary technology and satellite as a
alternatives back-up in case of disruption of the terrestrial service
For satellite operators, partnerships represent a good opportunity to avoid
a role of "commoditized transport provider", and therefore to become a
solutions provider instead of only a service provider.
Contribution services as an inclusive industry where broadcast companies
benefit of the complementary of optical fiber and satellite networks to
backhaul and broadcast video content
Capability to persuade customers to use hybrid solutions by bundling
services such as DTH TV with broadband connectivity
3.2. Challenges in urban areas
This section is devoted to the description of the challenges faced by satellite operators to
implement satellite solutions in urban areas.
The satellite services market is different in each region: every area presents its own challenges
and opportunities. The ultimate service provider will know how to develop added-value services
and implement flexible product strategies that will fit to each region's constraints and will allow
the operator to take advantage of the different business opportunities. As discussed in the
previous section of this chapter (3.1), satellite services have been pushed out of major cities in
developed countries (Tier 1 cities) and trans-oceanic routes by optical fiber cable and other
terrestrial technologies.4 5 This is resulting in a redirection of satellite operators' strategies. Four
main challenges that the operators face, especially in urban areas, are identified and discussed
below:
A) To sell their added-value services and new products over the already well-established
terrestrial access alternatives.4 6 In the case of new broadband services, for example, enterprises
have more flexibility to afford satellite services than residential customers, yet most of them are
concentrated in urban areas, where DSL and cable solutions are usually available. As a result,
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satellite operators will need to offer strong value propositions in order to convince firms to use
satellite as its complete solution for connectivity.4 7
B) To reduce customer premises equipment (CPE) and monthly services costs.48 Residential
broadband satellite services represent a significant opportunity for potential growth for satellite
operators, especially in Tier 2 and smaller cities where terrestrial solutions are not yet available.
Nevertheless, the lack of other alternatives will not drive end-users to adhere to satellite services
if the price is not competitive. Consumers in this sector are price-sensitive, and with CPE costing
around US$300 (as of July 2004)49, the development of this market is not likely to happen soon if
satellite operators cannot find a way to lower the initial cost, especially in urban regions where
the income distribution dynamics have a stronger impact on customer decision (such as Latin
America or Asia-Pacific). Until broadband satellite services become more affordable, their
market will be restrained to less cost-sensitive users such as SOHO.
C) Within the broadband Internet access market, one of the challenges is to develop a
technological solution for the lack of a return path (one-way versus two-way satellite
services).50 Even though one-way satellite services have some advantages (such as the fact that
the one-way service is considerably much cheaper to deploy than two-way services, and that it
covers most of the residential customer needs), it leaves customers with larger connectivity needs
dependent on a dial-up connection and an ISP account for uplink traffic (which is costly and
problematic). This is a serious disadvantage for customers that require more downstream
transmission capacity than the average residential user.
D) Finally, another downside in urban areas is the lack of clear DTH reception because a clear
view of the southern sky (or of the northern sky in the South Hemisphere) is not available
(for instance, if a tree, a building or any other object blocks the line of sight between the mini-
dish and the satellite). Although this problem currently occurs only in a small percentage of the
cases, it might condemn the broadband satellite services to remain a niche market with the
necessity to differentiate itself from other existing access solutions, by focusing on its unique
attributes (such as video content delivery and multicasting services).5'
In order to respond to these challenges, satellite operators have a number of alternatives. Some
examples of strategies that they could implement, or new services they could deploy, are
recommended below:
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1. DSL and cable will certainly help increase the penetration of broadband access into
businesses and consumers of Tier 1 cities. Satellite operators have therefore an
opportunity to increase their penetration outside those Tier 1 cities for last-mile
solutions, where terrestrial alternatives are not yet available. On the other hand, the
DSL/cable phenomenon within Tier 1 cities will also help drive traffic onto satellite and
backhauling/backbone services. Tier 2 cities represent an opportunity for potential
growth as the overall communications market grows.5 2 This market, however, represents
short-term opportunities in developing economies that are pushing for a large-scale
deployment of terrestrial networks. On the other hand, it is also likely that this window
reopen in the future, as demand outpaces terrestrial broadband availability in emerging
economies.5 3 An example of a broadband satellite service provider is WildBlue, a
Colorado-based company that is planning to deliver two-way satellite broadband access
to residential and SOHO markets, both in urban areas out of the reach of terrestrial
solutions and in rural areas. They plan to start operations in the second quarter of 200554,
serving what they believe is a large underserved market where wired broadband access is
not available. Low-price CPE and installation costs are critical for the success of the
venture.55 Finally, satellite solutions are highly appealing to SMB and SOHO because
DSL is often subject to possible degradations in speed depending on the distance to the
CO and, although the cost of satellite services is slightly higher, satellite solutions offer
SMBs and SOHOs the guaranty of quality and constant speed.56 Satellite operators should
therefore target markets outside of Tier I cities, i. e. rural areas (with little or no
terrestrial infrastructure) and urban areas out of the reach of terrestrial solutions.
2. Satellite operators have the opportunity to situate themselves as a complementary
alternative to terrestrial networks. By offering cost-effective bandwidth in smaller
cities (Tier 2 cities and smaller urban areas) and providing end-to-end solutions, they can
enlarge the range of their services and offer added value solutions. Some operators have
already implemented this strategy, one example is PanAmSat. This company purchased
transatlantic fiber that will be integrated with its satellite network to provide video and
data services.5 7 Offering this type of end-to-end services will probably bring the satellite
operators to direct competition with several of their customers that lease transponder
capacity. As a result, a new satellite service provider business model should be emerging
soon: operators need to choose where they want to add value across the value chain and
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identify new opportunities and partnerships that prevent them from being relegated to a
"transport provider" commoditized role.5 8 Partnerships with system integrators,
telecommunications companies and other customers are likely to be necessary in order to
build complete solutions that will satisfy customers' needs. Satellite operators need to
become a solutions provider instead of a services provider, i.e. they need to be a service
and network integrator.
3. Wi-Fi (wireless fidelity)59 technology might represent a unique business opportunity for
satellite operators. To date, a lack of affordability (since the satellite's upfront installation
cost is considerable higher than those of terrestrial technologies) has prevented the
satellite solution to become the third main technology in the broadband access market
(the first two being DSL and cable). Satellite service providers must therefore find ways
to offer affordable prices for their customer premises equipment (CPE). Using a mixed
Wi-Fi-satellite service could be a successful choice. This solution involves the use of
broadband satellite access for the backhaul, and Wi-Fi technology for local connectivity.
A VSAT terminal receives the satellite link and connects it to a Wi-Fi access point. A
wireless LAN can then be implemented and connect multiple users to the Internet.60 An
immediate application of this solution can be found in the market of wireless access
points (or hot spots). Common places for these hot spots include airports, restaurants,
hotels, and stores. Hughes Network Systems (HNS) is an example of the implementation
of this strategy. HNS launched D1RECWAY Wi-Fi Access, a solution that provides
customers with Internet access across North America.61 This type of solutions represents
an option for SMB (such as retailers and the leisure travel sector) to generate a new
revenue stream. The most likely candidates to benefit from this technology will be
companies that already use VSAT terminals, so that they don't incur in high up-front
CPE costs.
4. In order to lower costs, the recent developments in Ku-band technology and the launch in
2004 and 2005 of satellites with transponders operating in Ka-band frequencies should
allow satellite operators to provide their customers with more reliable and cheaper
access.62 Nevertheless, the problem of high upfront CPE costs is likely to restraint the
development of the broadband services market to residential users. WildBlue expects to
drive down their CPE costs to below US$400.63 This will be a key element for the
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success of their business model and for the deployment of the broadband satellite access
market, and the market response to this cost is uncertain.
5. Finally, satellite operators could develop a wholesale strategy through partnerships
with telcos or cable operators to increase their services' reach and reputation.6 4 In
markets where satellite services are not yet provided, a wholesale strategy would allow
operators to complement their retail markets. The rationale behind this strategy is that it
should be easier to sell an unknown satellite service through firms that are already
established and have customers' loyalty, such as telecommunications companies or cable
operators.
The goal of this section was to discuss the most important issues faced by satellite services
providers in urban areas. The next section introduces the reader to issues related to the
deployment of satellite services in rural regions.
3.3. Opportunities for rural connectivity (e.g., Aramiska and Twister project in
Europe)
This section provides an overview of the current business opportunities that satellite operators
have in the rural telecommunications market. Two examples of current undergoing projects that
promote rural connectivity, namely the TWISTER project, and Aramiska, are also discussed
herein.
As stated in the previous section, the expansion of optical fiber in the backbone infrastructure and
last-mile solutions such as DSL have accelerated the development of the telecommunications
industry in developed regions. As a result, fewer business opportunities are available for satellite
operators in urban areas. However, a young telecommunications market in rural areas is creating
new potential business prospects. These opportunities include broadband services and voice
applications. The voice market in developing regions, such as Latin America and Asia-Pacific,
includes fixed telephony services (both satellite mainlines and satellite phone booth), as well as
other rural networking facilities that are unlikely to be served by terrestrial alternatives due to the
high costs of deploying terrestrial network infrastructure from scratch. These are mostly
consumer markets, and some forecast studies suggest a small but steady growth rate within the
next ten years.6 5
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The other satellite application that is considered to have a significant growth potential in the rural
market within the near future is the provision of broadband satellite services. Broadband Services
Providers (BSP)66 see the satellite alternative as a cost-effective solution to provide consumers
out of the reach of terrestrial networks with a comparable service to DSL and cable. The biggest
obstacle to fully deploy satellite broadband services has been the high cost of implementing bi-
directional access (i.e. two-way data transmissions). However, the great coverage provided by
satellite communications allows a quick deployment of broadband access to customers out of the
reach of terrestrial solutions. All in all, satellite operators have a potential market in this sector,
and some of them (such as Astra and Eutelsat in Europe)68 have already started to expand their
broadband service offering in rural areas, that have high demand for advanced services. The most
important submarkets are consumers, SMB, and enterprises with remote locations dispersed over
vast geographic areas.69 In the United Sates, WildBlue Communications (supported by the
National Rural Telecommunications Cooperative) is planning to provide two-way satellite
broadband access in rural areas across North America, by using a high-powered spot beam
technology and standards-based end-user terminals that employ the Data-Over-Cable Service
Interface Specification (DOCSIS) technology in order to reduce CPE costs.7 0
Another recent hybrid technology that offers satellite service providers a distinctive market
opportunity is the use of Wi-Fi and satellite to provide broadband access to the Internet in small
rural communities, where terrestrial broadband solutions are not easily available. The rural area
receives the satellite signal at a VSAT terminal located within the community, from where
residents and small business can receive the data through a wireless access point. This solution
significantly lowers the cost of a satellite-only alternative, since wireless adaptors are
considerably less expensive than satellite receivers.7 ' As a result several customers share the cost
of the satellite service.
In general, rural connectivity by satellite represents a good opportunity for satellite operators
around the world. Every geographical region has vast areas out of the reach of terrestrial
networks, either because of the topology of the area, or because of the high implementation
costs. 72
In Europe, the broadband services industry is still evolving. The market is fragmented and
European Union's member and non-member countries face regulatory problems. Nevertheless,
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approximately 15 million households are out of the reach of DSL/cable,7 3 making the broadband
industry a market with great potential for satellite operators. Service providers have the greatest
potential in rural and peripheral areas. The European Commission (EC) launched the eEurope
2005 Action Plan, which aims to bring broadband connectivity at competitive prices to rural
communities, in order to stimulate information availability and economic revival.74 Broadband
access is considered to be a key factor for the deployment of modern public services such as e-
government, e-health, and e-learning.
The EC has strongly supported broadband access through alternative technologies. It is currently
subsidizing the TWISTER (Terrestrial Wireless Infrastructure Integrated with Satellite
Telecommunication for E-Rural) project. Launched in February 2004, this venture will provide
broadband services through satellite and Wi-Fi technology to approximately 100 rural areas
across Europe (Spain, France, Sweden, Poland, Greece, Malta) over a period of three years.7 5 The
project consists in providing free broadband access for 18 months, and then charging the access at
rates similar to those of DSL services.7 6 The objectives of the European Commission are to
reduce the digital gap between urban and rural areas, to increase the numbers of broadband
subscribers, and to force costs down.7 7 The project is led by EADS Astrium, and is partially
funded under the Aeronautics and Space priority of the EU's Sixth Research Framework
Programme (FP6). From a total budget of E8.5 million, E5 million will be provided by the EC.7 8
The TWISTER consortium involves several stakeholders of the telecommunications value chain,
including satellite operators, satellite and wireless equipment manufacturers, universities, and
research organizations.
Aramiska is a satellite service provider that started offering broadband access solutions in Europe
in 2003. It offers high-speed Internet access, mainly to businesses, using a two-way satellite
technology.7 9 This type of solution provides customers with cost-effective, high-speed and
"always-on" connections. Aramiska is one of the satellite service providers that are leading the
broadband satellite access industry, positioning the satellite solution as an alternative to terrestrial
providers. Furthermore, Aramiska's strategy follows a new business model that focus on
delivering customized global solutions for the customer's specific needs. Aramiska's main
customers today are local rural businesses and large multi-site enterprises with locations spread
across Europe.
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3.4. Trans-oceanic satellite traffic and underwater cable
This section discusses the key issues associated with trans-oceanic communications. A
comparative analysis of the two technologies, namely satellite and underwater cable, is presented
here, followed and supported by some figures about the current trends in capacity and usage of
trans-oceanic satellite networks.
Before the deployment of underwater optical fiber cable, point-to-point trunking service
applications were the main source of revenue for satellite services providers within the
international satellite business (mostly trans-oceanic). Since the advent and installation of the
higher-capacity cable infrastructure, there has been a recurrent debate and discussion about
whether the two types of solutions are competing or complementary technologies, and to what
extent satellite can compete against underwater cable.
Trans-oceanic satellite and cable traffic demand have similarities and differences. Both markets
often experience similar trends. For instance, in the early 2000s, there was a shift towards private
line and data traffic from voice traffic carried on the trans-Atlantic networks.80 Later, satellite
started conveying a substantial part of the trans-Atlantic Internet traffic, offering other data
transmission services as well. A difference between both technologies is the fact that around 20%
of the trans-oceanic satellite transponder capacity is used to transmit video and other
miscellaneous services (such as occasional video),8 l whereas video represents an insignificant
percentage in underwater cable traffic. This trend, however, is changing as telcos are seeking to
use underwater optical fiber cables to transmit video contents on specific routes.
An important advantage of underwater cable over satellite networks is the capacity. It is evident
that trans-oceanic cable networks have a much greater capacity. In 1997, for instance, trans-
Atlantic satellite capacity represented about 2% of cable capacity.8 2 Nevertheless, it is difficult to
estimate the exact available bandwidth that some underwater cable systems provide. The reason is
that, often, it is not clear how much capacity is reserved to handle emergency reconfigurations
and how much is actually available for regular service.83
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In any case, nowadays it is rather clear that in the long-term satellites will hardly be a substitute
or a competitor to trans-oceanic underwater cable, because it would be extremely difficult to
match or exceed the capacity of optical fiber cables that telcos and cable operators have been
deploying since the 1990s. The U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) stated, in a
report of the trans-oceanic communications market in the late 1990s, that satellite systems do "not
appear to be an adequate substitute for submarine capacity".84
There are, however, some engineering challenges faced by underwater cable operators that might
allow satellite systems to remain in this market (the trans-oceanic communications) as a
complementary alternative to fiber cable. The shape and behavior of the deep ocean bed is for the
most part unknown. Some studies suggest that there is more known about the surface of the moon
than about the ocean floor.8 5 The layout of underwater cable is therefore technically challenging,
and its operation involves important risks of disruption. Some of the physical obstacles that
submarine cables have to avoid are hundreds of volcanoes and seismic activity beneath the sea
floor. Another important source of incidents with underwater cables come from artificial elements
such as anchors or fishing nets. Cable damages such as compression, dragging or breakage are
not rare. A preventive solution involves using armors or shield and burying the cables to protect
them from anchors that can penetrate the sea floor by several meters.8 6 Satellite operators may
therefore get some benefit from the trans-oceanic communications market by providing a backup
solution, should disruptions in the underwater network occur. In the near future, however, this
role as backup to cable might be threatened, since modem underwater cable systems are intended
to be "self-restoring".8 7 New systems are designed as long loops, linking pairs of continental
stations. In other words, under this design, two points on one side of the ocean (separated some
hundreds of km) are connected to two similar points on the other side of the ocean. The signals
are usually transmitted through the primary cable, and they are switched to the secondary path
(within milliseconds) if there is any disruption on the main line. The cables are usually laid out
several hundreds of kilometers apart. This reduces considerably the probability of having both
cables affected by one potential incident, and improves the overall availability of the system (the
cable "ring"), making the system "self-healing" or "self-restoring".88
Yet, there is still another advantage of satellite systems over underwater networks that is allowing
satellite service providers to keep a share of the trans-oceanic communications market, and it is
the ease of reconfiguration. Cable traffic is concentrated at landing sites on both sides of the
ocean, while satellite traffic can be easily redirected to any spots within the coverage area of the
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satellite. In other words, once the underwater cable is installed between two landing stations, the
traffic going through it cannot go anywhere else, whereas satellite solutions can be adapted to
different needs, such as a shift in traffic between the U.S. and Western Europe, to Eastern Europe,
or the Middle East or Africa.8 9 In addition to this, underwater cable operators also realize that
satellite solutions have an unambiguous competitive advantage for point-to-multipoint broadcast
and low-volume transmissions.9 0
In the 1990s, as a result of a steady demand for transmission capacity of video content, together
with forecasts of unconstrained growth in Internet traffic, several satellite operators launched
satellites to mid-ocean slots. The excessive forecast of growth in Internet traffic and the parallel
deployment of trans-oceanic optical fiber cables shifted most of the trans-oceanic point-to-point
traffic away from satellite systems. The trans-oceanic communications business became a niche
market for satellite operators: as of early 2004 it represented only 8% of the total satellite
demand.91 The market is largely served by 39 satellites in slots over the Pacific and the Atlantic.
As of early 2004, these satellites were experiencing an average utilization rate of 58%, and 60%
of the utilized capacity was serving regional continental markets rather than the trans-oceanic
routes.9 2 Figure 3.5 shows the usage of trans-oceanic satellite capacity in 2003, by service
application.
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Figure 3.5: Usage of Trans-oceanic satellite capacity in 200393
(Data Source: Futron Corporation)
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3.5. WiMAX, a disruptive ~ technology? 94
This section provides a brief description of WiMAX, an emerging broadband technology that
might play a key role in the telecommunications industry within the next few years (timeframe
2005-2007).
extensive
Consumers and telecommunication service providers are encountering an increasing number of
broadband access technology options. After some telcos (such as AT&T and MCi) ruled out the
fixed-wireless strategies several years ago, the development of wireless technologies slowed
down. Yet, vendors kept on developing a new generation of wireless solutions to eliminate key
technological problems such as issues related to line-of-sight, and to expensive upfront
installations (cost of CPE). 95
WiMAX, short for Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access, is a wireless technology
based on the standard 802.16d of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE
802.16d). This essentially means that WiMAX technology is compatible with the WiFi
technology. WiMax provides "high-throughput broadband connections over long distances",96
and has the potential to be used as a "last-mile" solution to deliver high-speed connectivity to
enterprises and the residential market. This new technology will offer metropolitan area network
(MAN) broadband access at speeds up to 75 Mb per second, and it can be used to transmit data to
locations up to 30 miles away (although under the current deployment plans by Intel and the
WiMAX Forum, a WiMAX base-station will cover an average of three to five miles). 97
Currently, last-mile connections are provided by cable, DSL and satellite networks. The two main
problems with these existing broadband technologies are cost (high cost of deployment or high
cost of CPE) and coverage (locations out of the reach of terrestrial networks). On the other hand,
the essential issue that has prevented the WiFi technology to develop as a solution to broadband
connectivity is that access spots cover only small areas (rooms or buildings). WiMAX is a
technology that would provide high-speed broadband access, wireless access (therefore with
significant lower deployment costs than DSL or cable), and broad coverage (similar to a cell
A disruptive technology is a new technological innovation, product or service that eventually overturns
the existing dominant technology in the market. A disruptive technology comes to dominate an existing
market by either filling a role in a new market that the older technology could not fill or by successively
moving up-market through performance improvements until finally displacing the market incumbent. The
term was defined by Clayton M. Christensen in 1997. The reader is referred to Ref. 94 for a more extensive
definition of the concept.
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phone network).9 8 As a result, it represents both an opportunity (to the customers) to reduce the
cost of providing these services and a threat to the competitor technologies (satellite solutions
included).
Intel Corporation is driving the development of WiMAX networks. The deployment is planned in
three phases: the first one (by June 2005) will deliver "fixed wireless connections via outdoor
antennas".9 9 This type of access is likely to be used for high-throughput enterprise connectivity
(similar to T1 services), backhaul and cellular networks (and probably also for premium
residential services). By the second half of 2005, indoor installations will be deployed by using
smaller antennas similar to current Wi-Fi access points. Within this model, since the technology
will be "user installable), WiMAX is likely to be offered to large consumer residential markets,
and is expected to lower installation costs for carriers. Finally, by 2006, Intel is planning on
integrating WiMAX solutions into portable devices "to support roaming between WiMAX
service areas".100°° This technology should prove useful and attractive in particular to emerging
markets, where terrestrial networks are poorly or not deployed. High-speed Internet access to
customers with currently no access (or even with little access to wired phones) might be a reality
at lower or similar costs to those of DSL, cable and satellite broadband access. Regions such as
India, Mexico, and China, should find WiMAX particularly attractive, since the cost of deploying
wire networks around the countries would make broadband connectivity too expensive.' °0
At the time this thesis is being written, there is no clear outlook or forecast of the impact that the
development of WiMAX will have in the telecommunications market. Nonetheless, it is clear that
in order to remain competitive, broadband access operators (satellite service providers included)
will have to offer complete solutions and not only to provide a telecommunication service.
Strategic partnerships in order to offer a mix of broadband access technologies (such as DSL,
cable, Satellite, WiMAX, and WiFi) that allows operators to provide bundled voice, video and
data transmission services will be fundamental. 10 2
3.6. Summary and Conclusions
The central question of the first part of this thesis was exposed in this chapter: Are satellite
communications competing or complementary technologies to terrestrial networks -in what
context and for what service applications? The chapter started with what is one of the conceptual
contributions of this thesis: the definition of a framework designed to develop a comparative
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analysis between satellite and terrestrial telecommunication services. This framework is
structured around three axes: type of solution, service application, and geographic market. The
type of solution refers to satellite versus terrestrial networks. The service application perspective
divides the satellite communications market in two categories: transmission of voice and data, or
transmission of video contents. The third axis is about comparing both solutions (satellite and
terrestrial) in three major geographic markets: urban areas in developed markets, urban areas in
emerging regions, and rural areas in general. Then, Chapter 3 presented an overview of the major
terrestrial competitor technologies to satellite solutions, namely Fiber Cable and DSL networks.
The most important advantages of satellite technologies over terrestrial networks were
investigated: coverage, multiple access, distribution and flexibility. Afterwards, the chapter
continued with a thorough discussion of the tradeoffs associated with the use of satellites or
terrestrial solutions to deliver a specific service application (transmission of voice and date, or
video) in different geographic markets (urban-developed, urban-emerging, and rural in general).
Challenges and opportunities in urban and rural areas were also explored. Specific examples (i.e.
projects such as WildBlue, TWISTER, Aramiska) of rural opportunities for connectivity were
provided and discussed.
In conclusion, the case was made that in general, a) satellite solutions have important competitive
advantages for the transmission of data (and or voice) in rural areas as well as in urban regions in
emerging markets, where terrestrial networks have not been deployed and the option of deploying
these networks today makes terrestrial solutions less financially and technically attractive than
space-based solutions; b) in the market of video transmission, the DTH applications represent the
most dynamic market, in both urban and rural areas in developed and emerging countries, and it
also has the most potential growth for satellite operators. Other video service applications such as
contribution (video contents exchange between broadcasters) and feed of cable TV head-ends
should prove to be a steady market for satellite service providers. On the other hand, the author of
this thesis believes that satellite operators might find it valuable to forge partnerships with some
of their market competitors (i.e., DSL and cable providers), in order to exploit the dual character
(competing/complementary) of the telecommunication networks. Lastly, Chapter 3 closed with an
overview and outlook for a new technology, the Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave
Access (WiMAX), which might considerably impact the satellite services industry in the near
future, although at the time this thesis is being written, the WiMAX technology is too early in its
commercial development stage in order to assess the consequences it might have on satellite
operators.
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Chapter 4
The Regulatory Environment for Satellite
Operators and the
Policy-making process for
Space-based Communications
At the beginning of the space era, the role of space-based communications was to provide a
means to connect people located in distant fixed points on Earth. Since then, satellite
communications have evolved to a situation where they play a central role in promoting and
developing different types of human activities (such as entertainment, business, and education)
across the globe.1 Issues related to communications satellites have therefore transcended national
and regional boundaries. Currently, the dynamics of international communications are shaped by
several factors and by the interests of different stakeholders (that are not necessarily always
aligned). In the last two decades, the main stakeholders of the FSS industry, namely the satellite
operators, have gone from being publicly-owned regulated monopolies to competitive
international corporations. The main sources of influence and market power in the satellite
communications industry have therefore shifted from publicly-controlled companies, to
multinational firms who have experienced a period of deregulation in the last few years.2 At the
time this thesis is being written, however, the industry shows traits of a new period of regulation
and control by privately-owned companies. These firms, with significant influence on the
behavior of the market, are playing an increasingly decisive role when it comes to the negotiation
of international regulatory treaties.3 As a result, the legal context of space communications has
gradually become a more complex set of international and regional agreements, worldwide and
national regulations, and intricate relationships between private corporations, regulatory bodies,
governments, and international organizations.4 This chapter provides an overview of the
regulatory environment for satellite service providers. It also delineates what, in the opinion of
the author, might be the shape of the space communications policy in the near future. A detailed
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analysis of the legal context mentioned above is out of the scope of this thesis. The reader is
referred to Ref. 5 [Stalin, 2000] for a comprehensive discussion of the complexity of satellite
communications regulations.
The first section of this chapter provides an historical background on international regulatory
bodies, followed by an overview of what the author considers to be two of the most important
regulatory issues, namely, frequency/orbit allocation and space environmental pollution. The
second section of the chapter is devoted to the description of the space policies implemented by
the United States and the European Union in order to promote and develop satellite
communications.
4.1. Satellite communications regulations
This section is devoted to the description of some key issues within the regulatory context of the
satellite services industry. The first subsection provides the reader with a historical perspective on
the origins of international regulatory bodies. The subsequent subsections introduce what the
author considers to be two of the most important issues in satellite communication regulations:
subsection 4.2 discusses the spectrum/orbit allocation and the orbital spacing policy implemented
by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the United States. Subsection 4.3 focuses
on matters related to space environment pollution, i.e., the disposal of spatial debris.
4.1.1. The needfor regulation
The origins of space-based communications regulations can be traced back to the 1960s. The first
space treaty was developed after the first U.S.S.R. and United States satellites were launched.6
Space activities were still a duopoly formed by these two countries. In fact, satellite
communications were born as a product of a deterrent strategy implemented during the Cold
War.7 Space-based communications laws are therefore international in nature, where governments
and sovereign states are the law-makers. Since international telecommunications were seen as an
extension of national telecommunications, the publicly-controlled monopolies (e.g., COMCAST)
that represented national interests in a international satellite organization (e.g., INTELSAT) had
control over the regulatory framework of satellite communications.8
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The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is the largest international regulatory body
for telecommunication issues. It started as the International Telegraph Union in 1865 with 20
founding members.9 At that time, its mission was to define standards to facilitate international
interconnection through telegraph networks. The first regulations of wireless telegraphy were
issued in 1906 during the first International Radiotelegraph Conference in Berlin.'0 These
regulations evolved and expanded their scope throughout the years. Today, they are known as
Radio Regulations and, together with other international conventions, they establish
recommendations and standards for the use of radio frequencies and satellite orbits. The ITU took
its current name in 1932, when the International Telegraph Union decided to combine the
International Telegraph Convention of 1865 and the International Radiotelegraph Convention of
1906 to form the International Telecommunication Convention. The scope of the responsibilities
of the TU was expanded and by that time it covered "all forms of wireline and wireless
communication"." The first international regulations concerning satellite communications were
issued in 1963. They were the product of the ITU Extraordinary Administrative Radio
Conference, and they allocated frequencies to the different space-based communication
services.12 These conventions and regulations are the result of different interests, complex
relationships among the countries members, technical constraints, and national legal restrictions.
The role of the ITU is often considered to be that of a regulator, but it is in fact more the role of a
coordinator.13 The two basic conventions related to activities in the Outer Space are the Liability
and the Registration conventions. They state that a) the country members have full responsibility
of the activities carried by any of their national institutions that are also members of the ITU, and
b) the country member itself has to conduct a registration procedure in order to place a satellite in
a geo-stationary orbit. In addition to the ITU regulations, any organization that wishes to provide
satellite services or to establish a satellite network has to comply with the current regulations of
its home country in order to launch, implement and operate any system or network.14 It is
important to note that after the last trend of "de-regulation" (started in the U.S. in 1972 with the
"Open Skies" decision, but really implemented since the 1980s)'5 , a large number of the
regulations and restrictions to the operation of satellite systems has been eased or eliminated in
many countries (at least from a legal perspective, although from a market perspective, the satellite
services industry is one with relatively high barriers to entry). The second section of this chapter
provides a more detailed analysis of the telecommunication policies implemented in the United
States and Europe. In the next subsection, the reader will find a discussion of one of the
fundamental issues in satellite communication regulations: frequency and orbital allocation.
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4.1.2. Spectrum and orbit allocation
In Chapter 1 the author defined three main types of commercial satellite communication services
were defined, namely Fixed Satellite Services (FSS), Direct Broadcast Services (DBS), and
Mobile Satellite Services (MSS). From a technical perspective, however, the ITU Radio
Regulations define 38 different types of radio communication services. Satellite networks can
provide 17 of these 38 types defined by the ITU.' 6 In order to provide these services, satellite
operators use frequency spectra allocated by the ITU Radio Regulations. The allocation of these
frequencies usually takes place during the World Radio Conferences (WRC), and is done on a
world and regional basis. 7 Satellite services require two frequencies, one for "uplink"
communications and another one for "downlink" communications. New services that are intended
to deliver high-speed data require a wider bandwidth than traditional services. The allocation of
the frequency spectrum for satellite communication services started in 6/4 GHz or C-band, with
an allocation of 500 MHz that was also used by terrestrial microwave links.' 8 As more
transmission capacity was demanded, the GEO orbit slots were filled up with satellites operating
at C-band, and satellites were then built to operate in the next available frequency, 14/12-11 GHz
or Ku-band. 19 In the early 2000s, there was an increasing demand for a wider bandwidth in order
to provide new high-speed services (e.g., broadband access to the Internet). This has resulted in
the use of the Ka-band (30/20GHz) and higher frequencies, although these bands are subject to
high meteorological attenuation of the signal and other elements of interference (above 20 GHz of
frequency, attenuation caused by thunderstorms can be strong enough to make the link fail)20.
Throughout different World Radio Conferences (WRC), the allocation of different frequencies
has included bands L, S, C, Ku, K, Ka, V, and Q bands. FSS and DBS services provided by GEO
satellites use frequencies that range from 3.2 to 50 GHz, while Mobile Satellite Services use
frequencies ranging from 0.137 to 2.5 GHz, or L- and S-bands.2 1 Table 4.1 shows the allocation
of frequencies for FSS and DBS (also called BSS).
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Table 4.1: Frequency allocations for FSS and DBS (also called BSS). DataSource: ITU 22
Typical frequency Usual Mainly used by:Radiocommunications service bands for terminology
uplink/downlink
Fixed service
Fixed Satellite Services (FSS) 6 / 4 Ghz C band Fixed serviceterrestrial microwave
Military
communication /8 / 7 Ghz X band communicationDigital Radio feeder
links
Fixed service14 / 12-1 1 GHz Ku band Fixedserviceterrestrial microwave
Local multichannel
30 / 20 GHz Ka band distribution service
(LMDS)
Digital Radio /Broadcasting Satellite Services 2 / Digital2.2 GHz S band NASA and deep(FSS) 2 / 2.2 GHz S band NASA and deep
space research
12 GHz Ku band Direct-to-User
transmissions
* The BSS use a frequency of about 12 GHz for downlinks. The uplinks transmissions are carried
by the FSS (feeder links).
In 1993, the TU created the Radiotelecommunication Sector (ITU-R Sector). The objective of
the ITU-R Sector is to "ensure rational, equitable, efficient and economical use of the radio-
frequency spectrum and satellite orbits".2 3 The Radiocommunication Bureau (BR) coordinates
and manages the work of the ITU-R Sector. The BR is also in charge of registering frequency
assignments and orbital parameters of space-based communication services. It also maintains the
Master International Frequency Register (MIFR). In order to promote the efficient use of the
spectrum, many frequencies are allocated to more than one service. These frequency bands are
therefore "shared" by several services. Typical examples of services sharing frequencies are the
FSS and the fixed service (FS) or radio-relay links.2 4 This sharing is possible because the GEO
orbit arch is far above the "local horizon", and since the FS links travel at that level, the problem
of interference can be easily managed. During the WRC in 1997, the Radio Regulations (RR)
were revised in order to establish "procedures and limits to prevent harmful interference form
affecting the proper operation services sharing the same frequency bands or networks of a certain
service operating in the same frequency bands".25 In addition to the frequency allocation, one of
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the key regulatory issues in satellite communications is the effective use of the spectrum in order
to avoid interference in the transmission of signals. There are different types of interference and
different measures have to be taken to avoid them. The most common types of interference are: a)
between different networks (providing the same service) operating in the same band, b) when a
band is shared by more than one service, interference between the Earth or space stations of
different services.
The radio-frequency spectrum and the GEO orbit are limited resources and it is necessary to
ensure an efficient and economical use of them. They are considered to be a natural resource and,
as stated above, they are regulated by a complex set of international and multilateral agreements
and conventions adopted during international conferences organized by the ITU.26 The
spectrum/orbit are two inherent characteristics to the satellite communication services and, today,
they are considered as part of a common humankind heritage. The RR Resolution 2 introduces
principles stating the "equitable use, by all countries, with equal rights, of the GSO and of
frequency bands for space Radiocommunication services".2 7 According to these principles, all
countries should have equal rights in the use of both resources (frequency and orbit). A constant
source of international negotiations and disputes however is the acquisition or allocation of
orbital slots (the position in the GEO orbit arc where the commercial satellites orbit around the
Earth). Most orbital slots are "available" on a "first come, first served" rule.28 A country only has
to file a "notice of intention" to the ITU in order to launch a satellite to a specific orbital position.
Priority is therefore given on the so-called "first come, first served" basis. However, this should
not translate into a nation having the exclusive right to use a specific slot. To a certain extent,
"priority" means that any satellite to be launched to the same slot (or a near one) in the future has
to be operated in a way that it does not cause interference to the transmissions of the previous
satellite, but it should not prevent the use of the same slot to any other country.
Demand for voice, data, and video transmission capacity was steadily increasing in the United
States domestic satellite communications market in the 1980s. 29 Additional domestic satellites
were needed in order to meet the demand, but the orbital slots available were limited. In order to
promote a more efficient use of the GEO orbit, the FCC in the United States implemented an
"orbital spacing" policy in 1983. Prior to this date, domestic satellites launched to a GEO orbital
slot needed to comply with a minimum separation of 4 degrees at 6/4 GHz and 3 degrees at 12/14
GHz. Such orbital separations were large enough to guarantee no interference between different
services or networks operating in the same range of frequencies. The FCC reduced the orbital
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separations to 2 degrees in both bands and implemented technical constraints and regulations in
order to guarantee that there would be no interference in satellite transmissions.3 0 These resulted
in an increase in transmission capacity that allowed satellite operators to meet the growing
domestic demand at that time. In recent years, as demand continued to grow, it has been proposed
to further reduce this separation. However, analysts of the industry think that this separation
would create interference problems hard to solve with the existing transmission and reception
technology. This, together with the dynamic allocation of the frequency spectrum, is one of the
central issues in the satellite communications regulatory environment nowadays. Another
important issue that needs to be regulated is the space environment pollution. The next subsection
provides an overview of the current state of regulations in that matter.
4.1.3. Orbital Debris
This subsection briefly discusses the existing legal framework related to the disposal of space
debris, from both an international and a U.S. perspective.
A simple definition of orbital debris includes a) spacecraft that is no longer in operation, b) spent
rocket parts, and c) materials released during space operations. Space debris are certainly
scattered at different altitudes, but the majority of the debris are concentrated in altitudes where
there is an intense space activity, i.e. between the 800-1000 km of LEO and around the 36,000 of
GEO. Over 30,000 artificial space bodies have been detected by ground radars,3 ' and the
consequences of a collision could be extremely serious (a debris of 10cm with a relative speed of
I Okm/sec., for instance, has "a destructive power greater than 1 kg of TNT" 32).
Several simulation models provide different results about the probability of an impact for any
given object at LEO or GEO. They all agree, however, that if no regulation is implemented, by
2100 the number of collisions with an impact on any of the satellite networks that are currently
operating in GEO could be up to 50, and it could be up to 15 even if all spatial launches were
stopped after 2025.3 3 Unlike satellites in LEO (which sooner or later fall back to Earth due to the
atmospheric drag), GEO satellites do not naturally spiral back to Earth: they remain in the
geostationary ring forever, cramming and endangering what must be considered as a precious
piece of real state. However, the situation in GEO is far more delicate. A serious concern about
GEO satellites is that, once they are abandoned up there, they don't stay in their allocated orbital
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slot. The "non-uniform nature of Earth's gravity creates two stable orbit points in the
geostationary ring: one above India at longitude 75 degrees east and one over the Pacific at 105
degrees west".3 4 Any abandoned object in the GEO ring will therefore float towards the nearest
stable point and swing through (like a pendulum). A survey by the European Space Agency
(ESA) in 2004, revealed that out of 34 satellites abandoned between 1997 and 2003, 22 are
oscillating over India and 10 over the Pacific.3 5 This situation not only increases significantly the
risk of collision, but should a collision occur, it is likely that it will trigger a chain reaction. One
collision could easily result in the destruction of all of the objects currently orbiting in half of the
slots in the geostationary ring. Should two collisions occur, the entire GEO ring could be wiped
out! In the words of an ESA executive, "if we don't make some dramatic changes in the
[enforcement of space debris policy in the] geostationary ring now, [...] we will end up with a
garbage ring like Saturn's".3 6 This would obviously have devastating consequences not only for
satellite operators but also for the future of the telecommunications on Earth.
Although several methods to control and reduce the density of debris around the LEO and GEO
have been proposed, most of them are not possible to implement with today's technology. The
only real solution is to legislate and regulate spacecraft disposal in a way such that operators have
to propel them to orbits far from LEO and GEO. This, however, will certainly have a financial
impact on satellite service providers. For instance, in order to propel a standard GEO satellite to
an orbit where it cannot cause damage as debris, around 6 kg of fuel are needed. This represents
something between two and three months of revenue-earning operation.3 7 In 2003, out of 13
geostationary satellites that were put of operation, only 5 were propelled to safe "graveyard"
orbits. 3 8
Until recently, the FCC had not issued any regulation related to spatial debris. In June 2004 it
established a regulation that forces all U.S.-licensed satellites launched after March 2002 to be
propelled to a "graveyard" orbit between 200 and 300 kilometers above the GEO orbit.39 This
regulation set the path for other standards around the world, since no other nation with space
activity, or international regulatory body, has regulated about spatial debris. Prior to that
regulation, there were only "soft recommendations" about the disposal of unused spacecraft that
were ignored most of the time. Both commercial and government satellites operators agree that if
no action was taken to control de disposal of spatial debris, objects around the GEO "could
ultimately shut down the space industry".40 The new regulation established by the FCC is based
on recommendations issued by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordinating Committee (IADC),
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an international organism that includes representatives from 11 of the world's most space-active
countries.4 ' Under the new rules, satellite operators are required to commit to propel their
satellites to a safe orbit at the end of their lifetime in order to obtain a license to provide satellite
services in the United States.
On the other hand, in the international arena, regulation about spatial debris has not yet been
issued. Nevertheless, in an effort to control the damage that might be caused by spatial debris, the
United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN-COPUOS) initiated a study
about the issue. The committee has already finished its technical study. However, "its legal Sub-
Committee is yet to formulate a Spatial Debris Treaty to be signed by all member states".4 2
4.2. Space communications policy
The regulatory environment, especially the allocation of spectrum and orbit, plays often a
fundamental role in determining the success of any satellite-based venture. Satellite regulations,
however, are only a means to implement a broader plan or course of action developed (most often
by governments) to influence and shape the dynamics of the communications industry. The set of
goals and actions specified in this type of plans constitutes what is known as a space
communications policy. While the previous section provided an overview of regulatory issues
associated with satellite operators, this section introduces the reader to some of the key policies
associated with satellite communications. The first subsection presents a summary of the
evolution of the space telecommunications policy in the United States, paying especial attention
to the "Open Skies" policy. The second subsection is devoted to the description of the space
policy implemented by the European Union in order to promote and develop satellite
communications.
4.2.1. The "Open Skies" and the U.S. telecommunications policy.
The United States government started to develop a space communications policy in the 1960s.
President John F. Kennedy delineated the general principles of U.S. policy "in regard to satellite
communications and made the first unambiguous references to a single worldwide system"4 3
Months later, the U.S. Congress suggested that the International Telecommunications Union
revised the portion of satellite communications where international collaboration was going to be
necessary. In 1962, the U.S. Congress passed the Communications Satellite Act, which lays the
ground for a commercial investment in an international satellite organization. 44 Two years later,
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representatives of 12 countries signed an agreement to form an organization that would later
become the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT). A company
was then created in the U.S. to represent national interests within Intelsat: Comsat. At that time,
the Bell System was a monopoly in the long-distance telephone communications market within
the United States. The Bell System was excluded from any direct participation in satellite
communications.
In the United States, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is the government agency
that has authority over the satellite communications market. However, the U.S. Congress and
other organizations within the administration exert important influence in shaping the
telecommunications policy of the country. The monopoly of AT&T, the only telecommunications
operator in the U.S., started to be dismantled in the 1960s. The FCC was originally in favor of
conserving the monopoly, but became later a strong supporter of open competition in the
telecommunications industry.4 5 In 1970, President Nixon asked the FCC to design a strategy to
liberalize the satellite communications market. The FCC issued therefore the "Open Skies
Decision" in 1972, opening to competition the market of communications by satellite. Since then,
the industry has experienced a significant growth in the United States, especially in the radio and
television broadcasting sectors (both FSS and DBS).4 6 The first set of satellite regulations was
developed by the FCC in the 1980s. These regulations concerned mostly the FSS using GEO
satellites.
In regard to the FSS industry, one can identify two key impacts of deregulation on satellite
operators. Firstly, the implementation of the Open Skies policy in 1972 naturally resulted in a
consolidation of satellite manufacturers and satellite operators.4 7 This consolidation was further
promoted by the decision of the Federal Trade Commission, in 1995, of approving the merger of
two of the largest satellite operators in the industry: Lockheed Corporation and Martin Marietta
Corporation. In the opinion of some industry analysts, the FTC policy was helping "the aerospace
industry to reconstitute itself'.4 8 Secondly, another set of satellite regulations were issued by the
FCC in 1994 in order to promote "the creation of innovative new global broadband satellite
services (Ka-band)".4 9
Another important piece of legislation related to the industry was the Telecommunications Act of
1996. As stated in its introduction, its goal was "to promote and reduce regulation in order to
secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and
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encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies".5 0 Although this
legislation has little impact on competition within the satellite services industry, it has two
important implications for satellite communications. Firstly, it lays the ground to "equate"
satellite operators to common carriers. In other words, it states that "the proposed space segment
services are likely to be offered to the public indifferently, a basic characteristic of common
carrier service".5' In addition to this, it recognizes that "the imposition of common carrier
requirements [to space segment operators] may have an adverse effect on the development of this
service", 52 which gives satellite operators the possibility of having access to foreign funding
(therefore foreign ownership). The possibility of foreign participation increased the probability of
obtaining orbit resources (orbit slots) from foreign regulatory agencies. Secondly, the Act
promotes measures to increase competition in the telecommunications market by promoting
investment in new technologies, such as satellite services, to transmit high-speed voice, data and
video. It also reaffirms the U.S. government commitment to help U.S. satellite operators having
access to foreign markets.53
Effective January 1996, to continue with the deregulation trend, the FCC had also issued rules
that allowed foreign telecommunications operators to enter the U.S. market. This was in order "to
develop effective competition in the U.S.", "to prevent anticompetitive conduct in the provision
of international services or facilities", and "to encourage foreign governments to open their
telecommunications markets to US companies"5 4
The latest legislation issued to promote open competition in the satellite telecommunications
industry was the ORBIT* Act, in March 2000. It amends the Communications Satellite Act of
1962 and paves the ground to ensure the privatization of satellite communications.55 This Act had
a deep impact in Comcast, and some industry analysts consider it to have extraterritorial
implications for Intelsat. The Act's goal is to promote "a fully competitive global market for
satellite communication services for the benefit of consumers and providers of satellite services
and equipment by fully privatizing the intergovernmental satellite organizations, Intelsat and
Inmarsat".56
Currently, as a result of the deregulation of the industry started in 1972 with the "Open Skies"
policy, the United States have probably one of the most flexible regulatory environments for
satellite communications. The "Open Skies" policy was originally created to promote the
* The Open Market Reorganization for the Betterment of International Telecommunications Act.
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development of the industry with minimal regulations. As previously stated, some examples of
regulations and policies associated with this deregulation trend are the "orbital spacing policy"
and the reduction in the time to process space station licenses. For most industry analysts, the
high number of spacecrafts (especially Ka-band satellites) launched in recent years is an
irrefutable proof of the effectiveness of these policies. 7
Finally, it is important to evoke the current context of the U.S. space-based communications
policy from an international perspective. Most analysts of the satellite services industry suggest
that more international cooperation, especially in the licensing process of new telecommunication
satellites (which includes orbit and frequency allocation), would result in a more beneficial
relationship for both the U.S. and the rest of the world (especially Europe). With the last trends of
complete deregulation and open competition promoted by the U.S. (in the opinion of some
analysts,58 driven mostly by the U.S. wish to ensure and support strategic positions in the space
industry business), there is indeed a risk of trade war with Western Europe. As stated by the
Outer Space Treaty of 1967, "advocating cooperation and a shared interest between all
countries"59 should result in a more sound and healthy satellite communications industry.
In the next subsection the reader will find an overview of recently implemented policies related to
satellite communications in the European Union.
4.2.2.An expanding European Union
In regard to satellite communications regulations and policy, the European Union is an emerging
system and, in that respect, Europe is the "young" continent when compared to the United
States.60 There is no European organization or institution serving as one common authority over
space-based communications issues. In contrast with the United States, Europe is a m6lange of
different nations, histories, identities, cultures and languages, with different political interests,
governments and regional or local markets.6 ' As such, it represents vast market opportunities, but
it also encloses significant organizational and administrative challenges. In addition to this, in
Europe there are two types of stakeholders when it comes to shaping the space communications
environment. Firstly, there are nations (Members States of the ITU), which are allotted space
resources (spectrum and orbit slots in the GEO). Secondly, there are international and regional
organizations that are also allotted their own space resources. These organizations are formed by
representatives of the nation members of the ITU. 6 2 Furthermore, in order to fully understand the
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European context, one has to be aware of the several regulatory and government bodies that have
influence over space communications matters. The most important are, besides the national
regulatory agencies, the European Commission, the European Council, the European Parliament,
the European Space Agency, and other organizations with special authority over
telecommunications issues, such as the European Radiocommunications Committee (ERC), the
European Telecommunications Standard Institute (ETSI), the Conference Europeenne des Postes
et Tlecommunications (CEPT), or Eurocontrol. The necessity of a global European body with
authority over telecommunication issues (a "European FCC') has been expressed by different
industry and government leaders since the 1990s. Regulatory obstacles and different interests
have prevented its creation, but work has been done towards the development of such
organization at a European level.63
Until the late 1980s, little or nothing had been done about a legal structure for the development of
satellite communication at a European level. The Member States had national authority and
control over telecommunication issues. Four major documents laid the ground to develop a
satellite communications policy in the European Community up to the 1990s: the 1987 Green
Paper on Telecommunications, the 1990 Green Paper on Satellite Communications, the 1991
Guidelines on competition rules within telecommunication services, and the 1992 Maastricht
Treaty.
The Green Paper on Telecommunications of 1987 ("Green Paper on the Development of the
Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment") encloses the intention of
harmonizing the diverse set of national regulations within the European Community. It delineated
an action plan to transform the regulatory environment in order to meet the dual challenge of a)
the Common Market of 1992, and b) rapid technological developments".6 4 This document
delineates several action lines to promote the development of satellite communications. More
specifically, it proposes the creation of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI), the adoption of a "definition of a coherent position regarding the future development of
satellite communications in the European Community", and a single "definition of
telecommunication services and equipment with regard to relations with non-EC countries".6 5
Three years later, in 1990, the European Commission published a document called the "Green
Paper on a common approach in the field of satellite communications in the European
Community". Indeed, in the 1990s, Europe became more active in developing policies that
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focused directly on satellite communications matters. This paper specifically set the development
of a common position on satellite communications as one of the primary objectives within the
European telecommunications policy. Satellite communications in Europe are perceived as a key
factor in achieving the European commercial success needed to develop a strategic position in the
space industry. Therefore, the 1990 Green Paper became the foundation stone of the new space-
based communications policy of the European Community. It introduced four main lines of action
to promote the development of satellite communications: a) ensuring that satellite technologies
are considered in the development of network and services, optimizing the potential
complementary character of terrestrial and satellite solutions; b) fostering an adequate political
and regulatory environment in order to develop new services and equipment, ensuring maximum
utilization of space networks; c) promoting the implementation of satellite solutions when
applying European-level public policies, especially in sectors like education and training; d)
increase the level of research and development to support the growth of space-based
applications.66
The Guidelines on the Application of European Economic Community (EEC) Competition Rules
in the Telecommunications Sector were issued by the European Commission in 1991. These
guidelines present directives about anticompetitive agreements that "could not be granted
exemptions from EU competition rules and address specific issues such as distributorship
agreements for satellite services, uplink services and joint venture agreements between TOs
[telecommunication companies] and private parties".6 7 Even though this document deals more
with regulations than with policy issues, it does delineate a strategy created to promote
competition within the telecommunications industry, specifically in the satellite service providers
sector.
The Maastricht Treaty on the European Union was signed in February 1992, and it was
developed in order to give a new "impetus" and a solid basis for the creation of a more integrated
Europe. The spirit of the Treaty was not to supplant previous European agreements (such as the
Rome Treaty). Instead, the main purpose of the Treaty was to "expand the reach of all pervious
EC Treaties and Agreements by subtle alterations to the former provisions and by adding new
provisions to their global aggregated content".68 As a result, many provisions of the Treaty have
indirect impact on space communications. Yet, among the new additions by the Maastricht
Treaty, one that has a clearer and more direct impact on space-based communications is the
Trans-European Networks (TEN) provision. The development of TENs focuses on transportation,
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telecommunications and energy issues. Title XII of the Treaty states that "trans-european
telecommunication networks should play an important role in the move towards EU, especially
when viewed as part of the internal market's infrastructure". The Treaty also expands the power
of the European Community to support private investments in the industry. It recognizes that this
expansion of the EC power "will have an impact on European space policy in matters of
telecommunication infrastructure and particularly, communication satellites, with respect to
several crucial aspects: interconnection, interoperability, access to networks and financial
support". 6 9
In 1995, the European Industry Council raised the need to define a European Space Policy,
specially considering "whether it would be necessary to envisage a more autonomous EU policy
for satellites", since until now, many European services use North American satellites, creating a
certain dependency on the United States in a field that is "so important for the future of the
information society".70 As a result, the European Commission has issued several documents
delineating a new European Space Policy. Two of the most important are the EU Action Plan on
Satellite Communications (1997) and the White Paper "Space: a new frontier for an expanding
Union. Action Plan for Implementing the European Space Policy" (2003). The former introduced
an action plan in order to strengthen the "role of European services and manufacturing in global
advanced broadband and multimedia satellite systems, services and applications [...] .71 It
recognized the quick development of satellite services and underlined the necessity of a strong,
coherent satellite communications industry in Europe.
The White Paper on Space Policy is the most recent document on European Space policy (2003),
and it proposes the implementation of an "extended European Space Policy to support the
achievement of the European Union's policy goals: [... ] faster economic growth, job creation and
industrial competitiveness, enlargement and cohesion, sustainable development and security and
defense".7 One of the policy changes that this document proposes is to "invest in the knowledge
economy to strengthen economic growth job creation and competitiveness and make a success of
enlargement by supporting cohesion and economic, industrial and technological growth
throughout all Member States".7 3 The paper proposes the use of satellite communications as part
of a technology portfolio that might be used to bring broadband access to the 20% of the
inhabitants in Europe that are out of the reach of terrestrial networks in the medium term. This
113
action is conceived as part of a global strategy to close the "digital divide" t,74 with new Member
States and beyond.75 Specifically, the document states that broadband access can be delivered
through a variety of solutions such as DSL, cable, satellite, and wireless. It recognizes that these
technologies can be perceived as substitutes (competing solutions), but also as "complementing,
completing, and co-existing with each other according to local geographical needs".7 6 This White
Paper concludes by asserting that the EU has a key role to develop space activities in Europe,
especially in order to expand the European share in fast-growing markets where space-based
services are fundamental.7
It is important to stress the fact that most of the stakeholders within the satellite services industry
recognize a need for an international more concerted approach to develop satellite
communications policies and regulations. The relationship between the United States and the
European Union, in regard to space-based communications and space business in general, is a
sensitive matter. In addition, due to the political and economic influence of both the U.S. and the
E.U., their relationship is currently playing a major role in shaping the evolution of space law and
regulations.7 8 In fact, the evolving nature of the U.S. - E.U. aerospace-related interactions has
become part of the set of major factors that influence the geopolitical dynamics and the structure
of international relations.
4.3. Summary and Conclusions.
Chapter 4 provided an overview of the regulatory environment for satellite operators. Starting
with an historical perspective on international regulatory bodies, I followed with a discussion of
what I consider to be two of the most important regulatory issues for satellite operators, namely
spectrum/orbit allocation and space environmental pollution (i.e., the disposal of space debris).
With respect to the first issue, international regulatory bodies have allocated different frequencies
and bandwidths to FSS, MSS and DBS applications. In practice, however, most of the latest
generations of communication satellites operating in FSS frequencies carry high-power
transponders that open the possibility (to FSS operators) of implementing direct broadcasting
services (DBS) through FSS satellites. As a result, the regulatory environment for satellite
operators has become surprisingly dynamic; with continual behind-the scenes maneuvering by
both terrestrial and satellite services interests as well as by other stakeholders in the industry, in
t The "digital divide" is defined as "the inequality in the capability of access by broadband technology
connectivity (i.e. Internet services) to knowledge society. It is measurable in terms of widespread
availability of the connection or in cost of the connection in comparison to a benchmark".
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practice, frequency allocations are not necessarily always respected. While the commercial battle
for spectrum/orbit allocation is often engaged with a much less open approach, different
conventional and less conventional practices shape the actual state of the industry. With respect to
the second regulatory issue, Chapter 4 identified a need to legislate and regulate spacecraft
disposal in a way such that operators have to propel unused satellites to orbits far from the
geostationary orbit (where they cannot cause damage to operating GEO satellites). This, however,
will certainly have a short-term financial impact on satellite service providers. Currently, the only
existent regulations related to space debris were issued in 2004 by the FCC in the U.S., forcing all
U.S.-licensed satellites launched after March 2002 to be propelled to a "graveyard" orbit above
the GEO. This regulation set the path for other standards around the world, since no other nation
with space activity, or international regulatory body, has regulated about spatial debris. An
important contribution of this work is the clear identification of a critical need to enforce space
debris regulations. The geostationary orbit must be recognized as a precious real-state resource
that is likely to become useless should a collision occurred. Such an incident might have
extremely negative consequences for the development of telecommunication services on Earth.
This chapter also delineated what might be the shape of the space communications policy in the
near future. In the United States, as a result of the deregulation of the industry started in 1972
with the "Open Skies" policy, the regulatory environment for satellite operators is probably one
of the most flexible in the world. The "Open Skies" and the "orbital spacing" decisions are
examples of policies that were originally created to promote competition and the development of
the industry with minimal regulations. On the other hand, in regard to satellite communications
regulations and policy, the European Union is an emerging system and, in that respect, Europe is
the "young" continent when compared to the United States. Although in a much more measured
manner, Europe has also been moving toward deregulation. Yet, analysts coincide in the need to
further ease the current regulatory environment to promote competition among satellite operators
(today, the duopoly Eutelsat/SES exerts a decisive influence on regulatory issues in Western
Europe). The EU acknowledges a key role in developing space activities in Europe, and has
clearly implemented a strategy to expand the European share in fast-growing markets where
space-based services are fundamental. From a global perspective, however, more international
cooperation is desirable, since it would result in a more beneficial relationship amongst space
faring countries, eliminating a risk of trade war between the U.S. and Western Europe. In fact, the
evolving nature of the U.S. - E.U. aerospace-related interactions has become part of the set of
major factors that influence the geopolitical dynamics and the structure of international relations.
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PART II: ECONOMIC AND
ENGINEERING ISSUES IN SPACECRAFT
DESIGN*
The first part of this thesis focused on the market dynamics and policy drivers of the
satellite communications industry. Specifically, two questions were addressed: 1) Are
satellite communications competing or complementary technologies to terrestrial
networks, in what context and for what service applications? And, 2) what is the impact
of the regulatory environment and the policy-making process on the satellite
communications industry?
While market and policy issues play a central role in shaping the structure of the satellite
services industry, economic and engineering considerations can provide decisive insights
that might significantly alter the dynamics of the sector. The second part of this thesis
combines economic and engineering analyses in a multidisciplinary approach and focuses
on the lifeblood of the satellite industry: the satellite itself (as opposed to the industry-
context explored in Part I). In particular, part II explores issues associated with satellite
design lifetime and the impact it may have on the whole industry value-chain. Part II
consists of Chapter 5, To Reduce or To Extend a Spacecraft Design Lifetime?, and
Chapter 6, Utilization Rates of GEO Communication Satellites.
* Part Two of this thesis is based on two papers accepted for publication at the AIAA Journal of Spacecraft
and Rockets (chapter 5) and for presentation at the AIAA Space 2005 Conference (chapter 6). This work
was done in collaboration with different co-authors that are properly referenced in each chapter.
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Chap te r 5
To Reduce or to Extend a
Spacecraft Design Lifetime?
What is at Stake, for Whom, and How to Resolve the Dilemma
Joseph H. Saleht, Juan-Pablo Torres-Padilla*, Daniel E. HastingsO, Dava J. Newman**
The attitude towards systems design lifetime has often been ambiguous, and at times uninformed.
Although the issue has received almost no attention in the technical literature, there have been a
few qualitative arguments fraught with subjectivity for or against extending a system design
lifetime. In this chapter, the authors explore the engineering and economic issues at stake for
reducing or extending a complex system's design lifetime using spacecraft as example. The study
examines these issues from an operator/customer's perspective, a manufacturer's perspective as
well as from the perspective of society at large. We address the question of whether there is an
optimal design lifetime for complex engineering systems in general, and spacecraft in particular,
and what it takes to answer this question. Our approach constitutes a fundamental addition to the
traditional thinking about system design and architecture, and involves quantitative analyses of
both dynamics and volatility of the market the system is serving in the case of a commercial
venture, and the obsolescence of the system's technology base. Preliminary results indicate that
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necessarily in the best interest of an operator, and definitely not in the interest of the
manufacturer, to do so. Preliminary results also show that the design lifetime is, in the case of a
spacecraft, a key requirement in sizing various subsystems-and consequently has a significant
impact on the overall cost of the spacecraft. Additionally, at the level of the entire space industry
value chain, i.e., the spacecraft manufacturers, launch industry and the operators, the design
lifetime is a powerful lever that can significantly impact the whole industry's performance,
financial health, and employment. Overall, we show that the specification or selection of a
complex engineering system's lifetime begs careful consideration and requires much more
attention than it has received so far in the literature as its impact will ripple throughout an entire
industry value chain.
5.1. Introduction: From Product Durability to System Design Lifetime
There is a popular belief that manufacturers of durable goods (e.g., automobile tires, light bulbs,
batteries) often deliberately reduce the time period for which their products remain operational in
order to increase their sales and profits. For instance, it seems that the electric lamp industry in
the United States in the 1 960s "has served to limit, and frequently reduce, lamp life in order to
increase sales" when consumers' interests were generally thought to be better served by bulbs of
much longer life.' This hypothetical practice has sparked environmental concerns among
ecologists and policy makers, and created interest in the contribution that extended product design
lifetime can make towards reducing the waste management and other environmental problems.2
Several industries however strongly denied having a concealed policy of either deliberately
limiting product operational life, or of accelerated product obsolescence, i.e., introducing
upgrades or new functionalities in a product in order to promote consumer dissatisfaction with
existing products and promote sales of new products.3
The example discussed above, the relevance of which is heightened in the era of planned
obsolescence of hardware and software, is used for two purposes: First, it introduces the three
main stakeholders that should be taken into account when analyzing issues of product durability
and system design lifetime, namely the consumer, the manufacturer, and society at large. Second,
the example portrays tension between the stakeholders as each is affected differently by an
extended or reduced product lifetime, and shows that the interests of the one are not necessarily
aligned with the interests of the other. We therefore recognize that when exploring the issues at
stake in reducing or extending a product durability, or when asking whether there is an optimal
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design lifetime for complex engineering systems, it is necessary to first specify from which
stakeholder perspective the analysis is carried out as the interests and trade-offs can be
substantially different.
Academic interest in product durability peaked in the 1970s and early 1980s then temporarily
faded out only to resurface in the 1990s and grapple with issues of planned obsolescence of
computer hardware and software. But beyond product durability, emerge questions pertaining to
engineering system design lifetime. Product durability and system design lifetime are similar in
that they both characterize an artifact's relationship with time. The difference however is one of
complexity and scale, and the issues related to system design lifetime are much more involved-
and interesting-than those associated with product durability. In the following we define system
design lifetime as a requirement that specifies to the manufacturer the duration for which a
system should remain operational. This requirement can be specified either by the customer or by
the designer, or imposed by the market or by society. Design lifetime differs from product
durability in that it is mainly used to characterize the duration of intended operation for complex
engineering systems, as opposed to products of limited complexity and functionalities.
System design lifetime, unlike product durability, has received almost no attention in the
technical literature, either from academics or from industry professionals. For instance, the design
lifetime requirement in the case of satellites is "assigned rather arbitrarily"4 with an understanding
of the technical limitations that prevent further extension of this requirement, and a vague
intuition regarding the economic impact of extended design lifetimes. The engineering and
economic issues associated with system design lifetime do offer a rich field of investigation for
academics and industry professionals. In the following, we show that the design lifetime is a key
requirement in sizing various subsystems-using a spacecraft as an example-and that its
specification begs careful consideration and requires much more attention than it has received so
far in the literature as its impact is substantial and can ripple throughout an entire industry value
chain.
5.2. Qualitative Arguments for Reducing or Extending Product Durability or System
Design Lifetime
In the following, we discuss the qualitative implications and trade-offs associated with reducing
versus extending a product durability or a system design lifetime, as seen from the perspective of
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the three stakeholders introduced in the previous section, namely the customer, the manufacturer,
and society at large. Table 5.1 synthesizes our findings.
Table 5.1: Implications scorecard for reducing or extending a system design lifetime
To Reduce (Reduced) Design Lifetime To Extend (Extended) Design Lifetime
Customer's Manufacturer's Society's Customer's Manufacturer's Society's
perspective perspective perspective perspective perspective perspective
lA. Ability to
improve
subsequent
products through
more frequent
iterations of
fielding and
customer feedback
2A. Potential for
higher sales
volume
3A. Heightened
obligation for
employees to
remain technically
up-to-date and
attentive to the
voice of the
customer
1A. Shorter
design lifetime
can stimulate
faster innovation
and
technological
progress
2A. Potential for
maintaining and
boosting
industry
employment
level through
higher sales
volume
1A. Smaller
volume of
purchasing
2A. Potentially
smaller cost per
operational day
3A. "Old
products" are
easier to replace
than repair.
Hence the
likelihood of
more state-of-
the-art products
in use than with
products with
longer lifetimes
IA. Service
contracts have the
potential to
generate higher
profits that the
mere sale of the
product or system
2A. Increased
design lifetime
acts as a magnifier
of reliability as a
competitive
advantage.
Product reliability
is less critical for
short lifetime than
for products with
longer lifetime
1A. Products
with longer
design lifetimes
result in less
waste during a
given time
period than
those with
shorter lifetimes
2A. Longer
design lifetime
can stimulate
the creation of a
secondary
market for the
products
ID. Need to 1D. Fewer 1D. Adverse ID. Increased 1D. Extended 1D. Increased
purchase more opportunities for environmental risk the product warranty needed, risk of
products for a revenues from effect as a result will be which may result technological
given duration services of more product technically or in higher levels of slowdown,
disposal during commercially unpaid services potential
a given time obsolete before increase in an
period the end of its industry's
lifetime, hence unemployment
loss of revenues
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1A. Family of
products more
likely to be
improved
through more
frequent
iterations of
fielding and
feedback to the
manufacturer,
than products
with longer
lifetimes
- - - - - ---
5.2. I.Implications of reducing (or a reduced) design lifetime
In this section, we discuss the qualitative implications for reducing product durability or system
design lifetime. We have tagged each implication with a numeral followed by an "A" or a "D"
for what appeared to us more as an advantage or a disadvantage, even though some of the
implications did not necessarily carry a positive or a negative connotation.
From an operator or a customer's perspective, a product or a family of products with a shortened
lifetime is more likely to be improved upon, during a given time period, through more frequent
iterations of fielding and feedback to the manufacturer, than products with longer lifetimes. One
disadvantage however the customer could perceive if the duration of the needed service exceeds
the system design lifetime is the need to purchase increasingly more products as their lifetimes
decreases. This observation leads to the suggestion that customers are perhaps better off
purchasing products or system with design lifetime that match the duration of their service needs.
This suggestion however is not necessarily true, as we will show later.
From a manufacturer's perspective, the two points raised above translate into advantages: First,
manufacturers of products or family of products with shortened lifetime have an increased ability
to improve their products through more frequent iterations of fielding and customer feedback.
Second, shorter lifetime can stimulate sales since customers need to buy more volume in order to
sustain the same level of service during a given time period. For example, in the sports industry,
"Professional teams constantly update their merchandise to keep the public spending uniformly".5
Another implication of shortened lifetime, which we classified as an advantage to the
manufacturer, is a heightened obligation for the employees to remain technically up-to-date and
attentive to the voice of the customer in order to fend off competitors. This we believe is the case
since customers of systems with short design lifetime are not locked in for as long of a duration as
customers who acquire longer lived products; these customers can therefore more frequently
recommit resources to acquiring new products or systems from the competition, if the incumbent
is not constantly offering best value products. One disadvantage for manufacturers of reducing
system design lifetime is the limited opportunities they have to generate revenues from service
contracts. This can represent a substantial opportunity loss. However, this opportunity loss should
be analytically compared to the increased volume of sale and revenues associated with it before
manufacturers decide whether they are better off reducing or extending the product durability or
system design lifetime.
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From a society's point of view, short design lifetime present several advantages. First, shorter
design lifetime can stimulate a faster pace for innovation and technological progress. Planned
obsolescence or short-lived products but fast innovation may be preferred, from a society's
perspective, to long-lasting products and a slow pace for innovation. Second, if the assumption
we discussed above is true, namely that products with shorter lifetime can stimulate sales since
customers need to buy more volume in order to sustain the same level of service during a given
time period, then this increased sales volume has the potential to maintain or boost industry
employment. Third, "old" products are likely easier to replace than to repair than products with
longer lifetimes. More state-of-the-art products therefore are likely to be found more in use at any
given time than if these products were designed for longer lifetime. We classified this impllication
as an advantage for society, but we recognize that other people or groups might not consider this
to be so. One adverse environmental effect however associated with shortened lifetimes results
from an increased number of products to dispose of during a given time period.
5.2.2.Implications of extending (or an extended) design lifetime
In this section, we discuss the qualitative implications for extending product durability or system
design lifetime. The reader will notice that some of the stakeholders' advantages in reducing a
system design lifetime transform into disadvantages when longer design lifetime are considered,
and vice-versa.
From a customer's perspective, purchasing products or systems with long lifetime offers mainly
two advantages. First, customers have to purchase fewer products for the duration of their service
needs as the product design lifetime increases. Second, it is more likely that the product or
system's cost-per-operational-day decreases as the system's design lifetime increases. This point
will be discussed in more detail in the following analytical sections. One disadvantage a customer
will encounter with longer-lived systems in an increased risk that these systems will be
technically and commercially obsolete before the end of their lifetimes, hence an increased risk of
loss of revenue.
From a manufacturer's perspective, there are two main implications associated with an increased
system design lifetime. First, systems with long design lifetime offer manufacturers a heightened
ability to generate additional revenues, and higher profits, from service contracts than from the
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mere sale of the system (it is worth noting that for satellites, manufacturers normally do not have
service contracts, but usually provide anomaly support through the contracted life on-orbit at no
cost to the operator. If the satellite lasts longer than the planned contract life, then on-orbit
support service contracts are feasible, bur are generally not big dollar items. In today's buyer's
market, operators can demand that these additional services are also provided at no extra cost).
There is limited potential for additional revenues from services with system of short design
lifetime. The second implication, which is neither an advantage nor a disadvantage, merely an
observation is the following: increased design lifetime acts as a magnifier of system's "reliability
as a competitive advantage." That is the reliability of a system is increasingly more valuable for
customers as the system design lifetime increases. Therefore, manufacturers with core
competencies to produce highly reliable systems have some incentives to increase their systems
design lifetime in order to augment the quality gap with manufacturers of less reliable systems,
and therefore augment their market share at the detriment of the competition. One risk
manufacturers have to deal with when extending their system design lifetime is the need to offer
equally extended warranty, which may result in higher levels of unpaid services. This risk is
heightened for manufacturers of lesser reliable systems. In other words, manufacturers who do
not have a track record in designing distinctively reliable systems should carefully consider
before engaging in "design lifetime extension behavior" to differentiate their systems from the
competition's. This risk should be weighted against, or can be mitigated by, the service contract
advantage discussed above.
From a society's point of view, one clear environmental advantage of systems with long design
lifetime is that the use of such artifacts result in less waste to be disposed of during a given time
period than shorter lived products or systems. Another implication, which we classified as an
advantage for society, is that long design lifetime can stimulate the creation of a secondary
market for products, hence an increased economic activity. One disadvantage however that can
result from fielding systems with increasingly longer lifetime is that, while short design lifetime
can stimulate a faster pace for innovation, long design lifetime can increase the risk of
technological slowdown and adversely impact an industry employment level.
In the previous sections, we synthesized and discussed the different qualitative implications
associated with reducing versus extending a product durability or a system design lifetime, as
seen from the perspective of three stakeholders, namely the customer, the manufacturer, and
society. The purpose of this qualitative discussion was to illustrate the complexity of the choice in
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reducing or extending a system's design lifetime-not to take a position for reducing or extending
this requirement-and to lay the ground for the quantitative discussion to follow.
5.2.3.Example: to reduce or to extend a spacecraft design lifetime? An operator's
perspective
In recent years, manufacturers of high-value assets (e.g., rotorcraft, spacecraft) have chosen to
increase their systems design lifetime. Over the last two decades, telecommunications satellites
for instance have seen their design lifetime on average increase from seven to fifteen years. In
this case, increasing the space segment lifetime was driven by both the desire of satellite
operators to maximize their return on investment, and by the determination of manufacturers to
offer spacecraft with longer lifetime as a competitive advantage for their spacecraft in the hope of
increasing their market share (it is legitimate however to ask whether this competitive behavior is
not locking the players in a Nash-like equilibrium with the end result of a reduced market for all
manufacturers).
Extending satellite design lifetime however has several side effects. On the one hand, it leads to
larger and heavier satellites as a result of several factors such as additional propellant for orbit
and station-keeping or increased power generation and storage capability. This in turn increases
the satellite's development and production cost. On the other hand, as the design lifetime
increases, the risk that the satellite becomes obsolete, technically and commercially, before the
end of its lifetime increases. This trade-off is illustrated in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: Design lifetime trade-offs: keeping a satellite cost-per-operational day low
through long design lifetime but risking that the satellite becomes obsolete before the end of
its lifetime.
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The discussion above indicates that in specifying spacecraft design lifetime requirement,
operators have to assess the risk of loss of value due to both obsolescence of their spacecraft
technology base as well as the likelihood of changing or shifting market needs after the satellite
has been launched (volatility of the market the system is serving). For example it is not obvious to
be in the best interest of a satellite operator to make the contract life of a spacecraft too long: new
or enhanced capabilities, e.g., better spatial resolution for an optical instrument, might be
developed and become available within a couple of years following the launch, hence the need to
launch a new satellite or risk losing market share to a competitor who launches later with newer
or more advanced capabilities. So how can we capture the value of a system (or the loss of it) as a
function of its design lifetime? The following sections offer some suggestions towards this goal.
5.3. Is There an Optimal Design Lifetime for Complex Engineering Systems? A
Customer's Perspective
Questions regarding the design lifetime requirement of complex engineering systems can be
grouped into three categories:
1. What limits the design lifetime? How far can designers push the system's design
lifetime? What is the lifetime "boundary" and why can't it be extended?
2. How do the different subsystems scale with the design lifetime requirement, and what is
the total system cost profile as a function of this requirement?
3. What does (or should) the customer ask the contractor or manufacturer to provide for a
design lifetime, and why?
Although related, these questions cover nevertheless different realities. The first question is
purely a technical/engineering one and addresses the issue of lifetime boundary. For instance,
what prevents engineers from designing a spacecraft for say a hundred years? Current satellites
are launched with design lifetime of twelve to fifteen years. Solar array degradation due to
thermal cycling in and out of eclipses, micrometeoroid strikes, radiation damage and material
outgassing offer serious challenges for engineers to overcome if the current fifteen-year mark of
spacecraft design lifetime is to be extended. Other limitations result from battery technology
(number of charge/discharge cycles possible), inertial systems degradation and failure, as well as
electronics degradation both in the Telemetry, Tracking and Control subsystem (TT&C) of a
spacecraft as well as its payload due to space radiation (increased electronic shielding is costly
and does not scale up effectively).
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The second question, closely related to the first one, focuses on the effects of varying the design
lifetime requirement on each subsystem. We explored in a previous work6 how different
spacecraft subsystems scale as a function of the design lifetime requirement, then aggregated the
results and derived total spacecraft mass and cost profiles as a function of this requirement. We
found that the design lifetime is a key requirement in sizing various subsystems, and that typically
30%-40% mass and cost penalty are incurred when designing a spacecraft for 15 years instead of
3 years, all else being equal. More generally, the answer to this second question in the case of any
complex engineering system constitutes a mapping between a system design lifetime and the
investment necessary to develop or acquire such a system. The answer to this second question
also provides another confirmation of the old adage, from a different angle though, that "Time is
Money", that is more system lifetime requires more money to develop or acquire!
The third question builds on the two preceding ones and is mainly a management decision that
should be supported by engineering and market analyses as well as financial evaluation: given the
maximum achievable design lifetime (answer to Question 1), and given the impact of the design
lifetime on the system cost (answer to Question 2), what should the customer ask the contractor to
provide for a design lifetime? Is there a value metric that can be maximized through the selection
and specification of an optimal design lifetime? What should be taken into account when
evaluating this metric? These questions are addressed in the following sections. We first discuss
what it takes in order to answer the design lifetime optimality question.
5.3.1. Prerequisite: a mindset change
How can we capture the value of a system (or the loss of it) as a function of its design lifetime? In
order to do so, we first need to augment our understanding of system design architecture(-ing).
System architecture is defined as the fundamental and unifying structure, in terms of system
elements, interfaces, and constraints, of a system.7 System architecting is traditionally viewed as a
matching between two (vector) quantities, resources and system performance. One traditional
design paradigm fixes the amount of available resources and attempts to optimize the system
performance given this constraint. The other approach constrains the system performance to a
desired level and strives to find a design that will achieve this performance at minimal cost.7 The
first approach operates with-and attempts to maximize-a performance per unit cost metric; the
second approach seeks to minimize a cost per function (or performance) metric. In order to
(quantitatively) discuss issues related to the design lifetime, which we consider to be a
fundamental "component" of system architecture although we cannot see it or touch it, it is
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imperative that we view in a system the flow of service (or utility) it will provide over a given
period of time. We therefore need introduce cost, utility, and value per unit time metrics in order
to guide the selection the design lifetime.
5.3.2. Value of a system as afunction of its design lifetime
In order to specify the design lifetime requirement, a customer needs to be able to express the
present value of a system as a function of its design lifetime. We propose Eq. (1) as a means for
capturing this value.
V(Tjfe) = f[u(t)- 0(t)] x e-rdt -C(Tife) (1)
0
Tif e : System's design lifetime
V( Tafe) : Expected present value of a system architecture as a function of its
design lifetime
u(t) : Utility rate of the system (e.g., revenues per day for a commercial system)
0 (t) : Cost per day for operating the system
C(TLife) System cost profile as a function of its design lifetime
r : Discount rate
Equation I is conceptually analogous to the continuity equation (or conservation of mass) in fluid
dynamics, which in its integral form looks as follows:
t f pdv + f pUdS = (2)
tV S
p : Fluid density
V : Control volume
S : Closed surface bounding volume V
U : Flow velocity vector
dS : Elemental surface area vector
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The analogy between the two equations is illustrated in Fig. 5.2. The control volume becomes a
time bin-the system's design lifetime. The flow entering the control volume is analogous to the
aggregate utility or revenues generated during the time bin considered, and the flow exiting the
volume corresponds to the cost of acquiring a system designed for this time bin, TLf,, plus the cost
to operate it during the same period.
Figure 5.2: Analogy between the expected present value of a system as a function of its
design lifetime (Eq. 1) and the continuity equation in fluid dynamics.
Two time characteristics can be readily derived from Eq. 1: the minimum design lifetime for a
system to be profitable, and the time of operations for a system to break even given a design
lifetime. These are discussed below.
5.3.2.1. Minimum design lifetime for a system to be profitable
The minimum design lifetime for a system to become profitable can be computed by setting
V(Tef,) equal to zero:
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(3)
V(TLife) > 0 for TLife > TLi-min
While technical considerations limit the upper bound of system design lifetime, as we discussed
previously, the lower bound on the design lifetime, as seen from a customer perspective, is
dictated by economic (value) considerations, and is given by the solution to Eq. 3. The dynamics
of TLife-mi, and the parameters driving it will be discussed shortly. It should be noted that the
minimum design lifetime for a system to be profitable is NOT identical to the "time to break
even". This second time characteristic of a system is discussed below.
5.3.2.2. Time to break even given a design lifetime
The time for a system to break even is given by the solution of Eq. 4 in which TLfe is fixed. In
other words, once the system's design lifetime is specified, time is allowed to vary until the
discounted revenues cover the cost to design the system for TLife, C(Tfe), in addition to the
discounted cost to operate the system until tbreak-eve:
V(Ti,, tbreak eve,) = J[u(t) - (t)] x e-dt - C(Ti) = O (4)
o
The comparison between the time to break-even and the minimum design lifetime is summarized
in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Time to break even and minimum design lifetime
When TLife < TLf-nun Tfe = TLife-,ni,, Tufl > TLi-fin.
tbreak-ven does not exist threak-eve, = TLife-min tbreak-evel > TLife-min
How can these equations be useful? Let us assume for instance that the management of a
company about to acquire a large complex system wants to break even in tbreake,n years, what is
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the average revenue per day uo that the company should guarantee from the system in order to do
so? This is one instance of the mindset change we advocated previously about seeing in a system
the flow of service (or utility) that it will provide over a given time period. The answer is readily
given by Eq. 5 and 6:
t
break-een tbrealeven
fuox e-"dt = C(T) + f O(t)xe-r'dt (5)
0 0
Therefore
tbreak-vn
C(T,~i) + fo(t) xe-dt
u0 = r x (6)
Assuming that the cost to design the system is larger than the cost to operate it, i.e.,
tbreak-even
C(Te) >> f 0(t) x er tdt and recalling that e = 1 + x + e(x2), we get:
0
[ C(T,) Tife
U0 T ife X tbreak-even (7)
In a previous work,6 we introduced the concept of cost-per-operational day for a spacecraft. We
defined this metric as the ratio of the spacecraft cost to Initial Operational Capability and its
design lifetime, expressed in days:
C ostl 1,, - Cost to IOC
- design lifetime (days)
More generally, we can define an engineering system's cost-per-operational day as follows:
COSt1 p,= C(Tf,) (9)T, (days)
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This definition corresponds to uniformly amortizing the cost of a system-excluding the cost to
operate it-over its intended design lifetime. Going back to Eq. 7 and the question that prompted
that analysis, namely what is the average revenue per day u that a company should guarantee
from the system in order to break even in tbreak-ev,, years? We found the answer in Eq. 7, the first
term of which is the system's cost-per-operational day. This result can prove useful in feasibility
studies or back-of-the-envelope calculations. For instance, assume a company that is acquiring a
$100m system designed for ten years wishes to amortize its investment in two years. In order to
do so, the company should guarantee average revenues per day at least five times more than the
system's cost per operational day:
uO ° k ° x x--$55,000/day10x365 15
Conversely, if market analysis indicates that the service provided by this system can at best
generate $30,000/day, considering the market size and the presence of other players in this
market, then the time to amortize the investment is:
(100x106 10
( 10 x 365 30,000
It is likely, given this result that the senior management of the company will reconsider before
acquiring the system with its ten years design lifetime.
5.3.3. Quantitative analyses requiredfor answering the optimality design lifetime
question
We set up to investigate whether an optimal design lifetime exists for complex engineering
systems, optimality as seen from the customer's perspective. In order to answer this question, the
discussion first led us to advocate a mindset change about system design and architecture: namely
to view in a system the flow of service it will provide over a given time period. This led us to
recognize the need for system-level metrics as functions of time, such as cost, utility, and value
per unit time. Second, optimality presupposes a metric that is minimized or maximized; we
therefore proposed Eq. (1) as a means for capturing the present value of a system as a function of
its design lifetime. We can now mathematically formulate our question regarding the existence or
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not of an optimal design lifetime for complex engineering systems, as seen from the customer's
perspective:
V(Tife) = [u(t)- 0(t)] x e-"dt -C(Te)
0
Is there a Tfe such that V(Tf) > V(TLfe) for all TLife, Tfe? (10)
In order to investigate this problem, several analyses and models are required:
Engineering and cost estimate analyses of the system cost profile C(TLife)
Market analyses and forecast of system expected revenue model u(t)
Technical analysis and estimate of cost to operate and maintain the system 0 (t)
Financial analysis of the investment riskiness, usually referred to as beta, which in turn is used to
derive the appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate for the investment, r
We performed some of the above analyses in the case of commercial spacecraft wherever
possible, and used proxies or generic models in other cases. We briefly discuss our methodology
and findings in the following.
5.3.3.1. Spacecraft cost profile C(TLife)
How does the design lifetime requirement impact the sizing of the different subsystems on-board
a spacecraft? Consider the solar arrays for example. Life degradation is a function of the design
lifetime. It occurs for a number of reasons, e.g., radiation damage, thermal cycling in and out of
eclipse, and is estimated as follows:
Ld = (1- degradation/year) 'I (11)
The degradation-per-year is a function of the spacecraft orbital parameters (position with respect
to the Van Allen belts) as well as the solar cycle. It varies typically between 2% and 4%.4 The
solar array's performance at the end of life (EOL), compared to what it was at beginning of life
(BOL) is given by:
PEOL = PBOL x Ld (12)
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Given a power requirement at EOL, the power output of the solar arrays at BOL scales inversely
with life degradation, and the solar arrays have to be over-designed to accommodate this
performance degradation. This over-design of the solar arrays translates into mass and cost
penalty as the design lifetime increases. Batteries, which can constitute up to 15% of the dry mass
of a typical communications satellite,s are also significantly impacted by the spacecraft design
lifetime requirement. The amount of energy available from the batteries, or depth of discharge
(DOD), decreases with the number cycles of charging and discharging. To first order, the number
of charge/discharge cycles is equal to the number of eclipses a satellite undergoes during its
design lifetime. Typically, a satellite in GEO undergoes two periods of 45 days per year with
eclipses, hence 90 cycles of charging and discharging per year. As the design lifetime increases,
the number of charging/discharging cycles a battery has to undergo increases. Therefore its depth-
of-discharge decreases. For example, for a 3-year spacecraft lifetime in GEO, the average DOD
for a Nickel-Cadmium battery is approximately 76%, but it drops to 62% for a spacecraft lifetime
of 10 years. Battery capacity scales inversely with the DOD, therefore as the spacecraft design
lifetime increases, batteries have to be over-designed to compensate the reduction in DOD. This
result again in a mass and cost penalty for the spacecraft as its design lifetime increases.
The design lifetime is a key requirement in sizing all the subsystems on-board a spacecraft, not
just the solar arrays and batteries. When we aggregate the direct and indirect impact of the design
lifetime on all subsystems, we generate typical spacecraft mass profiles as a function of the
design lifetime. Then, using spacecraft Cost Estimate Relationships (CER) developed over the
years by various organizations-relating subsystem cost to physical or technical parameters-we
generate spacecraft cost profiles as functions of the design lifetime, our sought-after C(TLif,).
Typical results of C(TLife) and spacecraft cost-per-operational day are shown in Fig. 5.3 and 5.4.
We see cost penalties of 30% to 40% when designing a spacecraft for 15 years instead of 3 years.
A more elaborate discussion these results, along with their limitations, is provided in Ref. 6.
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Figure 5.3: Spacecraft C(TLifE or Cost to IOC as a function of the design lifetime
requirement (spacecraft in GEO, mission reliability = 95%, GaAs cells, Ni-H2 batteries).
The spacecraft cost-per-operational day decreases monotonically. In other words, the additional
cost (to get more "life" out of the system) scales up at a slower pace than the additional number
of days the spacecraft is designed to remain operational. In the absence of other metrics, this
behavior of the cost-per-operational day may justify pushing the boundary of the design lifetime
and designing spacecraft for increasingly longer periods. It also suggests that a customer is
always better off requesting the contractor to provide the maximum design lifetime technically
achievable:
TLif-b.,t = TLif-m (13)
This may be valid in a "cost-centric" environment, but is not necessarily true in a "value-centric"
environment as we will show later.
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Figure 5.4: Spacecraft cost-per-operational day ($/day) as a function of the design lifetime
(same parameters as in Fig. 5.3)
5.3.3.2. Spacecraft revenue models u(t)
After the system cost profile C(Tuf), the second model required in order to demonstrate the
existence or not of an optimal design lifetime consists of market analyses and forecast of the
system's expected revenue model u(t). In the case of a non-commercial system, the revenue
model can be replaced by an expected utility profile of the system as a function of time. For a
communications satellite in GEO, the revenue model should depend on the following:
u(t) = u(iongitude, #of Tx, service mixr, market volatility, technology obsolescence, ...) (14)
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The spacecraft longitude provides both an indication of the market size the operator can tap into
as well as the competitive intensity over this market (which in turn drives the service price).
Spacecraft prime locations have traditionally been over the Americas, Europe, as well as Trans-
Atlantic longitudes. The number of transponders as well as the service mix (audio, video, data)
are also important parameters that define a communications satellite revenue profile. Finally, the
volatility of the market the satellite is intended to serve and the obsolescence of the system's
technology base have to be factored in when forecasting a satellite revenue profile as a function
of time, u(t).
When we set up to investigate communications satellite revenues, we were surprised to find that,
while numerous spacecraft cost models exist and are widely available, used and taught in
academic environments, no (individual) spacecraft revenue models exist, to the best knowledge of
the authors. The data required in order to build these models is not easy to access (tracking the
revenue of an individual satellite on a monthly basis along with its utilization rate and service
offered). In addition, one can presume that satellite operators are not necessarily eager to share
this financial information. We are currently working with industry partners on developing
communications satellites revenue models that appropriately capture the dependencies shown in
Eq. 14. For this paper, we use two simple spacecraft revenue models based on back-of-the
envelope calculations and generic obsolescence models.
The simple case: we consider the revenues per day generated by the satellite to be constant over
its design lifetime-no ramp-up/fill rate, market volatility, or obsolescence issues taken into
account. The numbers, based on simple calculations using satellite operator's Income Statement,
average transponder lease ($M/year), average number of transponders per satellite and utilization
rate typically vary between $50,000 and $100,000 per day:
u1 (t) = u0 (15)
Technology obsolescence case: In the second case, we consider the impact of the technology
obsolescence on the spacecraft revenue model. We assume a model exists that relates component
obsolescence to system's obsolescence, and that a time scale of obsolescence affects the system's
revenues as follows:
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u(t) = u xex - - ] (16)
Tobs
The reader is referred to Ref. 7 and 9 for a more elaborate discussion of this model's rationale,
assumptions, and limitations. Time to obsolescence can be modeled in the simple case as a
deterministic variable, or more appropriately as a random variable with a lognormal probability
density function:9
[ ((1 7)
a : Standard deviation
m : median
r : Waiting time or shift parameter
Figure 5.5 illustrates the lognormal density function as well as the cumulative density function of
the Time to Obsolescence for a typical microprocessor.
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Figure 5.5: Cumulative distribution function i  and probability density function of the Time to
Obsolescence for a microprocessor (m=1.5 years, a = 0.8 years, = 0.5 years).
5.3.3.3. Operations cost and discount rate
The last two models or parameters needed in order to demonstrate the existence or not of an
optimal design lifetime consists are estimates of the cost to operate and maintain the system 0 (t),
and the risk-adjusted discount rate that the company may wish to use for its investment in the
system, r.
In the case of spacecraft, mission operations are described in detail in Ref. 10. The cost per year
to operate a satellite typically varies between 5% and 15% of the spacecraft cost to IOC. In our
analysis, we consider the cost of operations 0 (t), to be constant and equal to 10% of C(Tbf) and
perform our sensitivity analysis around this value. The assumption of a constant cost of
operations over the spacecraft design lifetime can be easily amended to incorporate different cost
profiles for operations as a function of the mission phase (e.g., e.g., operations during the launch
and deployment phase may require more personnel, hence be more expensive than operations
after the spacecraft has been delivered to orbit and tested to full functionality). This assumption
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however has little effect on our results, and bears no consequences on our conceptual findings as
we will show in the following.
We use a discount rate, r, of 10%-this is a commonly used figure and a few percent points above
the risk-free rate of return-and perform a sensitivity analysis around this value.
5.3.4.Illustrative results
Using the models and assumptions discussed previously, we can now explore the solution
to Eq.10, namely whether an optimal design lifetime exists for a satellite-as seen from a
customer's perspective-that maximizes the expected present value of a system as a function of its
design lifetime, V(TL¢,f). The results are shown on Fig. 5.6 and 5.7.
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Figure 5.6: Expected present value of a satellite as a function of its design lifetime V(TLy,)
assuming constant revenues per day over its design lifetime.
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Figure 5.7: Expected present value of a satellite as a function of its design lifetime, assuming
revenues per day affected by system's obsolescence (Eq. 16). Optimal design lifetime
deceases as the expected Time to Obsolescence decrease.
Several observations can be made:
1. Given our assumptions, an optimal design lifetime exists that maximizes the expected
present value of a satellite as a function of its design lifetime V(TL). In other words,
even if it is technically feasible to design a spacecraft for an extended lifetime, it is not
necessarily in the best interest of the customer to ask the contractor to provide a
spacecraft designed for the maximum achievable lifetime. This result, i.e., the existence
of an optimal design lifetime, disproves the implications of Eq. 13 that the customer is
always better off requesting the contractor to provide a spacecraft designed for the
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maximum achievable lifetime. We recall that this latter conclusion was reached by
considering only cost factors, namely the monotonic decrease of the cost-per-operational
day metric as a function of the design lifetime (see Figure 5.4).
2. The optimal design lifetime increases as the expected revenues per day increase (e.g.
from 14 to 21 years as the revenues increase from $50k/day to $90k/day). In other words,
the more revenues customers expect to generate from a system, the longer they would
want the system to remain operational. This of course is an intuitive result; Eq. 10 and
Fig. 5.6 provide a quantitative basis for it.
3. In Fig. 5.7, we note that the optimal design lifetime deceases (from 8 to 3.5 years) as the
expected system's Time to Obsolescence decreases (from 15 to 5 years). In other words,
the sooner customers expect a system to become obsolete, the shorter they should require
its design lifetime to be. While this result is intuitive, Eq. 10 and 16 provide a
quantitative justification for it.
Caveat and limitations: The above results DO NOT prove the existence of optimal design
lifetimes for complex engineering systems. They merely illustrate the fact that, under certain
assumptions, satellites have optimal design lifetimes that maximize a value metric. Caution and -
given the complexity of the task and analyses needed-humility are required before extrapolating
these results beyond their domain of applicability. The results however do show the importance
of undertaking the engineering, market, and financial analyses we described above as their
integration (Eq. 10) can significantly impact the choice for the design lifetime of the system the
customer is contemplating acquiring. More generally, our results show that intuition is not
necessarily a good guide in selecting or specifying a complex engineering system design lifetime,
and that customers are not always better off requesting the contractor to provide a system with a
maximum lifetime technically achievable.
In another work, we explored the impact of the probabilistic case of Time to Obsolescence, as
well as the market volatility. The results show that the less the customers know about the
dynamic characteristics of the system's underlying technology base as well as its market, i.e., the
larger the standard deviation of the expected Time to Obsolescence as well as the market
volatility, the shorter customers should require their system or investment design lifetime to be
(staging the design lifetime); however, the more valuable it becomes to contract options for the
system's life extension, upgrade or modification. It is worth noting that our findings are in accord
with a fundamental lesson from finance and the real option approach: namely that there is
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increasing value in breaking up large projects in uncertain markets or staging investments in
volatile environments:" the analysis of a spacecraft cost profile as a function of its design
lifetime, C(TLIf), and Fig. 5.2, show a direct mapping between investment and design lifetime.
The background and analytics for these results are beyond the scope of this paper; the reader is
referred to Ref 7 and 12 for a more comprehensive discussion.
5.3.5. Sensitivity analysis
We now perturb the assumptions underlying the analyses discussed previously and explore the
impact on the optimal design lifetime. Four models or parameters affect the solution of Eq. 10,
namely the system's expected revenue model u(t), its cost profile C(TLf), the discount rate r, and
the cost per year to operate and maintain the system 0 (t).
Our nominal case is the following:
un(t) = $70,000/day
r = 10%
0(t) = 10% of C(TLife)
C,,(TLf,) = $200 million designed for 15 years with an average slope of 4%/year
The results of the sensitivity analysis are displayed in Fig. 5.8. The plot reads as follows: a 10%
increase in the satellite expected revenues for instance, results in an 8.4% increase in the optimal
design lifetime. Conversely, a 10% increase in the investment discount rate results in a 7.9%
decrease in the spacecraft optimal design lifetime.
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Figure 5.8: Sensitivity analysis of the optimal design lifetime to variations in underlying
models and assumptions.
Given our assumptions and the nominal case considered, we find that the "location" of the
optimal design lifetime is most sensitive to the expected revenues of the satellite over its design
lifetime u(t), as well as the investment discount rate, r. Equally important is the spacecraft cost
profile C(Tif,) and how it scales with Tife. Of minor importance however is the impact of the cost
of operations 0 (t) on the optimal design lifetime. These results, while illustrative, indicate where
potential customers should invest resources and conduct careful modeling before selecting a
design lifetime for their system, and where they can make do with limited accuracy of their
models: of prime importance are the market analyses and forecast of the system's expected
revenue model, as well as financial analysis of the investment riskiness. Equally important are the
engineering and cost estimate analyses of the system's cost profile. Of lesser importance to the
selection of the design lifetime is the technical analysis and estimate of the cost to operate and
maintain the system.
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5.4. Are Satellite Manufacturers Driving Themselves Out of Business by Designing for
Increasingly Longer Lifetime?
The discussion about optimal design lifetimes in the previous sections was conducted from a
customer-centric perspective. What about the manufacturers? More generally, what about the
entire industry value-chain? How are all the players involved in the manufacturing, fielding, and
operation of a complex engineering system affected by the system's design lifetime? Satellites for
example are the lifeblood of the space industry and it is only fitting to ask how does increasing or
decreasing their design lifetime affect the manufacturers, the launch services, and the operators?
The results in this section are preliminary; they will be developed further in a forthcoming paper.
We chose nevertheless to share them because they make a strong case for the spacecraft design
lifetime as a powerful yet overlooked lever that can significantly impact the entire space
enterprise value chain.
5. 4. 1.Adapting Augustine's "First Law of Impending Doom " to the commercial space
sector
Norman Augustine, former Chairman and CEO of Lockheed Martin, half-jokingly calculated that
the cost of a tactical fighters quadrupling every 10 years, by 2054, the entire defense budget
would be able to purchase just one aircraft! We contend there is somewhat similar dynamics in
the commercial space sector, a geometric increase in satellite capability that will herald the
"Second law of impending doom" of the commercial space sector. What are these dynamics and
what is the "Second law of impending doom"?
Over the past ten years, communications satellites have continued to grow in terms of size,
power, and design lifetime. The average number of transponders (36 MHz transponder
equivalent) for example has increased from 26 in 1992 to 48 in 2002. The increase in power and
design lifetime is shown in Table 5.3. We also include in the table the Compounded Annual
Growth Rate (CAGR) over the 10-year period.
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Table 5.3: Trend in GEO satellite size, power, and design lifetime
(Data Source: Futron Corporation)
1992 2002 CAGR (1992-2002)
Average number of 36 MHz
26 48 6.3%
transponder equivalent (TE)
Average power level 2.2 7.6 13.2%
Average design lifetime 8 14 5.8%
The increase in number of transponders on-board a spacecraft, along with enhanced data
compression techniques and increase in design lifetime have contributed to make satellites ever
more powerful. According to the Futron Corporation, "the average satellite of today is
approximately 900% more capable than the average satellite launched in 1990. In other words,
the average satellite launched today is doing the equivalent work of 9 average satellites launched
in 1990."'3 Assuming this trend will maintain its momentum, we can state our "Second law of
impending doom" of the commercial space sector:
The capability of a communications satellite doubling every 4 years, the entire demand for
satellite services and bandwidth in 2021 will be satisfied by just one satellite!
5. 4.2. The space sector financial scorecard
There is a large discrepancy in the financial health and performance of the different players in the
space industry value chain. We only consider in this section the satellite manufacturers, launch
services, and satellite operators; equipment manufacturers, end users, insurance companies,
regulatory agencies and others who play a role in the space industry value chain are not discussed
here.
There is a myriad of metrics to describe the financial performance and outlook for a company or
an industry; we choose for this section a reduced financial scorecard with two measures: the
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sector's revenue growth over the past five years as well as its operating profitability or EBITDA
margin. These two measures provide a good indication of the sector's past financial performance,
as well as its financial attractiveness, outlook, and valuation.
Space sector revenue growth
CAGR (1997 - 2002)
19%
3%
-5%
Space sector operating profitability
EBITDA margins (2001 - 2002)
3% - 6%
I · ~~~!
3% - 6%
F777ZI
Satellite .Lauch
manufacturers .services
70% - 80%
WI~,.:
Figure 5.9: Financial scorecard for the key players in the space sector
(Data sources: Futron Corporation, IDATE, annual reports).
The results are shown in Fig. 5.9. They merely confirm what is already known in the industry,
namely that:
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Satellites are "cash-cows" for the operators! Satellites operators are posting excellent profitability
compared to any other economic sector. In fact the EBITDA margins we found show little
variation and have been hovering over the past 5 years between 70% and 80% (e.g., AsiaSat,
EutelSat, IntelSat, PanAmSat, SES Global)
The combined effect of several factors has decreased the demand for GEO satellites, and
dramatically limited the growth potential as well as the profitability of satellite manufacturers and
launch services. Among those factors, first and foremost, there is the substantial overcapacity in
satellite manufacturing and launch services. This overcapacity is driving a heightened
competition among manufacturers, putting downward pressure on prices and allowing operators
to set aggressive terms and conditions for procurement. All these effects results in the very small
margin we see in Fig. 5.9. The relatively flat demand for GEO communications satellites results
from another set of factors: on the one hand, there is no, or not yet, a "killer app" that will
revitalize the market and spur demand for new satellites that can provide broadband access and
compete with cable and DSL. On the other hand, there is the fact that manufacturers are designing
spacecraft ever more capable, with increased number of transponders, enhanced data compression
techniques and extended design lifetime, thus limiting the need for additional spacecraft (see the
"Second law of impending doom" of the commercial space sector discussed above).
Figure 9 also suggests that the current industry structure is not sustainable, and that we will likely
witness consolidation, vertical integration, and/or business unit divestiture in the near future. In a
forthcoming publication, we discuss the emergence of a new space industry structure, and the
possibility of a duopoly in the world satellite manufacturing business.
5.4.3. Design lifetime impact on thefbrecastfor satellite orders
The satellite is the lifeblood of the space industry. Unfortunately, unlike other industries that can
generate additional revenues, and higher profits, from service contracts in addition to the sale of
their systems, e.g., jet engines, satellite manufacturers do not have this option given the particular
feature of GEO satellites of being physically inaccessible for maintenance or upgrade. On-orbit
servicing remains to date a stalled idea of limited practicality; Ref. 12 provides a comprehensive
discussion of this subject matter. We therefore are left with the number of satellites ordered as a
defining metric of the industry's financial performance and health.
How does changing the design lifetime affect the demand for communications satellites going
forward? In order to answer this question, the global demand for telecommunication services
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(telephony, video, data) must first be estimated. Second, terrestrial competition must be assessed
as well as the demand that can be captured by terrestrial networks. We are then left with the
demand for satellite bandwidth, which can be translated into demand for actual satellites given
the inputs of satellite size (number of transponders), utilization rate, and design lifetime. There
are numerous financial analysts' reports, as well as consulting companies that provide the data for
the first and second step discussed above. We have relied in this section on the forecast for
satellite bandwidth over the period of 2004 to 2012 provided by the Futron Corporation; using a
design lifetime of 15 years, a utilization rate of 60% to 80%, and an average of fifty 36 Mhz
Transponder-Equivalents, Futron forecasts a dramatic decline in the demand for communications
satellites. The company estimates there will be a need for barely 8 to 15 commercial GEO
satellites for the next several years. We have relied on Futron's estimate for satellite bandwidth,
and used the current average satellite utilization rate (60%) and number of Transponder-
Equivalents (48). However, we varied the design lifetime between 5 and 15 years. Our results are
shown in Fig. 5.10.
Figure 5.10: Impact of the design lifetime lever on the total demand for communications
satellite over the period 2004 - 2012. The nominal design lifetime is set 15 years.
The results show for instance that, should manufacturers set the design lifetime of their
communications satellites to 9 years instead of 15 years, there would be a 25% increase in the
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demand for communications satellites over the next several years (2004 to 2012), compared to
demand resulting for a design lifetime set at 15 years.
Though preliminary, these results show nevertheless that a spacecraft design lifetime is a
powerful, yet overlooked lever that can significantly impact the market size for commercial
communications satellites. In addition, it is likely that these results will affect the financials of the
key players in the space sector, and can result in a redistribution of growth and margins, other
than the one displayed in Fig. 5.9. We explore these issues in a forthcoming paper.
5.5. Summary and Conclusion
We set up to explore the engineering and economic issues at stake for reducing or extending a
complex system's design lifetime, using spacecraft as example. In the first section of this paper,
we came to recognize that when exploring these issues, or when asking whether there is an
optimal design lifetime for complex engineering systems, it is necessary to first specify from
which stakeholder's perspective the analysis is carried out as the interests and trade-offs can be
substantially different. We then synthesized and discussed the different qualitative implications
associated with reducing versus extending a product's durability or a system's design lifetime, as
seen from the perspective of three stakeholders, namely the customer, the manufacturer, and
society. The purpose of this qualitative discussion was to illustrate the complexity of the choice in
reducing or extending a system's design lifetime-not to take a position for reducing or extending
this requirement-and to lay the ground for the quantitative discussion that followed. Following
the qualitative discussion, we asked whether there is an optimal design lifetime for complex
engineering systems, as seen from the customer's perspective. In order to answer this question,
we first made the case for a mindset change regarding system's design and architecture: we
discussed the need on the one hand to view in a system the flow of service (or utility) that it will
provide over its design lifetime, and on the other hand, to introduce metrics per unit time such as
cost, utility and value as functions of time. Second, optimality presupposes a metric that is
minimized or maximized; we therefore proposed Eq. (1) as a means for capturing the present
value of a system as a function of its design lifetime. After discussing the quantitative analyses
required in order to answer the design lifetime optimality question, we show that, under certain
assumptions, satellites do have optimal design lifetimes that maximize the value metric we
introduced. Theses result disproves the traditional implicit assumption that satellite operators are
always better off requesting the manufacturer to provide a spacecraft designed for the maximum
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technically achievable lifetime. Caution, however, and-given the complexity of the task and
analyses needed-humility are required before extrapolating these results beyond their domain of
applicability and generalizing them to other complex engineering systems. The results
nevertheless demonstrate the importance of undertaking the engineering, market, and financial
analyses we described in this paper, and illustrate using spacecraft as example, as their integration
can significantly impact the choice for the design lifetime of the system the customer is
contemplating acquiring. In the last section, we ask provocatively if satellites manufacturers are
driving themselves out of business by designing for increasingly longer lifetime? We review the
trends in GEO communications satellites in terms of power, number of transponders, and design
lifetime and conclude half-jokingly, that should these trends maintain their momentum, the entire
demand for satellite services and bandwidth in 2021 will be satisfied by just one satellite; we
called this result the "Second Law of impending doom" of the commercial space sector, in
deference to Augustine's "First law of impending doom" regarding the rising cost of tactical
fighters and the ability of the DoD to purchase just one aircraft in 2054! More seriously, we
showed that the design lifetime is a powerful, yet overlooked lever that can significantly impact
the market size for commercial communications satellites as well as the financials of the key
players in the space sector.
Our main claim in this paper is that issues pertaining to the selection and specification of
a an engineering system design lifetime are much more complex-and interesting-than those
related to a simple product's durability; and that these issues beg careful consideration and
require much more attention than what they have received so far in the literature as the impact of
a system's design lifetime is substantial and can ripple throughout an entire industry value chain.
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Chatptter 6
Utilization Rates of
GEO Communication Satellites
Statistical analysis of loading dynamics
Joseph H. Saleht, Juan-Pablo Torres-Padilla t , Edward Morgan §, Ray Sperber**
Satellites have been rightfully described as the lifeblood of the space industry, and the number of
satellites ordered per year is to a large extent the defining metric of the industry's level of
activity. Similarly, the case can be made that a key metric for the commercial space
communication sector is the utilization rate, or load factor, of a satellite or a fleet of satellites. For
this paper, we collected and analyzed load factor data of twenty one communication satellites
launched between 1980 and late 1990s. We conducted time series analysis and built statistical
models for the evolution of utilization rates, or loading dynamics, of a communication satellite
that broadly address three questions: First, how fast does a satellite get "filled up" after it has
been launched? Second, does a satellite load factor reach a steady-state level? Third, if a steady-
state load factor is reached, does it remain at that level or does it decline (when and how fast if
so) as the satellite ages? We found consistent results that exhibit three different loading patterns:
these patterns are consistent within groups of satellites launched in the early 1980s, in the late
1980s, and in the mid 1990s (load factor ramp-up in three to four years; a steady-state load factor
between 80% and 100%; and a decline in load factor after five to seven years on-orbit for
satellites launched in the mid 1990s). We further discuss these results and the factors that drive
satellite loading dynamics, from the supply/demand (im)balance of on-orbit bandwidth over the
This chapter is based on a paper accepted for presentation at the AIAA Space 2005 Conference. This
work was done in collaboration with the co-authors above referenced.
t Executive Director, Ford-MIT Alliance.
Graduate student, Technology and Policy Program.
§ President. Communications Center. Clarksburg, MD 20871.
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last two decades to customer chum from aging transponders and switching towards newer more
powerful and reliable units. Results should prove useful to satellite operators and industry
observers; they also inform the estimation and specification of financially optimal satellite design
lifetimes.
Nomenclature
AT(t) = Number of added transponders during year t.
DT_ global = Global demand for transponders.
f(.) = Probability density function.
L(t, i) = Load factor of satellite i at time t. Also known as the utilization rate or
fill rate.
L(t) = Instantaneous average load factor of L(t, i).
LBOL = Beginning-of-life average load factor of L(t, i).
LEOL = End-of-life average load factor of L(t, i).
(L)g=lobal Average load factor of the entire GEO fleet of communications satellite
at any given year.
(L)opetor = Average load factor for the fleet of satellites of a given satellite operator
at any given year.
W(L)region Average load factor of all satellites serving a given geographical region,
e.g., North America, at any given year.
nTx_ave(t, i) = Number of active transponders on-board satellite i at time t.
N total(i- = Total number of transponders on-board satellite i.
(OC)global = Global overcapacity of satellite transponders.
r(t) = Range of load factors (min-max values difference) at time t.
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ro = Initial range or dispersion of load factors.
RTx(t) = Number of retired transponders during year t.
STx_globaI = Global supply of transponders.
Tohs = Time to obsolescence.
a = Exponential coefficient in the range model.
ADX (t) = Incremental demand for transponders during year t.
ASTx (t) = Incremental supply of transponders during year t. ASTx (t) = A (t) - RT (t) .
o(t) = Standard deviation of L(t, i).
-r = Exponential fill time constant.
6.1. Introduction and problem statement
On October 4, 1957, a small beeping satellite, Sputnik, heralded the beginning of the Space Age.
From this humble start, the space industry grew into an impressive $100 billion industry four
decades later. Space technology today pervades many aspects of our daily lives with services
ranging from video distribution for TV and cable networks, to telephony and data
communications, and to Earth monitoring and meteorological services (not to mention the less
publicly visible military applications of reconnaissance of electronic surveillance). The
commercial space industry unfortunately hit turbulence around the year 2000; its growth potential
and financial attractiveness were revised downwards, especially after the collapse of the Low
Earth Orbit (LEO) communications systems, which led many companies and investors to revise
their commitment to this industry. In 2002 for example, only six communications satellites were
ordered, thus severely straining the satellite manufacturers operations. The number of satellites
ordered per year has increased since then, and is expected to range between eight and fifteen for
the rest of the decade'. Satellites have been rightfully described as the lifeblood of the entire
space industry (satellite manufacturers, launch system providers, satellite operators, equipment
providers and space insurance), and the number of satellites ordered per year is to a large extent
the defining metric of the industry's level of activity, at least upstream of the space industry value
chain (e.g., for the satellite manufacturers and equipment providers).
Another equally important and defining metric downstream in the space industry value chain
(e.g., for the satellite operators) is the utilization rate, or load factor, of a satellite or a fleet of
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satellites. Simply put, a high utilization rate suggests that the demand for on-orbit capacity may
not yet be fully satisfied, and the market can absorb additional capacity (hence new satellites will
be ordered). Conversely, a low utilization rate suggests that there might be over-capacity in the
market, and investment in additional capacity is better put on hold until the market conditions are
carefully investigated (or the satellite operator fully loads its on-orbit assets before investing in
new ones).
In this study, we set out to explore the loading dynamics of GEO communications satellites. This
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents different average load factors of
communications satellites, and discusses them as measures of supply and demand (im)balance of
on-orbit transponders. Three average load factors are considered: first, the global average load
factor of the entire fleet of GEO satellites,(L)o,bW; second, the regional load factor of GEO
satellites serving specific geographic regions, (L)regio,n for example North America, Western
Europe, or Asia Pacific; and third, the average load factor of specific satellite operators (L) rat 
The discussions in this second section of this paper were supported by data that is either available
publicly or reported in the specialized press. Following the "static" analyses of load factors in
Section 2, we turn our attention in the third and fourth sections of this paper to the loading
dynamics-not averages but evolution over time of the load factor-of a satellite after it has been
launched. We identified a sample of twenty-one communications satellites over North America,
launched between 1980 and 1997, and collected their yearly load factor from the time of their
launch until their retirement. To the best knowledge of the authors, this is the first time such time
series data of satellite load factors has been collected, analyzed, and presented to the technical
community. The data we collected allowed us to answer three questions. First, how fast does a
satellite get "filled up" after it has been launched? Second, does a satellite load factor reach a
steady-state level? Third, if a steady-state load factor is reached, does it remain at that level or
does it decline (when and how fast if so) as the satellite ages? We found some interesting loading
patterns that we report and analyze in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes with the summary
and implications of this work.
6.2. Satellite load factor and fleet average load factors
The load factor of a communications satellite, also known as its utilization rate or fill rate, is
defined as the ratio of the number of transponders active or leased at a given time to the total
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number of transponders on-board the spacecraft. For a given spacecraft i, its load factor at time t
is given by Eq. 1:
L(t, i) nTx-active(t, i) (1)
NTr _ total (i)
Equation I represents the "instantaneous" load factor of one specific satellite. This measure of the
utilization of a satellite payload is rarely available publicly. Instead, the specialized press often
reports "average" load factors, for example the "average" load factor for the entire GEO fleet of
communications satellites every year. Figure 1 illustrates this global average, (L)global. There are
however different ways of averaging load factors. For example, an average can be calculated for
all the satellites serving a given geographical region, e.g., North America or Western Europe,
(L)egi as seen in Fig. 5.2. Another average load factor can be calculated for the entire fleet of
satellites of a given satellite operator, (L)oe,tor as seen in Figure 3. It is important to note the
difference between these average load factors and the "instantaneous" load factor for one specific
satellite given in Eq. 1, the analysis of the latter being the novel contribution in this paper.
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Figure 6.1: Average load factor of the entire fleet of GEO communications satellites,
(L)global Adapted from Ref. 2.
Average load factors are important metrics in the commercial satellite communications world.
They represent a measure of the supply/demand imbalance of on-orbit transponders, globally or
regionally, and reflect to some extent how well satellite operators are managing their on-orbit
assets, as we will discuss shortly.
Global load factor: Figure 6.1 shows a steady decline in the average load factor of the entire
GEO fleet of communications satellites, (L)globa, from 79% in 2000 to 70% in 2003. In 2003,
there was globally a total of 7,585 transponders available on-orbit2 . We refer to this as the global
supply of transponders, STx-global. An average global load factor of 70% (69.85%) indicates that
out of the 7,585 transponders available, there were in effect 5,299 transponders in use in 2003.
We refer to this number as the global demand for transponders in 2003, DT global. The number of
unused transponders in 2003 was therefore 2,286. This represents a significant unused on-orbit
capacity. Equation 2 relates the global supply and demand of transponders to the global average
load factor:
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79%
(L) RlobaI = DTX global (2)
STx_ global
Figure 6.1 also shows a significant drop in global load factor, (L)global, between 2001 and 2002
from 77% to 71%. This is due to three colluding factors: 1) a significant number of new
transponders were launched in 2002 (over 1,000 transponders), 2) few were retired resulting in a
net add of 745 transponders in 2002 (compared to 103 net add in 2001), and 3) the demand for
additional transponders in 2002 grew at a very slow rate of 2.9%.2 More generally, we can relate
the global load factor from one year to another by considering the incremental demand for
transponders during that year ADT(t), and the added and retired transponders during that year
ATX(t) -RT(t), as shown in Eq. 3 (the subscript global is omitted from Eq. 3 for readability
purposes but should be assumed for all the variables):
(L( + 1)) DTx(t + 1) . DTx(t) + ADTx (t) ALt)) x DTX1-) ASTx(t) (3)
ST, (t + 1) ST()+[AT (t)-RT (t)] DT ) STx (t)
We define the global overcapacity, (OC)globa, as the percentage of unused transponders from the
global supply of on-orbit transponders (Eq. 4):
S - _(OC) fbi= xgflobal 1- (L)g1obal (4)
Tx _ global
It should be noted that some industry observers consider 20% or less of unused transponders a
useful margin to have for reliability purposes (e.g., back-up), and to accommodate occasional
leases of satellite capacity for unplanned events2 . While this distinction between unused
transponders and overcapacity is pertinent, it can be argued that 20% unused transponders when
the global supply is over 7,000 transponders (instead of say a few hundred transponders) is
excessive and does constitute "overcapacity". Changes in global transponder supply, demand,
overcapacity, and load factors between 2000 and 2003 are summarized in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1: Global supply, demand, and overcapacity in satellite transponders
(Data source: Euroconsult2).
2000 2003
Global supply of Tx, STxglobal 6,409 7,585
Global demand for Tx,
5,072 5,299
DTx _ global
Global load factor, (L)global 79% 70%
Un-used Tx 1,337 2,286
Overcapacity, (OC)globa 21% 30%
Regional load factor: Communications satellites are launched into specific orbital slots and
designed to serve specific geographical regions. Regions in turn have different supply/demand
characteristics that are not reflected in the global average load factor (L)g 1 . This finer level of
detail is instead captured in the regional load factor, calculated for all satellites serving a given
geographical region (L)rio n. Figure 6.2 represents this metric for North America, Western
Europe, Central and East Europe, and the Asia Pacific region. We see for example that the
supply/demand imbalance is significantly higher in Central Europe with a load factor of 56% (or
conversely an overcapacity of 44%*) than in Northern America where the average load factor is
76% (or 24% overcapacity). Increased overcapacity, along with industry structure and
competitive intensity, translates into increased downward pressure on transponders lease prices.
For example, the average lease price of a transponder in North America in 2003 averaged $1.2
million/year, whereas in Central and Eastern Europe, transponder lease price averaged $0.9
million/year 2.
* Or 44% - 20% = 24% based on the definition of overcapacity used in Ref. 2.
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Figure 6.2: Average load factor in 2003 by region (Data source: Euroconsult2).
Operator load factor: A third "average" load factor can be calculated for the fleet of satellites of
a given satellite operator, (L)operator . This metric reflects to some extent how well a particular
satellite operator is managing its on-orbit assets. Figure 6.3 shows the load factors of four major
satellite operators. Eutelsat for example had 77% of its on-orbit capacity leased in 2003, whereas
Intelsat had only 61% of its on-orbit capacity utilized during that year (from a total of 1,845
transponders) 2. This low utilization rate represents a sizeable opportunity loss for Intelsat: a
simple calculation shows that, at an average lease price of $1.4 million/year, should ntelast
improve its management and operation of its on-orbit assets to the level of Eutelsat (77%), it
could generate an additional $400 million per year. This is a significant revenue increase for a
company that generates approximately a billion dollars a year. Figure 6.3 also shows the
contributions of Video and Voice and Data services to the utilization of satellite fleet of each of
the four satellite operators we considered. Video is clearly seen as a major contributor to satellite
utilization (approximately 50% for three major satellite operators) except for Intelsat, which for
historical reasons, being an Inter-Governmental Organization until 2001, had limited strategic
flexibility in deciding its service mix of voice and video.
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Figure 6.3: Average load factor of four major satellite operators, and contributions of Video
and Voice and Data services to the utilization of their satellite fleet
(Data source: Euroconsult2 ).
6.3. Satellite loading dynamics following launch: data collection and methodology
In the previous section, we discussed different average load factors for communications satellites,
(L)globat (L) regio,n' (L)operator' from data that is either available publicly or reported in the
specialized press. In this section, we are interested in gaining insights into the loading dynamics-
not averages but evolution over time of the load factor-of a single satellite i, after it has been
launched, L(t, i). A satellite load factor, L(t, i), can be modeled as a stochastic process or a
random function of time. A stochastic process is simply an indexed family of random variables in
which the index corresponds to time3 (in other words, for every specific time to, L(to, i) is a
random variable). We therefore posit that L(t, i) follows some random probability distribution and
can be analyzed statistically. The reader may be familiar with "time series": when the time index
of a stochastic process takes only discrete values, the stochastic process is called a time series.
Figure 6.4 shows the different averages that can be computed for a stochastic process.
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Figure 6.4: Modeling satellite load factor as a stochastic process L(t, i).
In order to conduct our statistical analysis of L(t, i), we first needed to obtain load factor data of a
number of satellites from the time of their launch until their retirement. This information is
understandably proprietary and satellite operators are not necessarily eager to publicly share such
data, which can be used to target marketing or sales efforts.
To circumvent this difficulty, we teamed with Communications Center, a company that has been
tracking and measuring North American transponder usage and supply using their own earth
stations of spectrum analyzers in conjunction with a variety of video and audio receivers. The
reader is referred to Ref. 4 for a thorough discussion of the data collection methodology. We
identified a sample of twenty-one communications satellites over North America, launched
between 1980 and 1997, and collected their yearly load factor from the time of their launch until
their retirement. To the best knowledge of the authors, this is the first time such time series data
of satellite load factor is collected, analyzed, and presented to the technical community.
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An initial display of the raw data collected did not reveal any interesting pattern. However, when
we segmented our sample into three categories defined by the launch period of the satellite: early
1980s, late 1980s, and mid 1990s, and initialized the time axis to the year of launch, we found
some very interesting patterns in the load factor time series L(t, i). These are discussed in the
following section.
6.4. Statistical analyses of satellite load factor
Of the twenty-one satellites for which we tracked the transponder usage throughout their design
lifetime, eight were launched in the early 1980s, seven were launched in the late 1980s, and six
were launched in the mid 1990s.
6.4.1.Loadfactors of satellites launched in the learly 1980s
Figure 6.5 shows the load factor raw data for the first group of satellites launched in the early
1980s. The time axis for all the satellites was initialized to the year of launch.
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Figure 6.5: Load factor raw data for 8 satellites in our sample that were launched in the
early 1980s
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The data shows that a satellite load factor increases after it has been launched, as new customers
are acquired and additional transponders are leased. The load factor ramp-up reaches steady state
within three to five years. Interestingly, we find that some capacity on-board a satellite is already
pre-booked (before the satellite is launched) and the initial average load factor is not 0% (it is in
fact 35% for the sample in Fig. 6.5). This observation makes business sense and operators ideally
should strive to book the entire satellite capacity as soon as or before the spacecraft reaches orbit;
failure to do so can be interpreted as an opportunity loss for the operator of the satellite (i.e., an
asset or the communications payload in our case is available to generate revenue but it is not put
to work).
The "instantaneous" average load factor (see Fig. 6.4) is the average at every time step of all the
satellite load factors in our sample. It is calculated as follows:
n
L(t) = L(t, i) (5)
i-l
Based on the previous observations, we propose to model the instantaneous average load factor of
a communications satellite L(t) as a function of time with three parameters or degrees of
freedom: an initial beginning-of-life average load factor LBOL at t = 0, a steady-state end-of-life
average load factor, LEOL, and an exponential fill process with a time constant . Equation 6
represents our model structure. Results of the regression analysis using this model are given in
Table 6.2.
L(t) = LBOL + (LL E -LBOL )X 1-eT (6)
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Table 6.2: Average load factor model parameters for satellites launched in the early 1980s
Model parameter Value
Beginning-of-life average load factor,
35%
LBOL
End-of-life average load factor, LEOL 95%
Exponential fill time constant r 2.5 years
R2 0.95
In addition to the instantaneous average load factor, L(t), the data collected allows us to model
the envelope or range within which the satellites load factors fall for every time step after launch,
as we discuss below. Figure 6.6 shows: 1) the envelope (minimum and maximum values) of the
load factor for the satellites in our sample, 2) the observed instantaneous average load factor, and
3) the modeled instantaneous average load factor as given by Eq. 6 and Table 6.2.
We observe for example on Fig. 6.6 an initial large dispersion of load factors right after launch
(LBOL varies from 0% to 67%, and has an average of 35%). This may reflect how aggressive a
satellite operator has been in pre-booking capacity on-board its satellite before launch: a satellite
with an initial load factor of 0% suggests the satellite operator has either delayed or not been
successful in its sales and marketing effort before its on-orbit asset was launched and became
operational. On the other hand, a communications satellite with a high initial load factor suggests
either that the operator has been aggressive and successful in its sales efforts prior to the launch
of the spacecraft, or that the spacecraft is in fact a "replacement satellite" taking over capacity
from another satellite that has reached the end of its service life. This latter hypothesis will be
further discussed later.
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Figure 6.6: Load factor (average, min-max, and regression analysis) for 8 satellites in our
sample that were launched in the early 1980s
We also observe on Fig. 6.6 that the dispersion of the load factor at every time step narrows down
with time and reaches almost a steady state within four years. The range, or difference between
the minimum and maximum values, in the load factors for satellites launched in the early 1980s is
represented in Fig. 6.7.
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Figure 6.7: Dispersion or range of load factors (min-max difference) for satellites launched
in the early 1980s.
We propose to model this range r(t) with a decreasing exponential function of time. Equation 7
represents our model structure (also shown in Fig. 6.7).
r(t) = ro x e- axt (7)
Results of the regression analysis using this model are given in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Model parameters for the range of load factors (Eq. 7) for satellites launched in
the early 1980s.
Model parameter Value
Initial range, ro 79%
Exponential coefficient, a 0.23
R2 0.71
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For simplification, we assume that the range is symmetrical with respect to the sample mean. By
doing so, we make an average error of 18% on the minimum and maximum values of the load
factors at each time step for the satellites in our sample (alternatively we could provide a
parametric model for the minimum or maximum values of the load factor).
Finally, although the data we collected is insufficient to confirm the following (our sample space
is too small to prove the following statistical inference), we hypothesize that the load factor
L(t, i) is normally distributed, i.e., it has a Gaussian probability density function at each time step,
and that the dispersion of load factors we observed in Fig. 6.6 and 6.7 represent 95% of all
possible measurements. In other words, we assume that the range r(t) represents four standard
deviationsf, o(t), of our assumed random vector L(t, i). The Gaussian distribution we consider for
L(t, i) is truncated and confined to the values of L between 0% and 100%. We translate this
hypothesis mathematically as follows (the values of the parameters are summarized in Table 6.4):
Ia(t x_ _t_ 2[a(t)]2 f[L(t)]-- () x Exp _(t)] 2
L(t)= LBOL +(LiEoL -LBOL) X I-e 
O(t) = r(t) = ro x e-a x
4 4
for 0% < L 100%
(8)
Table 6.4: Summary of the model parameters for the load factor
Model parameter Value
Beginning-of-life average load factor,
35%
LBOL
End-of-life average load factor, LOL 95%
Exponential fill time constant r 2.5 years
Initial range, ro
Exponential coefficient, a
r (Eq. 8)
79%
0.23 years-'
# For a normally distributed random variable x, 95.4% of all measurements fall within the mean plus or
minus two standard deviations (a - 2x)
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6.4.2.Loadfactors of satellites launched in the late 1980s
We now turn to our attention to the second group of satellites in our sample. These satellites were
launched in the late 1980s. As mentioned previously, we tracked transponder usage of twenty-one
satellites throughout their design lifetime: eight of these were launched in the early 1980s, seven
were launched in the late 1980s, and six were launched in the mid 1990s.
Figure 6.8 shows: 1) the envelope (minimum and maximum values) of the load factor for the
satellites in this second group of our sample, 2) the observed instantaneous average load factor,
and 3) the modeled instantaneous average load factor as given by Eq. 9.
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Figure 6.8: Load factor (average, min-max, and regression analysis) for 7 satellites in our
sample that were launched in the late 1980s
The fundamental difference in the loading dynamics between the satellites in our sample that
were launched in the early 1980s (previous subsection) and those launched in the late 1980s is the
absence of a ramp-up phase in the latter, as seen in comparing Fig 6.6 and Fig 6.8. In other words,
the sampled satellites that were launched in the late 1980s start with an initially high load factor
(LBOL = 95%) and their load factor remains relatively constant through their design lifetime
( LBOL = LEOL); whereas the sampled satellites that were launched in the early 1980s start with a
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lower load factor (LBOL = 35%), then exhibit a fill process and take between three to five years
before their load factor reaches a steady-state (Fig. 6.6).
Two reasons can explain this difference in the loading 'dynamics between these two groups of
satellites in our sample: 1) by the late 1980s, satellite operators had determined from their past
experience how to aggressively pre-book capacity on-board their satellites before launch and
realized the quantifiable financial advantages of doing so, or 2) most satellites launched in the late
1980s are simply "replacement satellites" taking over capacity from other satellites that are
considerably loaded but have reached the end of their service life. If the retiring and replacement
satellites have identical capacity, then the beginning-of-life load factor of the replacement
satellite will be equal to the end-of-life load factor of the retiring satellite. Otherwise, if the two
satellites' capacities differ, we will observe a discontinuity in the LEOL of the retiring satellite and
the LBOL of the replacement satellite.
We propose to model the instantaneous average load factor of the satellites in our sample that
were launched in the late 1980s (Fig. 6.8) as a constant. Also, for simplification, we assume that
the range or dispersion of L(t, i) around the mean L, is symmetrical with respect to the sample
mean. By doing so, we make an average error of 8% on the minimum values of the load factors at
each time step for this second group of satellites our sample. Mathematically, we write this trivial
model as follows:
L(t) = LBOL = 95%
(9)
r(t) = rO = 5%
6.4.3. Loadfactors of satellites launched in the mid 1990s
We now turn our attention to the third and last group of satellites in our sample. This group
consists of six satellites launched in the mid 1990s. Figure 6.9 shows: 1) the envelope (minimum
and maximum values) of the load factor for the satellites in this third group of our sample, 2) the
observed instantaneous average load factor, and 3) the modeled instantaneous average load factor
as given by Eq. 10.
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Figure 6.9: Load factor (average, min-max, and regression analysis) for 7 satellites in our
sample that were launched in the mid 1990s
We first observe on Fig. 6.9 that satellites launched in the mid 990s in our sample start with an
initially high load factor (LBOL = 95%), just as we saw previously on Fig. 6.8 for the satellites
launched in the late 1980s. The same previous interpretation or explanation applies, namely that
this reflects either the fact that these satellites are replacement satellites, or that satellite operators
are now routinely pre-booking most of the capacity on-board their satellites before their launch.
Figure 6.9 shows however one striking difference with all previous load factor dynamics, namely
that satellites exhibit a decrease in their load factor after five to seven years of operations. This
observation will be of significant importance if it is a common loading pattern to all
communications satellites launched over the last decade. We discuss the implications of this
observation in the Conclusion. Unfortunately, given the small size of our sample and some of the
problems with the data that we have (for example one satellite in our sample failed after 7 years
of operations, which we can see on Fig. 6.9, and thus significantly distorted the averages), we
cannot confirm this loading pattern. We can instead hypothesize that if this loading pattern is
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confirmed, it may correspond to end-users of satellite capacity turning away from "aging"
transponders and switching towards newer more powerful and reliable units. This hypothesis is
plausible given that there has recently been an increasing over-supply of transponders (on-orbit
capacity is becoming increasingly commoditized), and end-users have significantly more choice
and market power than in the past to "shop around" for newer, better, and cheaper transponders.
We propose to model the instantaneous average load factor of the satellites in our sample that
were launched in the mid 1990s (Fig. 6.9) as a decreasing function of time with two parameters or
degrees of freedom: an initial beginning-of-life average load factor LBOL, and a Time to
obsolescence, T,,s, as shown in our model structure in Eq. 10.
L(t) = LBoL x e (10)
Such model structure is often used to model the sales of a component as it goes through its
life-cycle phases of maturity, saturation, then decline and phase-out. The reader is referred to Ref.
5 and 6 for a more elaborate discussion of this model's rationale and assumptions. Parameters of
the regression analysis using this model are given in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5: Model parameters for the average load factor (Eq. 10) of satellites launched in
the mid 1990s.
Model parameter Value
Beginning-of-life average load factor,
95%
LBOL
Time to obsolescence, Tobs 12 years
R2 0.84
The range of the data we collected for the load factors of satellites launched in the mid 1990s
(before the one satellite failure occurred as seen on Fig. 6.9) falls within plus or minus 15% of
instantaneous average load factor model given in Eq. 10 and Table 6.5. Unfortunately, the quality
of the data for this group of satellites does not warrant that we further model this range as we did
with the two previous groups of satellites in our sample.
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6. 4.4. Summary of satellite loading dynamics: four archetypes
Based on our previous discussion and data analyses, we propose four archetypes for satellite
loading dynamics. These archetypes are classified based on two dimensions: the type of capacity
launched, whether it's a new or replacement satellite; and the market conditions, whether the
market is supply-constrained (i.e., the demand can absorb any capacity that is provided) or
whether there is over-capacity in the market. These four archetypes are represented in Fig. 6.10.
Satellite loading archetypes
Replacement
capacity*
New capacity
I \ i \ I
LIL X~ L
10
C
tI t I
Early to late 1980s Mid 1990s
Supply-constrained market Over-capacity in the market
* Or satellite operators with significant experience to pre-book most of the capacity on board their satellites before launch
Figure 6.10: Satellite loading dynamics: four archetypes classified across two dimensions,
type of capacity launched, and supply/demand (im)balance in the market.
Archetype A: This archetype or satellite loading pattern corresponds to what we observed with
the first group of satellites in our sample (Fig. 6.5 and 6.6), namely an initial ramp-up phase of
the load factor followed by a steady-state phase that remains throughout the operational life of the
satellite. The satellite load factor increases after launch as new customers are acquired an
additional transponders are leased. The steady-state phase is maintained throughout the
operational life of the satellite, as the demand for on-orbit capacity remains unmet (supply-
constrained market).
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Archetype B: This archetype corresponds to what we observed with the second group of
satellites in our sample (Fig. 6.8), namely a relatively constant load factor throughout the
operational life of the satellite (absence of a ramp-up phase). Satellites that exhibit such loading
dynamics are replacement satellites taking over capacity from other satellites that are
considerably booked but have reached the end of their service life.
Archetype C: This archetype corresponds to what we observed with the third group of satellites
in our sample (Fig. 6.9), namely a steady-state phase with a relatively high beginning-of-life load
factor (again with an absence of a ramp-up phase as with archetype B), followed by a decline
phase or a decrease in the load after several years of operations. This loading pattern is proposed
for replacement satellites that are launched to serve a market that is over-supplied with on-orbit
capacity, and customers can turn away from "aging" transponders and switch towards newer
more powerful and reliable units.
Archetype D: Although we did not observe this loading pattern in our data, we can hypothesize
the existence of such loading dynamics for a "new" satellite (i.e., not a replacement satellite) that
is launched to serve a market over-supplied with on-orbit capacity. This archetype therefore has
an initial ramp-up phase, a steady-state phase, and a decline phase.
6.5. Conclusion
In this paper, we set out to explore the loading dynamics of GEO communications
satellites. We began by presenting different average load factors of communications satellites,
and considered them as measures of supply and demand (im)balance of on-orbit transponders. We
first discussed the global average load factor of the entire fleet of GEO satellites, (L)globl; second,
since different regions have different supply/demand characteristics of on-orbit capacity (that are
not reflected in the global average load factor), we discussed average load factors for satellites
serving specific regions, (L)rgion, for example North America, Western Europe, or Asia Pacific;
and third, we discussed satellite operator load factors, (L)pe and suggested that this measure
reflects to some extent how well these operators are managing their on-orbit assets. These
discussions were supported by data that is either available publicly or reported in the specialized
press.
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Following these "static" analyses of load factors, we turned our attention to the loading
dynamics-not averages but evolution over time of the load factor-of a satellite after it has been
launched. We identified a sample of twenty-one communications satellites over North America,
launched between 1980 and 1997, and collected their yearly load factor from the time of their
launch until their retirement. To the best knowledge of the authors, this is the first time such time
series data of satellite load factor has been collected, analyzed, and presented to the technical
community. The data we collected allowed us to answer three questions. First, how fast does a
satellite get "filled up" after it has been launched? Second, does a satellite load factor reach a
steady-state level? Third, if a steady-state load factor is reached, does it remain at that level or
does it decline (when and how fast if so) as the satellite ages? We found and modeled three
different loading patterns that are consistent within groups of satellites launched in the early
1980s, in the late 1980s, and in the mid 1990s (load factor ramp-up in three to four years; a
steady-state load factor between 80% and 100%; and a decline in load factor after five to seven
years on-orbit for satellites launched in the mid 1990s). Based on these findings, we proposed
four archetypes or loading dynamics patterns that we classified based on two dimensions: the type
of capacity launched, whether it is a new or replacement satellite (the load factor of a replacement
satellite exhibits no initial ramp-up phase); and the market conditions, whether the market is
supply-constrained or whether there is over-capacity in the market (the loading dynamics of a
satellite in a market with over-capacity exhibit a decline phase or a decrease in the load after
several years of operations). This loading pattern with a decline phase is proposed for satellites
that are launched to serve a market that is over-supplied with on-orbit capacity, and customers
can turn away from "aging" transponders and switch towards newer more powerful, reliable, and
cheaper units.
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Ch 1tpter 7
Conclusions and
Recommendations for Future Work
7.1. Summary and Contributions
This thesis revolves in general around engineering, economics, and policy issues in the satellite
services industry. In particular, this work analyzes the dual character (competing/complementary)
of space-based communications versus terrestrial networks, as well as the current policy and
regulatory environments of the industry. In addition, economics and engineering analyses are
blended in a holistic approach providing valuable insights into the industry's performance and the
impact that technical parameters (such as a spacecraft design lifetime) might have on the whole
industry value-chain.
This work is divided in two parts. The first part begins by discussing the background of the
communications satellite industry, its value-chain, service applications, history and evolution, and
then explores two questions of significant importance to the survival and sustained growth of this
industry: 1) are satellite communications solutions competing or complementary alternatives to
terrestrial networks-in what context and for what service applications? And 2) what are the
characteristics of the regulatory and policy environments and how do they affect the satellite
communications industry?
Establishing a sound framework and setting coherent definitions constitutes a significant
contribution. Chapter 2 started by summarizing the evolution of the satellite communications
industry and introduced the key definitions of satellite services used by the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU). Then, a snapshot of the current financial state of the satellite
services industry was presented. The first contribution of this thesis was the identification and
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classification of the different types of service applications delivered by communication satellites
(transmission of voice, data, and video). Finally, the key facts and figures of some of the most
important satellite operators were presented at the end of the chapter.
The central question of the first part of this thesis was addressed in Chapter 3: Are terrestrial
networks a competing or a complementary alternative to satellite solutions, in what context and
for what service applications? The chapter started with what is one of the conceptual
contributions of this thesis: the development of a framework designed to analyze the tradeoffs
associated with satellite and terrestrial telecommunication technologies. This framework was
structured around three axes: type of solution (satellite versus terrestrial networks), service
application (voice and data, and video), and geographic market (urban versus rural areas, and
emerging versus developed regions). The most important advantages of satellite technologies
over terrestrial networks were explored: coverage, multiple access, distribution and flexibility.
The current challenges and opportunities for satellite operators in urban and rural areas were also
investigated. In conclusion, the case was made that: a) Satellite solutions have important
competitive advantages when it comes to transmit voice and data in rural markets as well as in
urban areas in emerging countries (where terrestrial networks have not been deployed and their
deployment would be less financially and technically attractive than employing space-based
solutions) b) Amongst the video service applications, the DTH TV represents the most dynamic
market with the highest potential of growth for satellite operators. Other video service
applications such as contribution and feed of cable TV head-ends should prove to be a stable
market for satellite service providers. On the other hand, the author of this thesis believes that
satellite operators should forge partnerships with some of their competing telecommunication
services providers (i.e., DSL and cable operators), in order to exploit the dual character
(competing/complementary) of telecommunication technologies. Lastly, Chapter 3 finished with
an overview of what could be a disruptive technology: the WiMAX, which might considerably
impact the satellite services industry in the near future.
Chapter 4 provided an overview of the regulatory environment for satellite operators. Two of the
most important regulatory issues for satellite operators were discussed, namely spectrum/orbit
allocation and space environmental pollution. As new satellite service applications (such as DTH
TV) have been developed, regulatory bodies have allocated high radio frequencies (Ka-band) to
be used by DBS operators (different than those frequencies allocated to FSS operators). In
practice, however, with continual behind-the scenes maneuvering by both terrestrial and satellite
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services providers as well as by other stakeholders in the industry, frequency allocations are not
always respected. Chapter 4 also identified a need of global regulations about spacecraft disposal
in a way such that operators have to propel unused satellites to orbits far from the geostationary
orbit. This is likely to have negative financial implications for satellite operators. An important
claim of Chapter 4 is that there is a critical need to enforce space debris regulations. The
geostationary orbit must be recognized as a precious real-state resource that is likely to become
useless should a spacecraft collision occur in the GEO ring. Such an incident might have
extremely negative consequences for the development of telecommunication services on Earth.
Chapter 4 also described the space communications policy of the United States and Europe. In the
United States, as a result of the deregulation of the industry started in 1972 with the "Open Skies"
policy, the regulatory environment for satellite operators is probably one of the most flexible in
the world. Different policies (such as the "orbital spacing" decision) have been implemented to
promote competition and the development of the industry with minimal regulations. On the other
hand, in regard to space-based communications policy, the European Union (EU) is only an
emerging system, and there is still no European organization serving as one common authority
over space-based communications issues. In addition, analysts suggest the necessity to further
ease the current regulatory environment in order to promote competition among satellite
operators. From a broader perspective, the EU has implemented a strategy to expand the
European share in fast-growing markets where space-based services are fundamental. However,
more international cooperation is desirable. Cooperation in regulatory issues should result in a
more sound and healthy satellite communications industry, as well as in a more beneficial U.S. -
Europe relationship in general. It was argued that in fact, the evolving nature of the U.S. - EU
aerospace-related interactions has become part of the set of major factors that influence the
geopolitical dynamics and the structure of international relations.
While market and policy issues play a central role in shaping the structure of the satellite services
industry, economic and engineering considerations can provide decisive insights that might
significantly alter the dynamics of the sector. The second part of this thesis focuses on the
lifeblood of the satellite industry: the satellite itself (as opposed to the industry-context explored
in Part I). In particular, part II explores issues associated with satellite design lifetime.
Chapter 5 explored the engineering and economic issues at stake for reducing or extending a
complex system's design lifetime, using spacecraft as example. Firstly, it was argued that the
interests of the different stakeholders that are involved are not necessarily aligned. Secondly, the
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qualitative implications associated with reducing versus extending a product's durability (or a
system's design lifetime) were discussed. Following the qualitative discussion, quantitative
analyses was presented in order to determine whether an optimal design lifetime for complex
engineering systems (from the customer's perspective) exists. In order to answer this question,
two new concepts were introduced: the need on the one hand to view in a system the flow of
service (or utility) that it will provide over its design lifetime, and on the other hand, to introduce
metrics per unit time such as cost, utility and value as functions of time. Optimality presupposes a
metric that is minimized or maximized; a metric was therefore proposed in order to capture the
present value of a system as a function of its design lifetime. It was then shown that, under certain
assumptions, satellites do have optimal design lifetimes that maximize a value metric. Theses
results disprove the traditional implicit assumption that satellite operators are always better off
acquiring spacecrafts designed for the maximum technically achievable lifetime. The results
demonstrate the importance of undertaking the engineering, market, and financial analyses
described in this chapter. Finally, a provocative question was raised: are satellites manufacturers
driving themselves out of business by designing for increasingly longer lifetime? It was shown
that design lifetime might be a powerful lever that can significantly impact the market size for
commercial communications satellites as well as the financials of the key players in the space
sector. The main claim of this chapter is that a) issues pertaining to the specification of a system's
design lifetime are much more complex than those related to a simple product's durability; and
that b) these issues require much more attention than what they have received so far in the
literature, as the impact of a system's design lifetime can ripple throughout an entire industry
value chain.
Chapter 6 analyzed the loading dynamics of GEO communications satellites. Different average
load factors of communications satellites were presented, and considered them as measures of
supply and demand (im)balance of on-orbit transponders. Specifically, three types of average load
factors were discussed: global average load factor of the entire fleet of GEO satellites, average
load factors for satellites serving specific regions, and satellite operator load factors. The attention
was then turned to the loading dynamics-not averages but evolution over time of the load factor-
of a satellite after it has been launched. A sample of twenty-one communications satellites over
North America (launched between 1980 and 1997) was identified. Yearly load factor data, from
the time of their launch until their retirement, was collected. To the best knowledge of the author,
this is the first time such time series data of satellite load factor has been collected, analyzed, and
presented to the technical community. The collected data provided insights on three questions:
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1) How fast does a satellite get "filled up" after it has been launched? 2) Does a satellite load
factor reach a steady-state level? 3) If a steady-state load factor is reached, does it remain at that
level or does it decline as the satellite ages? Three different loading patterns were founded and
modeled: load factor ramp-up in three to four years; a steady-state load factor between 80% and
100%; and a decline in load factor after five to seven years on-orbit. These patterns are consistent
within groups of satellites launched in the early 1980s, in the late 1980s, and in the mid 1990s,
respectively. Based on these findings, four archetypes or loading dynamics patterns were
proposed, that can be classified using two dimensions: a) the type of capacity launched (whether
it is a new or replacement satellite); and b) the market conditions (whether the market is supply-
constrained or whether there is over-capacity in the market).
In sum, the main findings of this thesis are: 1) in Chapter 3, a conceptual contribution was the
development of a framework designed to analyze the tradeoffs associated with satellite and
terrestrial telecommunication technologies, specifically, this framework should prove useful to
organize the discussion on the dual character of satellite and terrestrial networks (complementary
versus competing technologies); 2) the case was made that: a) satellite solutions have important
competitive advantages when it comes to transmit voice and data in rural markets as well as in
urban areas in emerging countries, and that b) amongst the video service applications, the DTH
TV represents the most dynamic market with the highest potential of growth for satellite
operators; 3) in Chapter 4, a critical need to enforce space debris regulations was identified; and
4) the case was made that more international cooperation in regulatory issues is desirable; 5) in
Chapter 5, the case was made that: a) issues pertaining to the specification of a system's design
lifetime are much more complex than those related to a simple product's durability; and that b)
these issues require much more attention than what they have received so far in the literature; 6) it
was shown that under certain assumptions, satellites do have optimal design lifetimes that
maximize a value metric, disproving the traditional implicit assumption that satellite operators are
always better off with spacecrafts designed for the maximum technically achievable lifetime; 7) it
was shown that design lifetime might be a powerful lever whose lifetime can ripple throughout an
entire industry value chain; 8) in Chapter 6, time series data of satellite load factor were collected,
analyzed, and presented to the technical community.
Asides from the specific contributions per chapter, a fundamental contribution of this thesis is the
broad perspective that it introduces. In the academic and business literature, one can find various
reports and studies on different topics related to the satellite communications industry. However,
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to the best knowledge of the author, this is the first time that the members of the commercial
space sector are presented with a comprehensive analysis of the structure and the dynamics of the
satellite operators industry, including the market outlook, the policy and regulatory environments,
engineering considerations, and economic issues faced by major stakeholders in the sector. The
second major contribution of this thesis is the multidisciplinary approach that is proposes. It is
divided in two parts combining engineering, economics, industry analysis and policy in a way
that identifies insights beyond the reach of any one isolated discipline.
7.2. Recommendations for future work
One of my mentors once said that a good thesis raises more questions than it answers. I have
chosen not to break with tradition, and I have identified two major questions (one for each part of
the thesis) that would be interesting to address in future work.
7.2.1. On market issues:
In future work for part one, on market issues, it should prove useful to the satellite services
industry to explore the structure that could be used by satellite operators to partner with
competitors (i.e., terrestrial telecommunication services providers) in order to meet customer
demands and to deliver complete solutions to the customers (instead of only providing
transmission services). As a result of the increasing complexity of customer needs and demands,
new partnerships models among telecommunication service providers have emerged since 2004.
Satellite operators should, in the opinion of the author, become solution providers, not services
providers. They need a strategy that clearly identifies where a satellite solution provider wants to
add value across the value chain. One solution could be to integrate products and services while
conserving and increasing consumer loyalty. The development of a strategy to forge these
partnerships in order to provide complete solutions to customers, while preserving the
distinctiveness of the satellite services and the advantages of space-based communications,
should prove to be an interesting challenge. The author proposes a three-axis framework as a
starting point to explore the different possible partnership schemes, the consequences and the
dynamics that these partnerships would create in the telecommunications industry, as well as the
trade-offs associated to this proposal. The first axis would include the type of technologies
available for delivering telecommunication services. The second axis would consider the type of
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service provider, and finally the third element would evaluate the different types of services to be
delivered. Figure 7.1 shows a graphic representation of this framework.
Available technologies
Fiber-to-the-home
DSL
Coaxial cable
Wii-AAl
.Satellites
Video
Data (other than internet)
Internet
Voice
Bundl/
i
Telcos Cable
operators
Service delivered
Figure 7.1: Graphic representation of the framework proposed to analyze the possible
partnership structures amongst telecommunication service providers.
7.2.2. On economic and engineering issues:
For part two, on economic issues related to the analysis of utilization rates of GEO
communication satellites, it would be interesting to integrate transponder lease price with the
loading dynamics models that were developed in this chapter, in order to develop satellite
revenue or utility models. While satellite cost models are pervasive throughout the aerospace
industry, revenue models or utility models for satellites are quasi-inexistent. The absence of
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Satellite
operators
Type of provider
quantitative revenue models (in the case of commercial systems) or utility models (in the case of
scientific or military systems) makes it difficult to build the case for such systems to policy-
makers or decision-makers, especially in the light of their exorbitant costs. Furthermore, the
specification and selection of a system design lifetime, or of a system life extension (e.g., Hubble
Space Telescope) will always have weak arguments fraught with subjectivity in the absence of
quantitative revenue or utility models.
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App endix A
Global trends in communication satellites capacity
This appendix presents a brief description of recent trends in communication satellites capacity.
Important changes in the types of capacity and services implemented in the satellite services
industry have recently taken place in the United States. These transformations have been
observed mainly in three areas:'
* The proportion of FSS versus broadcast capacity and services;
* The proportion of capacity in different frequency bands available and in use; and
* The transition of video transmissions from analog to digital.
These trends became apparent in 2004. They are:
=> From a 15 percent of total capacity in the United States in 2002, direct broadcast services
capacity represented over 30 percent in 2004, and some forecast analyses by Futron
Corporation2 suggest that it will represent nearly 60 percent in 2010.
= In 2002 C-band and Ku-band capacity was split almost evenly (50% each); Ka-band capacity
in 2004 accounted for 20%, and the same previously mentioned forecast analyses3 suggest
that the C- and Ku-bands together will represent less than fifty percent of overall capacity by
2010.
= In 2002, 52% of the FSS video capacity over the United States was occupied by analog
television broadcasts. In 2004 this number decreased to 40%, and if this trend continues, the
proportion of satellite capacity carrying digital channels will be around 90% by 2010.
Satellites have continued to grow in size, in terms of bandwidth launched, over the last fifteen
years.4 The general trend has been around one 36 MHz transponder equivalent per year. In 2003
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and 2004, however, a significant decline in this trend was observed. The excess supply of on-orbit
capacity experiences in recent years, which lead to declines in transponder lease prices, may
explain the lack of orders of high-capacity satellites. It is more economical for satellite operators
to reconfigure the excess capacity they have on orbit in order to satisfy current demand than to
launch more satellites.
While this may explain some short-term drivers for the decline in satellite size, other
could affect the longer-term trend. The satellites expected to be launched in 2006 include
DBS satellites with fewer and smaller transponders, but much higher-powered.
drivers
several
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